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Abstract 
 
 
Increased literary attention and debate has been directed at business turnaround in recent years; albeit 
DV)XUPDQ	0F*DKDQSVXJJHVWµGHVSLWHWKHLUFHQWUDOLW\OLWWOHLVVWLOONQRZQDERXWWKHLU
SUHYDOHQFHRUWUDMHFWRU\¶. This case study departs from most other turnaround research by addressing 
the global Aerospace and Defence sector; of which has remained unexplored until this point. 
Specifically, it looks to ascertain µhow new top management enact successful turnaround¶ and 
consequently, µwhat characteristics inform these actions?¶ Using a cross-case analysis, the studied 
firms of  BAE Systems, Boeing and VT Group were observed to predominantly  deploy resources 
toward strategic orientations, hence comprising the basis for achieving successful turnaround.  
Furthermore, executives¶ human capital- exemplified within their generic skills combined with long 
and short term approaches; were found significant in informing choices of strategic orientations which 
precipitated successful turnaround. It is acknowledged that the study¶s was limitations were derived 
from its small sample size and moreover, the cyclical complexity of the industry. However, this is 
tempered by the fact that emphasis on growth industries, application of the RBV and the merging of 
turnaround research with top management characteristics; provides a basis from which hopefully, more 
robust and conclusive research is stimulated. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Performance declines are natural experiences within firm evolution; however, the severity of these can 
be exacerbated to the extent that companies fail. What is more, this process is increasingly catalysed in 
contemporary business environments which are characterized by rapidly advancing technological 
change, erosion of trade barriers, volatility of capital markets, shifting economies and importantly, 
greater competition. Consequently, positions that argue businesses are constrained to a limited number 
of generic options as famously prescribed by Porter (1980), suggest that recovery from performance 
decline is increasingly unmanageable amongst these unforgiving competitive environments. 
Subsequently, the global economic downturn precipitating a number of corporate declines prevalent 
ZLWKLQ WKH ¶V GURYH WKH DFDGHPLF SXUVXLW RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ KRZ VRPH ILUPV UHFRYHU IURP
declining positions. Hence, increased literary attention and debate has been directed at business 
turnaround in recent years; alEHLW DV )XUPDQ 	 0F*DKDQ  S VXJJHVW µGHVSLWH WKHLU
FHQWUDOLW\ OLWWOHLVVWLOONQRZQDERXW WKHLUSUHYDOHQFHRUWUDMHFWRU\¶5HJDUGOHVV WKHSULPDU\UDWLRQDOH
for greater interest is to elucidate the critical components which coalesce to produce this rare 
phenomenon. One such component is the incidence of top management change, which corresponding 
to modern developments in corporate governance; has become increasingly applied as an effective 
internal control mechanism amongst poorly performing firms. In turn, executive succession has 
received prominent advocacy, albeit contentious empirical support amongst the current turnaround 
literature. Herein, this paper aims to explore this relationship further in order to illuminate the patterns 
and strategy applied by new top management in order to successful enact turnaround.  
 
Within the bank of literature pertaining to turnarounds, most studies have been focused in 
manufacturing and financial sectors, or those declining in munificence; notably the textile industry. 
My study departs from this by addressing this subject area in the global Aerospace and Defence sector; 
of which has remained unexplored until this point . The paucity of literature on turnarounds within 
growth industries further affords me greater insights as firm decline cannot be attributed to market 
10 
 
WUHQGV DQG KHQFH VKRXOG SURYLGH QRYHO GLVWLQFWLRQV EHWZHHQ LQFXPEHQW WRS PDQDJHPHQW¶V
XQVXFFHVVIXO VWUDWHJLHV DQG WKH UHSODFLQJ PDQDJHPHQW¶V VXFFHVVIXO DSSURDFKHV WRZDUGV VWLPXODWLQJ
turnarounds. As such, selection of cases for critical study was informed by previous categorisations of 
turnarounds deployed within existing literature; recognised generically as an extended period of 
decline followed by a sustained period of improved performance. Furthermore, turnaround had to 
coincide with incidences of executive succession of whom evidently led the recovery process. 
Specifically, performance indicating decline and recovery was measured against Return on Capital 
Employed (ROCE); aligned to a number of prominent turnaround studies of which favoured 
profitability ratios over less reliable measures such as stock price or operating profit. 
 
The global Aerospace and Defence industry has exhibited consistent growth over the last decade, 
reflected in global military spending rising 4% in 2008 to a record $1,464 billion; up 45% since 1999. 
In turn,  industry growth is attributed to rapidly rising demand for air transport, aggressive global 
consolidation, increased defence spending and new market opportunities from Asia driving down costs. 
Correspondingly, reactions  to 9/11  and on the back of strong macro-economic performance; leading 
industry incumbents have enjoyed accelerated production and bulging order-books. Moreover, the 
sector is gradually becoming a key component of the economic structure of the most powerful nations 
in the world due to its crucial relevance within foreign policy and its capability to provide 
technological improvements. Thereby and set within this environment; pressure for growth, 
profitability and delivery of shareholder value are magnified to far greater extents. Herein, this makes 
the incidence of corporate turnaround supplemented by top management change all the more 
interesting and significant as initially; it suggests no company is immune from decline. But moreover, 
it emphasises the importance in competency of top management; by virtue of the fact that companies 
can still suffer from firm-based decline even amongst favourable external conditions. In exploring 
these circumstances, my study addresses the primary question: 
 
- µHow do new top management enact successful turnarounds?¶ 
 
Inferences drawn from this can be compounded by answering this further question: 
 
- µThus, what CEO characteristics inform the actions exhibited by new top management to enact 
successful turnarounds?¶ 
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Moreover, my study will serve to infer whether existing models of turnaround proliferated within the 
literature, can be applied to a growth industry, in the same way that they were drawn from incidences 
within industries declining in munificence. Answering theses fundamental questions will provide novel 
and unique conclusions insofar as my study initially is the first to address the global Aerospace and 
Defence industry. This is assisted by the sector being a growth industry of which has received scant 
attention to date within the turnaround literature. Specifically, Pandit (2000) corroborates how my 
study is distinct as there is little theoretical analysis which combines investigations into turnarounds 
ZLWKWKHµResource-Based-View. Similarly, my analysis departs from other theoretical models applied 
LQ SUHYLRXV UHVHDUFK E\  LQWHJUDWLQJ $GQHU 	 +HOIDW¶V  µ'\QDPLF 0DQDJHULDO &DSDELOLWLHV¶
framework; to delineate the enduring characteristics which augment top PDQDJHPHQW¶V WXUQDURXQG
efforts. The merging of turnaround literature with these two models serves to better illuminate the 
strategies, competencies and skills that top managers employ when enacting turnaround, of which 
previously has been subsumed  as one component of many to recovery. The closest paper examining 
WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWRSPDQDJHPHQWFKDQJHDQGWXUQDURXQGLVVSHFLILFDOO\%DUNHUHWDO¶V
study of levels of top management team replacement. This extends beyond their research by 
investigating how and what new top management do to achieve successful turnarounds. 
 
This dissertation thus seeks to establish how new top management enact successful turnarounds and 
correspondingly, what characteristics inform their efforts towards recovery. Chapter 2 draws upon the 
existent literary theory and arguments rooting the central debates which have developed within 
turnaround literature. The dominant portion of the literature explores the existent literary theory 
pertaining to turnarounds and top management change. Following on, I address the theoretical base 
underlying the Resource-Based-View and Dynamic Managerial Capabilities. The aim of this section is 
to recognise the different views and theories of Academics and Practitioners, and analyse their merits in a 
critical manner. From this grounding, Chapter 3 departs towards a methodological emphasis; presenting the 
approach adopted in this study, including my rationale and justification deployed toward the research. This 
precedes a review of prominent literary methodologies in defining turnaround and reasoning 
supporting my choice of industry, specific cases and the sources utilised to draw the necessary data. 
Subsequently, Chapter 4 begins by initially detailing the dynamics and development within the 
Aerospace and Defence industry over the past few decades. After which, the individual case studies 
are delineated, exploring the events and top management influences which combined to achieve 
successful turnaround. Chapter 5 presents a discussion across the cases of the various aspects 
12 
 
contributing to how new top management enact turnaround. This integrates the prominent themes 
introduced in Chapter 2 and applies them toward the three case studies elucidated in Chapter 4, serving 
to reveal a number of key insights. This is achieved using the method of cross case analysis, selecting 
categories of analysis and then finding group similarities coupled with group differences. Finally, 
critical inferences and insights drawn from the discussion are brought together in Chapter 6, and 
applied here to answering the research questions; whilst additionally addressing the limitations of the 
study and any further research recommendations 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The function of the literature review herein is to allow me to explore the existent theoretical base 
underpinning corporate turnaround. Furthermore, this is supported by the inclusion of prominent 
theories of Top Management Change, the Resource-Based View (RBV), Dynamic Managerial 
Capabilities. In turn, this will serve to inform the insights which I draw from the case analysis and thus, 
help illuminate the significance of top management change upon turnaround situations. To this end, 
my study will serve to either substantiate the literature or subsume it as just theoretical. 
 
2.2 Corporate Turnaround 
³5DLVHSULFHVORZHUFRVWV)LQGRXWZKDW¶VSURILWDEOHDQGZKDW¶VQRW'RPRUHRIWKHIRUPHUDQGOHVV
RIWKHODWWHU´ R. H Waterman 
Unfortunately, the above formula for successful turnaround strategy is hardly indicative of the 
complexity of the achievement. In fact, the topic of turnarounds remains largely idiosyncratic and open 
ended; hence it is fitting that the literature is confusing and uneven due to overwhelming emphasis on 
the content of turnaround rather than the actual process of subsequent recovery or decline (Chowdhury, 
2002) A critical view of existing theory and research characterised by fragmentation and pluralism; 
demonstrates how incomplete our understanding of the phenomenon actually is and thus, leaves no 
enduring dominant model for successful corporate turnaround. A significant conclusion drawn from 
DWWHPSWV WR HVWDEOLVK WKH HPSLULFDO LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH RFFXUUHQFH LV WKDW µRI WKRVH ILUPV VXIIHULQJ
significant and/or sustained declining performance, a greater number proceed to fail rather than 
UHFRYHU¶ (Pandit, 2000, p.33). Bibeault (1982) found only 33% of firms experienced turnarounds and 
therefore 67% failed to recover. Hambrick and Schecter (1983) corroborate a similar incidence of 
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failure in finding only a 20% successful recovery rate. This is not only testament to the difficulty of the 
process, but further the rarity of the abilities necessary to achieve recovery.  
 
 
2.3 Turnaround Studies 
Multivariate definitions of turnaround exist, being suggestive of the lack of consensus within the area. 
*ULQ\HUHW DO  UHIHUV WR WKHPDV µ6KDUSEHQGHUV¶ZKHUHE\FRPSDQLHV WKDWKDYHEHHQ LQ UHODWLYH
decline with regard to their industry and have managed a process of sharp and sustained recovery. 
More generally, turnarounds are often associated with perseverance following an existence-threatening 
decline  through the use of strategies, systems, skills and capabilities to achieve growth and sustainable 
performance recovery (Pandit, 2000; Chowdhury, 2002). Thus, firms are sustaining resource losses 
that will cause the firm to fail if unabated (Arogyaswamy et al, 1995).  
 
Specifically, the current body of work investigating turnaround success has been bifurcated into two 
distinct categories: content and process. The first group of studies focuses primarily on identifying the 
content RI VXFFHVVIXO WXUQDURXQG VWUDWHJLHV HJ ILUPV¶SROLFLHVRUPDQDJHPHQW DFWLRQV WDNHQ RIWHQ
comparing strategies taken by firms that were successful in turning around e.g. Hambrick & Schecter 
(1983); Hofer (1980); Thietart (1988). Embedded in industrial economics tradition, the content 
approach explains turnarounds in terms of statistical relationships among dependent variables (e.g. 
performance) and independent variables. It represents static descriptions of a set of turnaround 
strategies to explain variations in performance outcomes, or to explain the influence of certain 
contextual factors on the degree of turnaround success. Emphasis on turnaround content is to some 
extent understandable as the appropriate techniques are well developed and the required data (usually 
secondary and published) are easy to obtain and measure. Proliferation of studies rooted in this 
approach is wide, albeit Chowdhury (2002, p.250) argues this is misleading; DV LW µIDLOV WR UHYHDO
complex interrelationships among explanatory variables, therefore it cannot accurately show the level 
RIWXUQDURXQGVXFFHVVREWDLQHG¶ 
 
The process category of studies have reported analyses of the turnaround processes or the process of 
responding to performance-induced crisis. Process studies have tried to explain the distinct stages a 
declining firm goes through in the process of responding to decline or achieving turnaround (Bibeault, 
15 
 
1982; Robbins & Pearce, 1993). They are a narration of how a sequence of events unfolds  to cause a 
dependent variable to respond to an independent variable (Arogyaswamy et al, 1995) Influences of 
executive succession and top management team change upon turnaround often are included in many of 
these studies; and are analysed over a period of time, hence providing more dynamic analysis 
compared to content-based studies. Hereby, my study adopts a process approach by examining how 
executive succession impacts turnaround performance and success. 
 
 
2.4 Retrenchment: An Indispensable Response to Decline? 
Robbins & Pearce (1992) propose there is growing evidence to suggest that a basic set of activities are 
prevalent among successful turnaround firms. Correspondingly, focus upon retrenchment in 
turnaround process study has become so pervasive that much of recent empirical research on 
turnarounds has consisted of tests of the value of retrenchment to turnaround.  
$QDORJRXV WR WKH QXPHURXV GHILQLWLRQV RI WXUQDURXQGV µ5HWUHQFKPHQW¶ WRR LV GHILQHG GLIIHUHQWO\
within most studies. Importantly, they all concur upon the principles of asset and cost reduction as 
PDQDJHPHQW¶VILUVWDQGLQLWLDOVWHSWRLQLWLDWHWXUQDURXQGRUILUVWVWUDWHJ\LPSOHPHQWHGZKHQDILUPLV
in financial distress (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Based upon the proposition that declining firms often 
VXIIHUFDVKIORZRXWIORZVµDVVHWDQGFRVWVXUJHU\LVWKHUHIRUHTXLFNO\QHHGHGWRVWRSEOHHGLQJEHIRUH
WKH ILUP IDLOV¶ 6ODWWHU  S Specifically, cost/asset reduction strategies are imperative to 
improve efficiency and margin by reducing direct costs and slimming overheads in line with volume 
(Slatter, 1984).  
 
2.4.1 Literary Support 
Albeit empirical evidence supporting retrenchment is equivocal; large sample studies from Hambrick 
& Schecter (1983), Ramanujam (1984), and Robbins & Pearce (1992)  comparing turnaround and non-
WXUQDURXQGILUPV¶VWUDWHJLHVKDYHIRXQG WKDW UHWUHQFKPHQWEDVHGHIILFLHQF\-oriented) strategies were 
the route to profit recovery (ArogyaswDP\ HW DO  =LPPHUPDQ¶V  VWXG\ of turnaround 
cases in the agriculture and automotive industries correspondingly found that those companies which 
were able to implement a successful turnaround exhibited much better performance as low-cost 
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producers than the unsuccessful companies. Successful firms exhibited far better performance on the 
traditional measures that reflect more efficient manufacturing, characterised in retrenchment. 
Significantly, successful companies stayed with their cost reductions programs longer until costs were 
PRUHFRPIRUWDEO\EHORZWKHFXUUHQW UHYHQXH OHYHOV8QVXFFHVVIXOFRPSDQLHVZHUHPRUH µLQFOLQHG WR
SHUPLWH[SHQVHVWRVWDELOL]HRULQFUHDVHZKHQSURILWVZHUHVWLOOYHU\ORZRUHYHQQHJDWLYH¶SDQG
pursue acquisitions, divestitures or mergers. The ability of successful firms to remain efficient in the 
manufacture of products was the cornerstone of the turnaround success. Herein, this implies that 
sustained retrenchment efforts are critical to achieving turnaround, and not reverting back to sporadic 
spending and growth strategies too early is equally important. 
Within their study of textiles, Robbins and Pearce (1992) found that cost retrenchment was so 
pervasive as to be considered indispensable in achieving turnaround. When improved margins from 
cost retrenchment were insufficient to meet current obligations then asset retrenchment was required to 
DFKLHYH WXUQDURXQG µ&RVW DQGDVVHW UHWUHQFKPHQW LQ FRQFHUW UHVXOWHG LQ WKHKLJKHVW DYHUDJH OHYHORI
WXUQDURXQG SHUIRUPDQFH¶ (p.303). Consequently, this led them to question the prevailing view that 
business turnaround processes should match strategic and operating natures of underlying problems; 
and hence suggested that retrenchment was a desirable response, regardless of the initial problems 
IDFHG &DVWURJLRYDQQL 	 %UXWRQ  )XUWKHUPRUH RQH FRXOG VXJJHVW WKDW 5REELQV 	 3HDUFH¶V
 HYLGHQW VXSSRUW RI µUHWUHQFKPHQW¶ DV WKH FULWLFDO DFWLYLW\ LQ VXFFHVVIXO WXUQDURXQGV LV DOO WKH
more significant, as the study was conductHGLQWKHGHFOLQLQJWH[WLOHLQGXVWU\'¶$YHQLS
DVVHUWVVXSSRUWLYHLPSURYLQJDQGJURZLQJLQGXVWULHVµEX\WLPH¶IRUGRZQVL]LQJDQGHIILFLHQF\DFWLRQV
synonymous with retrenchment. Therefore, one could argue that conclusions drawn  from Robbins & 
3HDUFH¶V  VWXG\ KROG JUHDWHU ZHLJKW DV VXFFHVV RI WXUQDURXQG DQG VSHFLILFDOO\ VXFFHVV LQ
retrenchment activities was measured within tougher industry conditions, of which would precipitate 
greater failure in turnaround efforts compared to a stable or growing industry. 
Although this view suggests that managerial action increasing revenue and decreasing costs is the 
source of turnaround behavior; it must be tempered by recognizing that managerial variables are not 
solely responsible for strategic actions. Industry exit barriers or the extent of market concentration in 
the firms competitive region for example can influence the position and strategic direction of firms.  
This is an important point, as certain market structures are more likely to cause decline e.g. highly 
competitive 
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&RQWHQWLRQWRZDUGV5HWUHQFKPHQW¶V8QLYHUVDO$SSOLFDWLRQ 
In opposition to proponents of retrenchment, other researchers have concluded that financial 
approaches to attempting  turnaround through asset and cost reductions have limited success 
(Arogyaswamy et al, 1995); with remedies of revitalization, rejuvenation and innovation beginning to 
replace the conventional wisdom of pared down operations and disposing of assets (Thietart, 1988). 
Stopford & Baden-Fuller (1990, p.412) corroborate the theoretical justification of this contention (but 
QRW LWV HYLGHQW DGYRFDF\ LQ REVHUYLQJ IDLOLQJ ILUPV µXQGHUSOD\HG WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI LQQRYDWLRQ LQ
VWUDWHJ\WUDSSHGLQWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIILQDQFLDOO\PRWLYDWHGWXUQDURXQGV¶ 
Smith & GrDYHV¶  KRZHYHU GLG ILQG HYLGHQFH WR WKLV HQG ZKHQ GLVFRYHULQJ PHDVXUHV RI
downsizing activities suggested that companies that expand their asset base (as opposed to selling-off 
productive assets) were more likely to affect a recovery; contradicting the findings of Robbins & 
Pearce (1992)6LPLODUO\DQGLQUHIXWDWLRQRIUHWUHQFKPHQW¶VHIILFDF\ towards turnaround; Barker and 
Mone (1994) re-examined the sample used by Robbins & Pearce (1992), finding that retrenching firms 
tended to be those experiencing the greatest decline.  They concluded that retrenchment may be a 
consequence of decline rather than a facilitator of turnaround. That is, severe decline first forced firms 
to retrench in order to survive and then severe decline may have been accounted for the relatively high 
performance improvements, simply because there was more room to improve.  
Moreover, Schendel & Patton (1976) declare the empirical base underlying the retrenchment-
efficiency relationship is not very strong. Herein,  improvements found for turnaround firms in large 
sample studies may not necessarily reflect retrenchment by management. This is due to efficiency 
being measured using financial ratios indicating that turnaround firms over time achieved significantly 
lower cost of goods/sales, lower R&D expenditure/sales compared to firms that continued to decline. 
While such efficieQF\ JDLQV KDYH EHHQ LQWHUSUHWHG DV HYLGHQFH RI DVVHW DQG FRVW UHGXFWLRQV µVXFK
efficiency improvements can also be caused by significantly greater sales gains by turnaround firms 
GXULQJ WKH UHFRYHU\ SKDVH¶ ,Q VXP RQH FDQQRW GHWHUPLQH IURP WKH H[LVWLQJ Hvidence whether the 
increased efficiency for turnaround firms results from retrenchment, sales gains or a combination of 
the two (Arogyaswamy et al, 1995, p.495).  
)XUWKHUPRUH WKH\DUJXHUHWUHQFKPHQWDVPDQDJHPHQW¶V LQLWLDOUHVSRQVHWRGHFOLQHLVDWEHVWa partial 
description of the early stages of the turnaround process. Clear evidence exists showing ulterior 
antecedents to firm decline beyond inefficiency, such as dysfunctional decision-making processes, 
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deteriorating internal firm climates or reduced stakeholder support. Because these other problems are 
XQOLNHO\WREHFXUHGE\DVVHWRUFRVWUHGXFWLRQVUHWUHQFKPHQWDVDµORQHLQLWLDOUHVSRQVHWRGHFOLQHLV
XQOLNHO\WREHWKHJHQHVLVRIDWXUQDURXQG¶LELGS 
 
 
2.5 Types of Turnaround Approach 
The current bank of literature, generally categorises approaches towards turnarounds as either strategic or 
operating. 
Schendel et al (1976) were amongst the first to contend that efforts could be classified into the two 
distinct groups. They argued that if the downturn is primarily due to inefficient operations, then the 
company should adopt operating-oriented recovery strategies such as cost cutting and asset reduction 
DFWLYLWLHV +RZHYHU LI WKH FRUSRUDWH VWUDWHJ\ LV QR ORQJHU UHOHYDQW GXH WR µVWUXFWXUDO VKLIWV LQ WKH
PDUNHW¶WKHQWKHFRPSDQ\PXVWPDNHFKDQJHVVRWKDWLWLVPRUHVXLWHGWRLWVFurrent or new market; 
that is, it should adopt a strategic orientation. More generally, if difficulties tend to be internal to the 
organisation, then repairs tend to be focused on operations, while externally caused difficulties are 
responded to by strategically driven redeployments of resources (Murphy, 2008). Furthermore, they 
advised that turnaround efforts  be directed at strategic or operating orientations; whereby those that 
engage in both simultaneously, are likely to endure continued decline. Overall, they concluded that 
efforts and choice of turnaround orientation should match the cause of decline. Arogyaswamy et al 
(1995) temper this by suggesting that firm-based decline i.e. due to inefficient, internal operations; 
would necessitate strategic re-orientations (not operating) if firms have strong competitive positions 
wherein certain resources or capabilities have underutilised value, and can be leveraged to drive 
recovery. The primary implication of their argument being, that the desirability of particular 
turnaround actions may vary from one context to another and thus, cause of decline might not be the 
primary contingent factor influencing turnaround strategy choice. 
 
+RIHU¶V'LVWLQFW2SHUDWLQJ6WUDWHJLHV 
Hofer (1980) substantiated  6FKHQGHO HW DO¶V  SRVLWLRQ GHOLQHDWLQJ IRXU W\SHV RI µRSHUDWLQJ
WXUQDURXQGV¶QRQHUHTXLULQJDFKDQJHLQVWUDWHJ\7KH\HPSKDVLVHincreasing revenues, wherein firms 
attempt to increase sales by some combination of product re-introduction or lower prices. Decreasing 
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costs, entailing reductions in marketing, R&D and administrative expenses. Decreasing assets, 
encompassing removal of assets impacting performance or finally; a combination effort. Moreover, he 
argues the same strategies could be applied to strategic turnarounds, but  significantly; the focus is on 
WKH VWUDWHJ\ FKDQJHV VRXJKW DQG KHQFH µSHUIRUPDQFH EHFRPHV D GHULYDWLYH RI WKH VWUDWHJ\ FKDQJH¶
(p.21). In operating turnarounds, the primary focus is the performance targets achieved.  
 
As such+RIHUVWLOORIIHUVWZRW\SHVRIµVWUDWHJLFWXUQDURXQGV¶WKHILUVWEHLQJWKDWLIWKHUHLVDQ
opportunity for firms to regain leadership or obtain leadership within an industry, then market 
segmentation should be pursued. Alternatively, firms can engage in product differentiation to obtain 
sustained advantage over the competition. Zimmerman (1989) corroborates the efficacy of this strategy 
in finding evidence that successful turnaround firms made small, incremental improvements to 
produce differentiated products. Emphasis herein was on quality during the production process and 
further, product quality and product differentiation were often neglected by unsuccessful turnaround 
attempts. Correspondingly, +DPEULFN DQG 6FKHFWHU¶V  REVHUYDWLRQ RI µproduct market 
UHIRFXVLQJ¶ LV DQ H[DPSOH RI VWUDWHJLF WXUQDURXQG FKRLFH ZKLFK WRR UHVRQDWHV VWURQJO\ ZLWK +RIHU¶V
 DGYRFDF\ RI GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ 6LJQLILFDQWO\ +RIHU¶V  UHVXOWV WRR H[HPSOLILHG WKH
importance of choosing the appropriate turnaround strategy if firms are to be successful in their 
recovery efforts. Additionally, Hofer (1980, p.29) theorized that the severity of the decline should 
dictate whether cost cutting should only be undertaken in operations or, more aggressively, in asset 
reduction as well. 
 
 
2.5.2. Entrepreneurial & Efficiency Approaches 
 
Hambrick & Schecter (1983) addressed methodological limitations of previous studies by measuring 
multiple variables which represented strategy; providing empirical verification of operating  and 
strategic approaches initiated within mature or declining industries; both of which were significantly 
associated with turnaround. Albeit, they categorized the two distinct stages differently, termed as 
µHIILFLHQF\¶ WXUQDURXQGV RSHUDWLQJ DQG µHQWUHSUHQHXULDO¶ VWUDWHJLF In support of Hambrick & 
Schecter (1983) , 2¶1HLOO¶VELQYHVWLJDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSVRIWXUQDURXQGDSSURDFKHVWR
external, contextual factors within the commercial banking industry; concluded that although growth as a 
successful strategy would be severely constrained by strong competition, both approaches could be 
successful. 
20 
 
 
Within Arogyaswamy & Yasai-$UGHNDQL¶V  investigation of efficiency-oriented turnaround 
efforts; they found that cutbacks, efficiency improvements and investment in technology were 
important factors for successful turnarounds as these actions improved profitability in the short run and 
allowed the company to release slack resources. Robbins & Pearce (1992) and Chowdhury & Lang 
(1996) too established that efficiency-orientations, not entrepreneurial initiatives, contributed to 
successful turnarounds. Specifically, regardless of the cause of the decline, turnaround performance 
was strongly associated with retrenchment. Notably, this single minded decline stemming approach 
through retrenchment may create incremental and short ±term efficiency  gains, but can be limited to 
the extent that it may also exacerbate the deterioration of  the internal climate (Smith & Graves, 2005). 
Conversely, entrepreneurial-oriented efforts are indicative of grand, long term initiatives e.g. 
diversification, vertical integration, new market share thrusts and divestment (Chowdhury & Lang, 
1996) toward successful turnaround. Put differently, the entrepreneurial stage aims to achieve 
profitable long term growth through restructuring the firms asset portfolio or product/market 
refocusing. This can encompass restructuring the core of the firm by: reorganizing the firm into self 
containing strategic business units, divestment of lines of businesses not fitting the core businesses, 
acquiring companies that result to strengthen the core, discontinuing unpromising products and 
engaging in strategic alliances/ joint ventures (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). In this instance, from 
6FKHQGHOHWDO¶VSRVLWLRQWKH\ would deem it that these action are appropriate when businesses 
suffer from improper alignment with their markets. 
 
 
2.5.3. Simultaneous Application of Strategic & Operating Approaches 
Interestingly, Hambrick and Schecter (1983) identified important gestalts which represent patterns of 
successful turnarounds. The two most pertinent of these being selective product/market pruning and 
piecemeal productivity; representing the combined efforts of revenue generation and cost reduction 
UHVSHFWLYHO\2¶1HLOO6a). Zimmerman (1989) likewise observed all the companies that were able 
to execute lasting turnarounds, emerged with favorable strategic profiles involving some combination 
of  low-cost production and product differentiation. This would concur with ArogyaVZDP\ HW DO¶V
(1995) position that effective management actions supporting both of these strategies are vital to 
UHFRYHULQJIURPGHFOLQHDWRGGVWR6FKHQGHOHWDO¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWVLPXOWDQHRXVDSSOLFDWLRQRI
the two precipitates decline. One notable caveat to this dichotomy is as Robbins & Pearce (1992) argue, 
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the major unresolved issue of delineating strategic (entrepreneurial) and operating (efficient) strategies 
persists; whether they are mutually exclusive or predictably overlapping. Hofer (1980) claims in 
practice, the two become blurred; as although unique on definition, changes in one area often 
necessitates changes in the other (Kesner & Dalton, 1994). 
 
2.5.4 An Integrated Two-Stage Model 
Not far removed from this dichotomy is as Murphy (2008) declares, the most powerful and 
parsimonious model within the literature, being µWZR-VWDJH¶ model of turnaround. Bibeault 
(1982),Pearce & Robbins (1993) and Arogyaswamy et al (1995) all viewed the turnaround process as 
consisting of two stages: decline stemming and recovery strategies. The primary objective of decline 
stemming strategies is to stabilize the company's financial condition and reverse the position caused by 
the dysfunctional consequences of decline. It includes actions such as gathering stakeholder support, 
eliminating inefficiencies, and stabilizing the company's internal climate and decision processes.  
Drawn from Hofer (1980), their models acknowledge severity of the distressed state and resource slack 
available ultimately determines the duration/extent to which the decline-stemming strategies are 
applied and succeed. Once the company's financial position has stabilized, it must decide on its 
recovery strategy. At this stage, Bibeault (1982) envisaged a decision point wherein firms choose to 
either continue retrenchment VWUDWHJLHVRUVKLIWWRDµUHWXUQ-to-JURZWK¶VWDJHZKHUHLQDWWKLVSRLQWWKH
ultimate direction of the strategy becomes clear. Either profitability with unaltered strategy and 
reduced resource commitments, or couple this with a growth-oriented emphasis that positions the firm 
to better compete in its industry. *ULQ\HU HW DO¶V  VXUYH\ LV HYLGHQFH RI WKH ODWWHU FKRLFH E\
observing recovery firms shift to longer term strategic change during operational efforts. 
Arogyaswamy et al (1995) hereby assert both strategies are essential to recovery; partly in opposition of 
too much emphasis placed by current literature on the role of retrenchment. 
2.7 Top Management Change/ Executive Succession 
Proven turnaround capability is increasingly the inescapable, ultimate test of competence, credibility 
and management. Herein, the business is at a critical turning point from which improvement or failure 
are the only outcomes (Thain & Goldthorpe, 1990). It is amongst these periods of change and crisis, 
that the saliency of leadership is significantly increased.  
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Management change or executive succession is a dominant theme in the turnaround research, and a 
widely advocated mechanism to be used in response to highly turbulent conditions, in order to enact 
successful recovery (Bibeault, 1982; Slatter, 1984; Finkin, 1985; Castrogiovanni et al, 1992; 
Arogyaswamy et al, 1995) . Hereby, infusions of new managerial blood aim to revitalise the company 
and direct upturn (Murphy, 2008); such that Bibeault (1982) argues that executive succession is a 
precondition for successful turnarounds as it is difficult for the incumbent management to change their 
habits and initiate strategic change .Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1990, p.412) concur, finding the role 
RIQHZFKLHIH[HFXWLYHV LV µFULWLFDOO\ LPSRUWDQWERWK LQ WULJJHULQJ WKH LQLWLDO FKDQJHDQG Ln acting as 
WHDFKHUGXULQJ WKHHQVXLQJ VWHSV¶  Thain and Goldthorpe (1989b, 1990) found that one of the most 
significant actions undertaken by 27 turnaround successes they investigated; was to make changes to 
their senior management team, since in many cases, the incumbent management were unable or 
unwilling to make the changes necessary to stem the decline. Furthermore, most firms reported that the 
turnaround effect was driven by the CEO and was largely dependent on his leadership.  
 
2.7.1 Empirical Evidence Supporting Top Management Change 
Substantiating management change as an effective means to achieve successful turnaround; Virany & 
7XVKPDQ¶VORQJLWXGLQDOVWXG\IRXQGKLVWRULFDOO\KLJKSHUIRUPLQJorganizations demonstrated a 
greater tendency than less successful firms to shift management team characteristics over time, via 
executive succession. Denis & Denis (1995) likewise present evidence that top management changes 
are preceded by large and significant operating performance declines and followed by significant 
improvement in operating performance. Corroborating the prominent theoretical position of 
advocating retrenchment as a means to enact successful turnarounds; they too observed firms 
significantly downsize their operations following management change, exhibiting declines in 
employment, capital expenditures and total assets. Schendel et al (1976) found that over 70% of 
FRPSDQLHVLQ WKHLUUHVHDUFKPDGHPDMRUFKDQJHVLQPDQDJHPHQWZKLOHDOOILUPVLQ2¶1HLOO¶V
study did so. 0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\*ULQ\HUHWDO¶VVWXG\FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHDSSRLQWPHQWRIDQHZ
CEO triggered turnaround activity in 55 % of the cases studies. 
7KLVVDLGVRPHDXWKRUVFRQWHQGWKHOLWHUDU\JURXQGLQJRIWRSPDQDJHPHQWFKDQJHDV2¶.DQH
SVXJJHVWVµthere is no reference, theorizing and empirical research regarding the role of a newly 
appointed OHDGHU LQ D WXUQDURXQG FRQWH[W¶ )XUWKHU KH DUJXHV WKLV IROORZV WKH SDWWHUQ WKDW ZKLOH
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content-specific turnaround research is more convenient, it tends to offer little more than a static 
descriptions of turnaround strategies and thus, research on performance turnaround following CEO 
change has been limited and inconclusive (Castrogiovanni et al, 1992). Hereby, albeit literature exists 
concerning the need to change leadership to trigger turnaround; studies which have examined the exact 
role or timing of newly appointed leaders within the turnaround context has not yet been uncovered. 
As such, while changes in top management to initiate turnaround are so widely espoused by popular 
scholars, they are by no means uniformly adopted  (Kesner & Dalton, 1994) and therefore; WKHUH¶VQR
FRQFOXVLYHHYLGHQFH WKDWFKDQJLQJ&(2¶V OHDGV WRDPRUHVXFFHVVIXO WXUQDURXQGDWWHPSW LQ WHUPVRI
firm performance (Arogyaswamy et al, 1995). As highlighted earlier; although research on strategy 
formulation and implementation has provided insights into turnaround efforts, these insights remain 
somewhat fragmented and even ambiguous. This is exemplified from some studies reporting that firms 
that have successfully implemented turnarounds are generally those who have hired outside executives 
2¶1HLOO  ZKHUHDV RWKHUV KDYH IRXQG WKDW LQFXPEHQW H[HFXWLYHV DUH W\SLFDOO\ PRUH HIIHFWLYH
leading to recovery efforts (Zimmerman, 1989).  
 
2.7.2 Top Management Change : A Signal of Intent 
 
Arogyaswamy et al(1995) suggest top management changes act as decline stemming strategies  that 
stabilise the firms internal climate  and decision processes.  Significantly and pertinent to my study, 
leaders of firm based declining companies are more likely to be stigmatised by employees and external 
stakeholGHUVEHFDXVHWKHILUP¶VGHFOLQLQJSHUIRUPDQFHFDQQRWEHDWWULEXWHGWRDQLQGXVWU\FRQWUDFWLRQ
RU HFRQRPLF F\FOH EH\RQG PDQDJHPHQW¶V FRQWURO $URJ\DVZDP\ HW DO  LH DV LV WKH FDVH LQ
growth industries. External stakeholders hold top managers responsible for performance therefore it is 
imperative they retain credibility  otherwise stakeholder support will erode Thus, change in top 
management is tangible evidence that something positive is being done to improve the firms 
performance (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Changes to the senior management subsequently are seen as a 
PHDQV RI UHVWRULQJ VWDNHKROGHUV¶ FRQILGHQFH LQ WKH IXWXUH YLDELOLW\ RI WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ WKHUHE\
ensuring their continued support and creating greater access to stakeholder resources. Replacement can 
KHQFHDFWDVDV\PEROLFGLPHQVLRQDVLJQDORILQWHQWDQGDFKDQJHLQSHUFHSWLRQVRIFRPSDQLHV¶LPDJH
helping restore confidence in their futures (Schwartz & Menon, 1985). 
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2.8 Incumbent Management: Ineffective Turnaround-Agents  
Theorists and researchers have proved that top managers at declining firms suffer from biases in the 
ways that they make sense and determine the causes of their firms performance problems. Case 
analysis suggests that this pathology stems from managers usually attributing causes to problems 
µH[WHUQDOEH\RQGPDQDJHPHQWFRQWURODQGWHPSRUDO¶%DUNHU	3DWWHUVRQS They found in 
µFDXVDO DWWULEXWLRQ¶ WKDW WKH XQGHUO\LQJ ORJLF  LV WKDW PDQDJHUV ZKR LQVLVW RQ DWWULEXWLQJ GHFOLQH WR
outside factors do not engage in learning about the  relationship between firm activities and the 
environment. Hence, they  are less likely to change in response to poor performance, thus leading to 
little strategic reorientation as part of turnaround attempts.  $V H[HFXWLYH¶V RUJDQLVDWLRQal identity 
H[SDQGVLQLPSRUWDQFHRYHUWLPHµRWKHULGHQWLWLHVEHFRPHOHVVVDOLHQWDVELDVVHOI-serving attributions 
LQFUHDVH¶ &ODSKDP HW DO  S ,PSRUWDQWO\ WKLV SHUVSHFWLYH SUHFLSLWDWHV IDXOW\ H[HFXWLYH
decisions, which often in the case of decline; results in firm strategy being misaligned with its task 
environment. For example, this misalignment may result from executive  failure to update product 
lines, overcome functional weakness, curtail operating expenses or ill-advised expansion (Lohrke et al, 
DQGWKXVVXEVWDQWLDWHVWKHSRVLWLRQRILQFXPEHQWPDQDJHPHQW¶VLQDELOLW\WRVXFFHVVIXOO\HQDFW
turnarounds. 
 
2.8.1 Outsider Succession 
Recent decades have seen companies in the need of innovative change-agents looking outside their industries 
for new chief executives. Tourtellot (2004) advocates executive replacement be allocated to outside 
candidates  as they maintain perspective, are the best source for out-of-the-ER[WKLQNLQJDQGKDYHQ¶W
the entrenched or biased views of long-standing management or family-owned businesses. Hence, they 
are better equipped to combat or resist the aforementioned conditions which hinder successful 
turnaround efforts to reverse firm decline. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) hypothesized that strategic 
reorientations will be most frequently driven by a new set of executives hired from outside the 
organization. Correspondingly, Schwartz & Menon, (1985) found outsider succession is far more 
prevalent amongst failing companies than insider succession. Theoretical justification for this position 
derives from new outsider-executives bare little if any connection to existing strategy and in fact, are 
charged with a mandate for change (Barker et al, 2002)  
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2.9 Top Management Skills/ Competencies 
Zimmerman (1989) argues that successful turnarounds tended to be headed by individuals with 
H[WHQVLYHH[SHULHQFHLQWKHLQGXVWU\EHLQJVHUYHG7KLVLVLQVWDUNFRQWUDVWWR7RXUWHOORW¶VS
UDWLRQDOHWKDWDVDFFHVVWRLQGXVWU\H[SHULHQFHDPRQJVWLQFXPEHQWPDQDJHPHQWGLGQ¶WSrevent decline, 
the need for industry experience in turnaround situations is a myth.  
Therefore, one could suggest that other skills or competencies are required to effectively manage a 
successful recovery. Thain & Goldthorpe (1990) contend turnaround programs must be tailor made 
and specifically designed to solve the unique combination of problems and opportunities in each 
situation. Specifically, Zimmerman(1989) argues successful turnaround agents tended to focus on 
operational issues such as improving the product, producing the product at lower cost, and improving 
the product quality and customer service. Unsuccessful turnarounds were more likely to be involved in 
acquisitions, financial restructuring or sporadic cutbacks in product development. 
Effective management of turnarounds can be characterised by more intangible and less measurable 
TXDOLWLHV VXFK DV OHDGHUVKLS LQ SURYLGLQJ µD VHQVH RI GLUHFWLRQ E\ VHWWLQJ SULRULWLHV DQG VKRUW-term 
JRDOVZKLOVWHVWDEOLVKLQJDVHQVHRIXUJHQF\¶6ODWWHUS). In turn, it is essential for leaders of 
corporate recovery to have a viable strategy  or vision as well as a cadre of key people to buy into that 
vision (Kanter, 1992). As %LEHDXOWSREVHUYHVµLW¶VYHU\GLIILFXOWIRUDFRPSDQ\WRVXVWDLQ
a WXUQDURXQG XQOHVV LW FDQ WXUQ LWV SHRSOH DURXQG¶ Turnaround managers hence need to concentrate 
their attention on ideological phenomena such as beliefs, goals, values and ideas in order to develop 
that operational vision. In contrast, Muczyk et al (1998) argue that successful turnarounds and 
retrenchment efforts are highly dependent  on an autocratic and directive style of leadership when 
VWDWLQJWKDWµGHVSLWHLWVGUDZEDFNVFRHUFLYHDSSURDFKHVDUHQHFHVVDU\¶ 
Alternatively, Bibeault (1982, p.89) suggestV WKDW µKXPDQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DQG HQHUJ\¶ LV WKH NH\
ingredient to a turnaround success and often, decline can often be traced to a disconnection from the 
customer or lack of human understanding thereby. In agreement with Bibeault (1982), research shows 
successful turnaround organisations are market-oriented, and leadership energies are directed toward 
meeting customer needs (Murphy, 2008). In addition, top managers should possess a both long and 
short term perspectives to recovery, as they must be cognisant that they are planting the seeds for the 
FRPSDQ\¶V UHSRVLWLRQLQJ and therein they must stop the bleeding with one eye on the eventual 
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recovery of the company. This indicates change agents must apply a dual perspective of foresight and 
immediate focus to best navigate the firm from decline and towards sustained better performance. 
 
 
2. 10 Top Management Change: Empirical Opposition 
Despite top management change receiving much support as a critical step to enacting turnaround, there 
is little empirical evidence from large sample studies that this step is associated with performance 
improvement (Arogyaswamy et al, 1995) and as such, researchers and practitioners are far from 
unanimous regarding this position. Boeker (1992)  suggests that weak levels of support toward this 
lead to the argument that many executives remain in their positions even if firm performance declines. 
0RUHRYHU 6XGDUVDQDP 	 /DL¶V  VWXG\ UHSRUWHG no relationship and a negative relationship 
between executive replacement and turnaround performance. Jarzabkowski (2003) warns that  new top 
management was not necessarily the cause of change in her study; and  thus one must exercise caution 
before assuming that improved performance is a function of executive succession as presumed in much 
of the literature. ,PSRUWDQWO\ LQ FHUWDLQ GHFOLQH VLWXDWLRQV WKH EHQHILWV RI FKDQJLQJ &(2¶V PD\ EH
outweighed  by the costs. Because forced CEO successions are disruptive to the internal environment 
of a firm; aforementioned benefit yielding conditions must exist to override the potential costs of such 
disruptions. Costs can be incurred as new leaders tend to disrupt existing patterns of behavior and the 
informal network of organizational relationships, thus  increasing instability and ambiguity (Kesner & 
Dalton, 1994). Likewise, Arogyaswamy et al (1995) posit that CEO succession may actually decrease 
recovery strategy effectiveness as the firm must endure internal disruptions at a time when efficient 
execution of the firms historic strategy may be important to performance recovery. Subsequently, they 
SURSRVH WKH µHIIHFWLYHQHVV RI UHFRYHU\ VWUDWHJLHV DW ILUPV DWWHPSWLQJ WXUQDURXQGV IURP LQGXVWU\
contractions based decline, and therefore the extent of turnaround will be increased by CEO and top 
management team VWDELOLW\¶S 
 
Consistent with little systematic evidence proving that replacing top management leads to substantial 
change in declining firms, Barker et al (2001) find reduced top management replacement occurs during 
turnaround attempts at large firms and those that have followed the same strategic orientation for a 
long time. Overall, they argue there is little evidence beyond cases that confirm new top management 
can bring sweeping organisational changes to declining firms. Overall, these contradictory arguments 
indicate that top management change can be a disruptive event which may not be associated with 
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turnaround. Tushman et al (1985, p.300) suggest if executive succession is coupled with strategic 
reorientations , the combination of leadership changes and system wide organization changes may 
break the grip of organization inertia and add needed executive energy and competence. 
 
 
2. 11 The Resource-Based-View (RBV) 
6LQFH FRUSRUDWH WXUQDURXQG LV FOHDUO\ DERXW WKH µORRVLQJ RI FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH the threat of 
H[WLQFWLRQ DQG WKH VXEVHTXHQW UHJDLQLQJ RI FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH¶ LW LV DSSURSULDWH WR IRFXV RQ  D
perspective of the nature of firm-level competitive advantage that has gained currency recently, 
explaining performance variation with reference to unique resources contained within the firm. This 
resource-based-view (RBV) of the firm defines resources as tangible and intangible assets that affect 
WKH ILUP¶V DELOLW\ WR LPSOHPHQW VWUDWHJLHV WR LPSURYH LWV HIILFLHQF\ DQG HIIHFWLYHQHVV (Pandit, 2000, 
p.49). 
Early focus of the sustained competitive advantage literature centred on the external environmental 
characteristics faced by industry incumbents and exploitation of opportunities and threats through 
positioning (Porter, 1980) . In refutation of this prescription, Wernerfelt (1984) suggested that firm 
strategic decisions be informed by pre-H[LVWLQJVWUHQJWKVDQGWKDWGHYHORSLQJWRPRUURZ¶VVWUHQJWKVDUH
UHOLDQWXSRQWRGD\¶VVWUHQJWKV+HUHLQRQHFRXOGXQGHUVWDQGVWUDWHJ\DQGSHUIRUPDQFHWKURXJKWKe lens 
RIXQLTXH UHVRXUFH HQGRZPHQWV%DUQH\¶V ZRUNKRZHYHU DUWLFXODWHGD FOHDUHU IUDPHZRUN IRU
WKHµ5HVRXUFH-%DVHG9LHZ¶ 
The resource-based approach sees firms with superior systems and structures being profitable, not 
because they engage in strategic investments that may deter entry and raise prices above long run costs; 
but because they have markedly lower costs or offer markedly higher quality or product performance. 
This approach focuses on Ricardian  rents accruing to owners of scarce firm-specific resources rather 
than economic profits from product market positioning (Barney, 1991). 
%DUQH\¶V95,1&ULWHULD 
Competitive advantage hence lies upstream of product markets in this paradigm, and rests on the firms 
idiosyncratic and difficult to imitate resources. Barney (1991) asserts that such resources must be 
valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable (VRIN) to be the source of sustained 
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competitive advantage, whereby firms exploit this to create competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Moreover,  that value and rarity  indicate whether or not the resource is an important source of value 
and whether or it is in short supply. Value and rarity therefore constitute the extent of the advantage, 
for example; utilising superior technology can improve their competitive position relative to 
competitors Inimitability and non-substitutability prevent any positions of value and rarity being 
eroded via duplication by rival incumbents. This, according to Barney (1991) is maintained by three 
barriers. Causal ambiguity firstly, denotes firms lacking understanding of the causal relationship 
between resources and their competitive advantage; preventing it being eroded by competitors. 
2UJDQLVDWLRQ¶V historical circumstances can also indicate a resource is imperfectly inimitable, 
acknowledging the significance of history determining performance (Barney, 1991). The final obstacle 
to imitation is social complexity, where competitive advantage is ingrained within the organisational 
culture, thereE\ OLPLWLQJ FRPSHWLWRU¶V FDSDFLW\ WR LPLWDWH Thus, contingent on whether the VRIN 
SULQFLSOHV SHUVLVW WKH ILUP¶V EXQGOH RI UHVRXUFHV FDQ DVVLVW LQ SURGXFLQJ VXVWDLQHG DERYH DYHUDJH
returns (Peteraf, 1993). 
+RZHYHURYHUWLPHDVWKHILUP¶VHQYLURQPHQWFKDnges, these competencies may erode in value and so 
may require replacing. As such, the central problem facing the firm is the need to balance the 
exploitation of existing competencies with the exploration of new competencies in order to ensure 
long-run survival (Pandit, 2000, p.50) This is reflected in firm heterogeneity with respect to their 
resource endowments. Consequently, these are sticky at least in the short run- as firms are stuck with 
what they have and may have to live with what they lack. Stickiness arises because business 
development is viewed as an extremely complex process, and subsequently, firms lack the competency 
to develop new competencies quickly (Diereckx and Cool, 1989). Thus, restricting firm capacity to 
explore in the long term and encouraging firms to exploit in the short-term. Hereby, one can relate the 
incidence of organisational decline to this logic. 
 
 
2.11.2 Managerial Roles Within the RBV 
 
The RBV further cedes a substantial role to managers at odds to the academic study of industrial 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ HFRQRPLFV 7KLV WHQGV WR UHWDLQ LWV WUDGLWLRQDO FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V LQWHUQDO
ZRUNLQJV DV D µEODFN ER[¶ EH\RQG VFUXWLQ\ 8QGHU WKH 5%9 PDQDJHULDO UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV LQFOXGH WKH
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need to reposition the firm as opportunities change and its resource set evolves. Thus, managers in the 
5%9DUHERWKDGDSWLYHDQGSURDFWLYHLHWKH\DUHµHQDFWRUV¶/DGRDQG:LOVRQ. 
 
 
2.13 Dynamic Managerial Capabilities 
 
Predicated on the  observed heterogeneity in managerial decisions and firm performance, Adner & 
+HOIDWLQWURGXFHGWKHFRQFHSWRIµG\QDPLFPDQDJHULDOFDSDELOLWLHV¶when exploring the role of 
managers in strategic and organisational change. 7KH\FDWHJRULVHGµG\QDPLFPDQDJHULDOFDSDELOLWLHV¶
DVWKHFDSDELOLWLHVZLWKZKLFKµPanagers build, integrate, and reconfigure organizational resources and 
FRPSHWHQFHV¶ S This concept reflects three underlying factors : human capital, social capital 
and managerial cognition. Separately and in combination, these influence the strategic and operational 
decisions of managers. Specifically within a turnaround context; the value of these resources depends 
RQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKH\HQKDQFHDWRSPDQDJHPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRSUHYHQWRUJDQLVDWLRQDOIDLOXUHDQGLQ
turn, help rebuild a firms competitive advantage (Lohrke et al, 2004, p.78).  
 
2.13.1Human Capital 
Human capital refers to learned skills that require some investment in education, training, or learning 
more generally (Becker, 1964) and subsequently, provide a basis for enacting turnaround. Similarly, 
managers acquire knowledge, develop expertise, and perfect their abilities in part through prior work 
experience.  Accordingly, executives are limited in their decision making capacities and strategy 
formulation by virtue of bounded rationality; subsequently gauging judgement based on their world 
YLHZV7KHVHYLHZV LQ WXUQ DUH FUHDWHGE\ WKHPHPEHUV¶ FDUHHU H[SHULHQFHV RIZKLFKDUH FULWLFDO LQ
comprising their human capital (Bantel and Finkelstein, 1995, p.68). Castanias and Helfat (1991) 
further distinguish specific facets encompassing human capital as generic, industry-specific, and firm-
specific skills; concluding that some types of generic skills may be relatively more important than 
firm-specific skills in certain types of situations e.g. turnarounds.  
Using top management demographics as a proxy for human capital characteristics; research examining 
the relationship between executive demographics and successful turnaround efforts has focused on 
IXQFWLRQDO EDFNJURXQG RI &(2¶V =LPPHUPDQ (1989) found successful turnarounds were led by 
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executives with internal (production and engineering) rather than external (sales and marketing) 
functional backgrounds. Alternatively, Stanwick (1992) observed the opposite with external (legal, 
finance, general administrative) functional backgrounds precipitating the best recovery efforts (cited in 
Lohrke et al, 2004, p.68). Thus, these conflicting results would indicate that no prescriptive functional 
background is best possessed by change-agents, such that generic skills may be a critical component of 
human capital for top managers to achieve successful turnarounds. 
 
 2.13.2 Social Capital 
Geletkanycz et al, (2001, p.891) propose that positions arguing the embodiment of executive capability 
is constituted from human capital LV LQFRPSOHWH DV µH[HFXWLYH¶V H[WUD-organisational networks also 
DIIHFWSHUIRUPDQFH¶0RUHRYHU LW LVEHFRPLQJ LQFUHDVLQJO\DSSDUHQW WKDW µZKRH[HFXWLYHVNQRZ¶ LH
social capital is as equally relevant to organisational outcomes as human capital. Social capital 
advocacy is derived from the argument  that social structure has important effects on economic action. 
Specifically, it confers influence, power and control upon those who possess great stocks of it, such 
that it facilitates coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Within a corporate setting, the 
concept denotes the extent of top management relationships with actors internal (CEO communicating 
with front line managers) and external (serving on other firms boards as directors) to an organisation 
(Lohrke et al, 2004). Amongst shifting environmental conditions, these ties are critical as a supply of 
resource inputs to best mitigate decline and ensure survival. 
 
+LJKµLQWHUQDOVRFLDOFDSLWDO¶KHQFHLVFULWLFDOWRWXUQDURXQGVXFFess, by ensuring active involvement of 
senior managers in every function and every business unit.  By receiving greater information from 
these channels, painstaking evaluation can craft the building blocks and allows senior management the 
decision of when and where to stack them in better informed recovery efforts (Whitney, 1986). High 
µH[WHUQDOVRFLDOFDSLWDO¶FDQLPSURYHILUPSHUIRUPDQFHLQWZRZD\V)LUVWWKHWLHVFDQSURYLGHDFFHVV
to external resources that firms need in order to operate (e.g., financing). Secondly, directorship ties in 
particular provide information about practices in different firms, whilst attracting potential strategic 
partners and new alliance opportunities. Thus, directorate ties reduce the level of uncertainty 
surrounding external resource dependencies; allowing firms to secure critical resources often on more 
IDYRXUDEOH WHUPV 0RUHRYHU WKH\ FDQ JDLQ LQVLJKWV LQWR RWKHU ILUPV¶ VWUDWHJ\ DQG VXEVHTXHQWO\
enhances the ability of firms to implement strategic policies that effectively negotiate environmental 
contingencies.  
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5HVHDUFK LQWR H[WHUQDO VRFLDO FDSLWDO SURYHV LW WR LPSURYH ILUP SHUIRUPDQFH DV  '¶$YHQL 
discovered; unearthing that firms with higher percentages of top management members holding 
outside board directorships, previous government employments or have elite educations, allowed firms 
to postpone bankruptcy better relative to less socially enriched competitors. 
 
2.13.3 Managerial Cognition 
Leadership is integral to turnaround, the logic here is that almost all other elements of the turnarounds 
DUHGHSHQGHQWXSRQDQG LQH[RUDEO\ OLQNHGZLWKPDQDJHPHQWFRJQLWLRQ0XUSK\µ0DQDJHULDO
FRJQLWLRQ¶ HQFRPSDVVHV WKH EHOLHIV DQG PHQWDO PRGHOV WKDW WRS PDQDJHPHQW HPSOR\V LQ PDNLQJ
decisions (Adner and Helfat, 2003).  TKHVHEHOLHIVDUHHVWDEOLVKHGXSRQDµFRJQLWLYHEDVH¶IRUGHFLVLRQV
ZKLFK FRQVLVWV RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V NQRZOHGJH RU DVVXPSWLRQV 7KLV EDVH DQG WKH GHFLVLRQV PDGH DUH
informed by values which affect the preferential ordering of alternatives and consequences. Prahalad 
DQG %HWWLV   DOVR VXJJHVW µGRPLQDQW ORJLF¶ ZLWKLQ D FRPSDQ\ UHIOHFWV WRS PDQDJHPHQW
EHOLHIVWUXFWXUHV0RUHRYHUSHUFHSWLRQVILOWHUHGWKURXJKPDQDJHPHQW¶VFRJQLWLYHEDVHDOVRLQIRUPWKH
basis for managerial decisions.  Recent empirical ZRUN VXJJHVWV WKDW µPDQDJHULDO FRJQLWLRQ VKDSHV
strategic decisions and outcomes, including responses to changes in the external environment, (Adner 
& Helfat, 2003, p.1021).  
 
Within a decline or turnaround context, top management can be guilty of employing their dominant 
logic and established decision making routines, thereby basing decisions on historical rather than 
prevailing environmental information, in response to environmental threats (Lohrke et al, 2004). This 
may be particularly the case when a firms faced with a rapidly changing environment. In such cases, 
top management may have to unlearn and update its dominant logic to reflect new environments 
UHDOLWLHV 3DQGLW  7ULSVDV DQG *DYHWWL¶V   VWXG\ RI 3RODURLG LV LQGLFDWLYH RI WKLV ZKHQ
REVHUYLQJ WKH WUDQVLWLRQ RI µFRUH FRPSHWHQFLHV¶ EHFRPH µFRUH ULJLGLWLHV¶ ZKHUHE\ WRS PDQDJHPHQW¶
inappropriate mental model rooted in a dominant logic emphasising old technology was superfluous in 
the contemporary competitive environment. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This section illuminates the research methodology under which I came to investigate the relationship 
of top management change upon successful turnarounds, within the Aerospace & Defence industry. 
Initially, the rationale underpinning my research approach must be examined, as qualitative strategies 
necessitate careful consideration with respect to the rigour critical to ensure a well completed study. 
This precedes a review of prominent literary methodologies in defining turnaround,  of which served to 
inform my own defined turnaround parameters.  This is essential toward ensuring accuracy when 
refining industry searches in order to select the most appropriate turnaround cases. In turn, this will be 
followed by the reasoning supporting my choice of industry and specific firms, and the sources utilised 
to draw the necessary data. First and foremost, the theoretical grounding of my research methodology 
must be expanded to achieve a more lucid perspective of the rationale behind choRVLQJDµ&DVH6WXG\¶
approach. 
 
 
3.2 Research Methodology 
 
 $TXDOLWDWLYHHPSKDVLV VSHFLILFDOO\DSSO\LQJD µFDVH VWXG\¶ DSSURDFKZDVDGRSWHGSULPDULO\DV WKH
incidence of corporate turnaround is a  rare phenomenon in itself,  and further occurrences become 
even sparser when this achievement is correlated directly to top management change. Therefore 
practically, a large dataset of which would encourage a study characterised by a quantitative 
methodology was completely unattainable. Also, many of the elements which comprise the influence 
of top management upon turnaround (e.g. dynamic managerial capabilities) are intangible, thus far less 
measurable statistically.   
 
&RQYHUVHO\TXDQWLWDWLYHUHVHDUFKLVDUJXHGWREHµYDOXH-IUHH¶DQGKHQFHDEHWWHUUHIOHFWLRQ of reality, at 
odds to qualitative research which to an extent, is influenced by researcher values and perceptions. 
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Silverman (2001) contends this point, arguing that this flexibility within qualitative methods can 
encourage innovative results. Subsequently and importantly; qualitative techniques are far better 
equipped to draw the novel insights which are indicative of management behaviour, hereby central to 
navigating firms toward recovery. Merriam (1998) corroborates this position, listing essential 
characteristics of qualitative research such as eliciting understanding and meaning, and drawing 
findings that are richly descriptive. Furthermore, naturalistic and heuristic inquiry embodied within 
qualitative research is especially pertinent toward investigDWLQJWRSPDQDJHPHQW¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRZDUG
WXUQDURXQGDVWKHVHPHWKRGVDUHEHVWµXVHGWRXQFRYHUDQGXQGHUVWDQGDQ\SKHQRPHQRQDERXWZKLFK
OLWWOHLV\HWNQRZQ¶6WUDXVV	&RUELQS 
 
That said, my study is not exclusively constrained to qualitative methods. Quantitative analysis is 
integrated when selecting cases and moreover, used when reflecting upon the accounting evidence of 
recovery. As Eisenhardt (1989, p.538) acknowledges; both qualitative and quantitative methods can be 
leveraged simultanHRXVO\  +H JRHV RQ WR H[SODLQ µTXDOLWDWLYH GDWD LV XVHIXO IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH
UDWLRQDOHRU WKHRU\XQGHUO\LQJ WKH UHODWLRQVKLSVXQYHLOHG IURPTXDQWLWDWLYHGDWD¶ H[HPSOLILHGZLWKLQ
my quantitative analysis flagging incidences of turnaround, which are subsequently explored in depth 
using qualitative methods. This is at odds to the predominant approach of large sample studies, which 
generate quantitative results through the comparison of successful and unsuccessful turnaround firms  
whilst attempting to hold broad environmental factors constant  (Pandit, 2000). 
 
 
3.3 The Case Study Approach 
 
Case study research has been defined a number of ways, but the redeeming elements common in most 
suggest it represents: an intensive, longitudinal and holistic empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within a single, natural setting that considers temporal and contextual 
aspects without experimental controls or manipulations. Further, the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident and they typically use multiple sources and methods for data 
collection from a number of entities (Yin, 1984; Meredith 1998). The latter point ensures that the issue 
is not explored through just one lens, but rather a variety of lenses;  allowing multiple facets of the 
phenomenon to be revealed and understood. It is this flexibility, coupled with rigorous application that 
enables this methodology to evaluate programs and develop theory (Baxter & Jack, 2008).  
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Rooted in a constructivist paradigm acknowOHGJLQJ WKDW WUXWK LV GHSHQGHQW XSRQ RQH¶V SHUVSHFWLYH
FDVHVWXGLHVUHFRJQLVHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHVXEMHFWLYHKXPDQFUHDWLRQRIPHDQLQJEXWGRQ¶WUHMHFWWKH
notion of objectivity. One of the advantages of this approach is participants are able to describe their 
YLHZVRIUHDOLW\DQGWKLVHQDEOHVWKHUHVHDUFKHUWREHWWHUXQGHUVWDQGWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DFWLRQV%D[WHU	
Jack, 2008). This being, collection of top management statements in annual reports and interviews 
from media sources serves to enrichen my study to this end; by providing insights comparable to 
collaborations between researchers and participants emblematic of ethnographic case studies. 
Evidently, the wide use of this qualitative research method within social science reflects its value, 
when examining contemporary real-life situations in order to provide the basis for the application of 
ideas and extension of methods.  
 
Yin (1994) argues various research strategies are better suited given the different form of research 
TXHVWLRQSRVHG7KHµKRZ¶DQGµZK\¶TXHVWLRQVDUHPRUHH[SODQDWRU\DQGFRQFHUQHGZLWKRSHUDWLRQDO
OLQNV ZKLOH WKH µZKDW¶ TXHVWLRQV DUH HLWKHU H[SORUDWRU\ RU DERXW SUHYDOHQFH DQG DUH FRQFHUQHG ZLWK
IUHTXHQFLHVRULQFLGHQFH<LQ6SHFLILFDOO\µKRZ¶TXHVWLRQVUHODWHWRH[SODQDtion or prediction 
DQG µZK\¶ TXHVWLRQV UHODWH WR XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH SKHQRPHQRQ µ+RZ¶ LQ WKLV LQVWDQFH UHIHUV WR
H[SODLQLQJ WKHDWWULEXWHV DQGPHWKRGV DSSOLHGE\ QHZ WRSPDQDJHPHQW WR HQDFW WXUQDURXQGV µ:K\¶
moreover follows the more generic relationship of why top management change is critical in initiating 
UHFRYHU\7KHUHIRUHµFDVHVWXG\¶UHVHDUFKLVVSHFLILFDOO\VXLWHGWRDQVZHUµKRZ¶DQGµZK\¶TXHVWLRQV
especially if the researcher is interested in a process rather than an individual event (Yin 1994). Stake 
SFRUURERUDWHVWKLVE\VXJJHVWLQJµFDVHVWXGLHVKHOSUHVHDUFKHUVWRXQGHUVWDQGSURFHVVHVRI
HYHQWVDQGWRGLVFRYHUFRQWH[WFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKDWVKHGOLJKWRQWKHLVVXH¶ 
 
What is more, cases studies allow researchers to follow an inductive reasoning allowing for greater 
insight into the topic of study. Conversely, the advantage of large samples is breadth, whereas their 
problem is one of depth. For the case study, the situation is the reversed (Flyvbjerg, 1992). Hence, 
albeit one can argue a lack of generalisability amongst small-sampled cases studies; the dynamism 
exemplified in this form of research facilitates understanding the development that underpins certain 
phenomena, and hereby justifies my choice of this methodology; when investigating corporate 
turnaround. Furthermore, this method is ideal as it permits the description and investigation of both 
units of analysis: the individual and the organisation as a whole. 
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3.4 Cross-Case Analysis 
Case analysis is often not confined to one organisation; and can occur in multiple cases within a single 
study. Yin (2003, p.47) describes how multiple case studies can be used to either firstly; predict similar 
UHVXOWV WHUPHG DV D µOLWHUDO UHSOLFDWLRQ¶ 2U  SUHGLFW FRQWUDVWLQJ UHVXOWV EXW IRU SUHdictable reasons, 
WHUPHG D µWKHRUHWLFDO UHSOLFDWLRQ¶ ,Q VXP WKH HYLGHQFH JHQHUDWHG IURP HLWKHU W\SH RI VWXG\ LV
considered robust and reliable (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The enduring theme within these methodologies  
is to become intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity. Thus, this process allow the 
patterns of each case to emerge before researchers push to generalise patterns or differences across 
FDVHV5LFKIDPLOLDULW\ZLWKHDFKFDVHDFFHOHUDWHVZKDWLVWHUPHGµFURVV-FDVHDQDO\VLV¶ 
 
MerrLDPSURSRVHVWKDWWKLVVWHSEHSHUIRUPHGVXEVHTXHQWWRµZLWKLQ-FDVHDQDO\VLV¶7KLVLQLWLDO
step is characterised by analysing and deriving conclusions from gathered case material independently. 
2QFH WKLV LV FRPSOHWH µFURVV-FDVH¶ DQDO\VLV FDQ FRPPHQFH ZKHUHLQ UHVHDUFKHUV VHHN WR µEXLOG
DEVWUDFWLRQV DFURVV FDVHV¶ 0HUULDP  S  +HUHE\ UHVHDUFKHUV DWWHPSW WR DSSO\ D JHQHULF
H[SODQDWLRQµWKDWILWVHDFKRIWKHLQGLYLGXDOFDVHVHYHQWKRXJKWKHFDVHVZLOOYDU\LQWKHLUGHWDLOV¶<LQ
1994, p. 7KHUHIRUHDV0LOHV	+XEHUPDQSZDUQ WKLVPHWKRGUHTXLUHVD µFDUHIXO
ORRNDWFRPSOH[FRQILJXUDWLRQVRISURFHVVHVZLWKLQHDFKFDVH¶ 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) extends this caveat by asserting that the danger amongst case studies is that 
researFKHUVUHDFKµSUHPDWXUHDQGHYHQIDOVHFRQFOXVLRQVDVDUHVXOWRILQIRUPDWLRQ-SURFHVVLQJELDVHV¶
7KXVWKHµNH\WRJRRGFURVV-case comparison is counteracting these tendencies by looking at these in 
GLYHUJHQW ZD\V¶ S 2QH WDFWLF H[HPSODU\ RI WKLV LV to select categories and then find group 
similarities coupled with group differences. Alternatively, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests researchers 
should select pairs of cases and then to list the similarities and differences between each pair. Either 
method forces researchers to search for subtle differences between cases. This juxtaposition can break 
simplistic frames, in the same way a search for similarities and nuances can lead to more sophisticated 
understandings. Largely, such cross-case methods encourage researchers to go beyond initial 
impressions, through using structured and diverse lenses upon the cases. Thus, cross-case analysis 
enhances the likelihood that researchers will capture novel findings (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.541). 
 
Contrastingly; Merriam (1998, p.195) concluded a mixed prognosis of cross-FDVH DQDO\VLV¶ YDOXH
,QLWLDOO\VKHDUJXHVWKDWµFURVV-case analysis differs little from analysis of data in a single qualitative 
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FDVH VWXG\¶ +RZHYHU VKH IXUWKHU UHQHJHV RQ WKLV FULWLFDO SRVLWLRQ WR VRPH H[tent by asserting that 
results vary across cases; suggesting that reinforcement of existing theory occurs or new categories, 
themes, or concepts may be drawn out. 
 
 
3.5 Developing an Operational Definition of Turnaround 
In order to select cases of which best reflect turnaround coupled with executive succession; a thorough 
operational definition must be developed. Thus by drawing on previous studies within the turnaround 
literature and critical analysis of their methodological validity; this will serve to inform my defined 
classification of the incidence of interest. In turn, the wide variety of definitions  employed by previous 
studies often reflects the differences in focus of study; and hence my methodology will be influenced 
to the same extent. 
 
3.5.1 Performance Measuring Indicators of Turnaround 
Predominantly, the existent literature has applied accounting-based indicators to reflect the decline and 
recovery typical of turnaround. These have varied significantly between stock market valuations, 
profitability-based ratios e.g. ROCE (Return on Capital Employed) and more standard profitability or 
income-based statistics. Less commonly, Schendel et al (1976) for example measured firm 
SHUIRUPDQFH LQ FRPSDULVRQZLWKZLGHUQDWLRQDO VWDQGDUGV VXFKDV µGross National Product *13¶
ZKLOVWRWKHUVWXGLHVKDYHXVHGLQIODWLRQFRUUHFWHGPHDVXUHV2¶1HLOOD 
Of the most prominent and well-received articles amongst this bank of literature; Bibeault (1982), 
6ODWWHU  2¶1HLOO E DQG 7KDLQ 	 *ROGWKRUSH 89b) all used nominal pre-tax profit. 
Contrastingly, Hambrick & Schecter, (1983), Robbins & Pearce(1992) and Chowdhury & Lang (1996) 
used profitability-EDVHG DFFRXQWLQJ UDWLRV VXFK DV  µReturn on Total Assets 52$¶ RU µReturn on 
Investment 52,¶ 6SHFLILcally, Hambrick & Schecter (1983, p.238) used the opportunity cost of 
FDSLWDO DV D EHQFKPDUN 7KH\ GHILQH D GRZQWXUQ SKDVH DV µSUH-tax ROI less than 10% for two 
successive years. This equates with an after tax ROI of approximately 5% which is less than the cost of 
FDSLWDO GXULQJ WKH SHULRG RI WKH VWXG\¶ 5HFRYHU\ LQ WXUQ ZDV GHILQHG ZKHQ D EXVLQHVV DFKLHYHG DQ
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DYHUDJHHQGLQJ52,RIDWOHDVWµ$QXQVXFFHVVIXOWXUQDURXQGZDVDEXVLQHVVZKRVHHQGLQJ52,
ZDVVWLOOOHVVWKDQ¶ (Pandit, 2000, p.37). 
Critically, Pandit (2000) argues using profitability alone is problematic. He cites Baden-Fuller & 
6WRSIRUG¶V  GHPRQVWUDWLRQ WKDW JUDGXDO ORVVHV LQ FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV RIWHQ GR QRW UHIOHFW JUDGXDO
deteriorations in profitability. As such, profitability may decline very slowly at first and then suddenly 
plummet. Furthermore, time lags can occur between improvements in competitiveness and subsequent 
profit improvement. Moreover an assertion that can apply to all accounting-based indicators for 
turnaround beyond profitability; is that managerial manipulation of accounting-based measures i.e. 
µZLQGRZ-GUHVVLQJ¶ IXUWKHU H[DFHUEDWHV WKLV SUREOHP LQ GHFOLQLQJ SHUIRUPDQFH FRQWH[WV *ULIILWKV
1992). Herein, Pandit (2000) argues more robust methodological measures of turnaround need to be 
applied in future research. 
 
 
3.5.2 Performance Measurement through Industry Benchmarking 
 
Less steeped in accounting and financial indicators, some researchers have opted to define turnaround 
from firms in relation to other firms within their competitive space. Grinyer et al (1988) stipulated the 
relative-to-LQGXVWU\VWDJQDWLRQRUGHFOLQHDVDSUHFRQGLWLRQWRWKHLUµVKDUSEHQG¶)XUPDQ	0F*DKDQ¶V
(2002) study of publicly-traded companies in the USA is indicative of this approach. Turnaround was 
GHILQHGE\µDFKDQJHLQEXVLQHVVVHJPHQWSURILWDELOLW\IURPWKHORZHVWTXLQWLOHDPRQJDOOEXVLQHVVHVLQ
a specific year to the highest quintile among all businesses in any subsequent year covered in the 
GDWDVHW¶S 
 
Pandit (2000) again deems LWXQVDWLVIDFWRU\DQGSUREOHPDWLFDV WKH µLPSOLFLW DVVXPSWLRQ LV WKDW ILUP
performance is largely a function of industry characteristics rather than industry performance being 
ODUJHO\ D IXQFWLRQ RI WKH DELOLWLHV RI WKH ILUPV WKDW FRQVWLWXWH LW¶ S +H further goes on to cite 
empirical evidence to support his argument; observing changes in the macroeconomic environment, 
over which the firm has no direct control, contribute to recovery in 16% and around one third of 
successful recoveries in Bibeault's (1982) and Slatter's (1984) samples respectively. Thereby, poor or 
good performance is judged as largely a function of internal firm characteristics. Significantly, 
turnaround measurement thus should be gauged relative to benchmarks of poor or good performance 
generally; as reflected within other studies. 
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3.5.3.  Integrating Multiple Indicators to Measure Turnaround 
 
Pandit (2000) argues going part of the way to address the problems identified above and as adopted by 
a number of studies; is to use multiple accounting-based indicators of performance to measure 
turnaround. Thiétart (1988) for example used ROI and market share, whereas Barker & Mone (1994) 
DQG5REELQV	3HDUFHXVH52,ZLWKµ5HWXUQRQ6DOHV¶526)XUWKHU*ULQ\HUHWDO 
employed multiple criteria which comprehensively reflects all key stakeholders in the firm. Albeit, 
aforementioned performance/indicator lags and accounting manipulation persist amongst these 
PHWKRGVDQGKHQFH3DQGLWSFRQFOXGHVLGHDOO\DµWULDQJXODWHG DSSURDFK¶LVGHVLUDEOH 
 
3.5.3.1Triangulation means the use of multiple methods and comparing many 
sources of evidence in order to determine the accuracy of information or phenomena 
and further, establish credibility amongst research. Thus, it allows researchers to 
cross-check data to establish its validity, articulated by Miles & Huberman (1994) as 
self-consciously setting out to collect and double check findings. As such, it contrasts 
the ubiquitous but generally more vulnerable single method approach that 
characterizes so much of social science research (Cohen & Manion, 1994), by 
developing converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 1994). Lincoln & Guba (1994, p.283) are 
VWURQJ SURSRQHQWV RI WULDQJXODWLRQ¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ VXJJHVWLQJ µQR VLQJOH LWHP RI
information (unless coming from an elite and unimpeachable source) should ever be 
JLYHQ VHULRXV FRQVLGHUDWLRQ XQOHVV LW FDQ EH WULDQJXODWHG¶ (LVHQKDUGW  LQ WXUQ
comments that triangulation methods provide stronger substantiation of constructs and 
hypotheses whilst of special note,  is the combining of qualitative with quantitative 
HYLGHQFHLQWKLVLQVWDQFHµ$OWKRXJKWKHWHUPVTXDOLWDWLYHDQGFDVHVWXG\DUHRIWHQXVHG
interchangeably, case study data can also involve qualitative only or even quantitative 
only; PRUHRYHUWKHFRPELQDWLRQRIWKHWZRFDQEHKLJKO\V\QHUJLVWLF¶S 
 
 
3.5.4 Turnaround Cycle Length 
When measuring turnaround against the selected indicator of performance e.g. ROCE, ROA, share 
price; researchers must judge the length at which these indicators are in decline and are increasing to 
suitably reflect the occurrence of turnaround. The literature correspondingly varies in the turnaround 
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cycle length with studies from Schendel et al (1976) and Bibeault (1982) using time periods of eight 
years (four years for both the downturn and upturn). Alternatively, Hambrick & Schecter (1983), 
Pearce & Robbins (1993) and  Chowdhury & Lang (1996) used four years (two years for both the 
downturn and upturn). Hence, combining this with whichever indicator of performance is selected; 
most studies use absolute benchmarks for specifying turnaround situations e.g. three consecutive years 
RIGHFOLQLQJ52,LQ5REELQV	3HDUFH¶VFDVH/RJLFDOO\UHVHDUFKHUVFKRRVHWRVSHFLIy cycles 
above a two year period as less might not reflect true  turnaround, moreover just an arbitrary fall and 
rise in performance. Importantly, turnarounds are defined from sustained periods of decline and 
recovery, thus explaining the lengthy cycle definitions applied in some studies. In turn, Sudarsanam & 
Lai (2001) argue that temporal analysis is critical, with the greater the period of time covered; the more 
insight into the dynamics of corporate recovery. 
3.5.5 Defining Top Management Change  
In addition to creating my own operating definition of turnaround, it is necessary for me to delineate 
WKRVH SRVLWLRQV ZKLFK ZRXOG UHSUHVHQW D FKDQJH LQ µWRS PDQDJHPHQW¶ *LOVRQ  GHILQHG WRS
management as the CEO, president, and chairman of the board whereas (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992) 
extended this to vice president and above, and moreover (Thain & Goldthorpe, 1989) included 
directors of companies. More pertinent to my study of individual actors as opposed to the top 
management team, Denis & Denis (1995) defined the top executive to be the CEO if there is one or 
chairman otherwise; and thus any change in the identity of the top executive is defined to be a top 
management change. 
3.6 The Definitions and Methodology Applied in this Study 
 
The research methodology that was developed for this investigation was influenced by the preceding 
studies of organizational turnaround discussed above. 
3.6.1 Operating Definition of Turnaround  
 3.6.1.1 Turnaround Cycle Time 
For this study, the turnaround cycle time period in which the decline and recovery occurs will be at 
least  four years. i.e. two years of downturn followed by two years of upturn. Robbins & Pearce (1992) 
found 3-4 years is the average turnaround period and it is reasonable to assume that a four-year time 
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period should be sufficient time to observe a successful turnaround. Extending this time period beyond 
four years would further reduce the sample size of which is considerably small, as recent industry 
consolidation and turnarounds contingent upon executive succession constrain the number of firms 
which meet these conditions as it is. Moreover, two years of increasing performance is stipulated as the 
change needs to be sustained and thereby greater than a year to indicate a lasting improvement. 
Additionally, I include in my definition an allowance of up to two years for new top management to 
reverse decline and initiate recovery i.e. a period of stagnation where the incumbent executive has 
been replaced and new top management is adjusting.  Hence, decline will be followed and recovery 
will be preceded by a short period of what would appear insignificant performance, not correlating to 
the general declining and inclining performance trends which have occurred either before or after it. 
 
 3.6.1.2  Indicator of Performance 
 
Correspondingly, the performance measuring indicator chosen to couple the specified cycle time when 
observing successful turnaround, is Return on Capital Employed (ROCE). ROCE is the truest 
indication of how much revenue and profits are being generated from best use of its assets or 
alternatively, the losses its making from its liabilities. I believe this measure is suitable as it is 
reflective of assets/ liabilities influence on performance and thus  when applying the Resource-Based 
9LHZ5%9FRUUHVSRQGVWRP\DQDO\VLVRI WRSPDQDJHPHQW¶V OHYHUDJLQJRIDVVHWVDQGUHVRXUFHVWR
enact turnaround. As such, I have not chosen to measure this rare phenomenon by indicators such as 
stock price as often they do not reflect the performance of the firm. Additionally and corresponding to 
3DQGLW¶V  DUJXPHQW LQGXVWU\-benchmarking has not been incorporated as the relative 
competitive positions of incumbent firms within my industry of choice has changed very little, and 
thus would serve to present few if any incidences of turnaround if measured in this way. 
 
Opposed to past studies, I have chosen not to specify a percentage decrease or increase within 
turnaround periods as it constrains the sample size of firms I can investigate within my analysis. This 
being, one could argue that this would provide incidences of marginal declines and inclines over the 
four year period which would fit my operational definition of turnaround. Accordingly and  in order to 
account for this; I have validated incidences which fit my definition by method of triangulation to 
ensure significant turnarounds have occurred, and are not just trivial fluctuations in performance. 
Triangulation confirming turnarounds was achieved by after applying my operational definition toward 
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the dataset; I cross-referenced incidences which appeared to be significant turnarounds with analyst, 
executive, media or other qualitative sources stating that a turnaround had occurred as a product of the 
actions of new top management. Furthermore, triangulation confirming turnaround was a necessary 
step to ensure that performance improvement was in fact induced from top management action, and 
not due to contextual factors e.g. industry growth. 
 
3.6.2 Top Management Change Defined 
My study departs from a number of other studies by classifying top management change or executive 
succession as only a change in the chief executive officer or chief financial officer. This is because 
these are the only individuals of whom have the strategic influence to enact overarching change, and 
are immersed in the daily operation of organizations; of which dramatically affects their bottom lines. 
Therefore, this specification is at odds to other studies who include directors, board members or less 
high-ranking management. Logistically, this top management change definition preferably occurred at 
some point during decline and not throughout recovery. This again, is validated via triangulation when 
confirming incidences of turnaround achievement by new executives. 
 
 
3.7 Case and Industry Selection 
3.7.1 Selection of Industry 
It was necessary to confine my study to firms who faced reasonably similar operating and competitive 
conditions, so allowing me to generate valid conclusions concerning the strategic management of 
turnaround situations. Thus the sample was confined to a single industry. Moreover, I specified this 
single industry to be a growth industry, from which I have the opportunity to draw novel insights, as 
therHLVDSDXFLW\RIWXUQDURXQGUHVHDUFKDPRQJVWVXFKHQYLURQPHQWV+HUHLQ,FKRVHWKHµ$HURVSDFH
	'HIHQVH,QGXVWU\¶RIZKLFKKDVDQHQODUJHGUROHLQFRQWHPSRUDU\EXVLQHVVZKLOVWEHLQJLQFUHDVLQJO\
prominent in current affairs. 
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3.7.2 Period of Investigation 
Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) suggest placing boundaries on a case maintains a reasonable scope and 
thus, prevents overwhelming amounts of data. As such, my period of investigation was still dictated to 
an extent by when the industry was growing and the archival availability of financial data within the 
database where I had to input the turnaround parameters which satisfy my operating definition. 
Therefore, I chose to examine data of all publically held Aerospace and Defence firms worldwide 
between 2000 to 2008.  
 
 
3.7.3 Selection of cases 
 
I decided to search and select multiple cases in order to augment the generalisability of my eventual 
conclusions. )LOWHULQJRIFDVHVZLWKLQWKHVHDUFKGDWDEDVHµ)$0(¶ZDVLQLWLDOO\GRQHE\WKH6,&FRGH
denoting aerospace and defense firms: 3530. These were then naturally run through the specified 
turnaround parameters to see if they satisfied my operational definition. However, these results were 
confined to the UK; so industry ranking was used to identify the largest firms internationally, of whom 
I then calculated their individual ROCE development over the period of investigation, and applied the 
same test against my turnaround definition.  
Additionally,  one basic requirement of each firm was it had to have been in operation and 
incorporated since 1998, so that had it started later on, it would not simply have experienced a typical 
start-up cycle of survival then growth. Similarly, publicly traded organizations were chosen only; 
given that the limited or holding companies which satisfied my definition of operational turnaround, 
were logically part of a greater corporate entities and hence their performance was influenced largely 
by their parent company. Secondly, publicly traded companies tend to be large and hence constrains 
extraneous variations, therefore forming a group of similar sized firms of whom share more contextual 
similarities (Eisenhardt, 1989). From this, conclusive insights and assertions can be generalized across 
all cases. $OVR FRQYHQLHQWO\ SOF¶V LQGLFDWe less internal ownership and therefore, carry a greater 
likelihood of top management change (Tushman et al, 1985). A further facet to the selection process 
UHVXOWHG IURP VLQFH ,¶P LQWHUHVWHG LQ WKH HIIHFWV UHVXOWLQJ IURP WKH LQWHUQDO FRQWURO PHFKDQLVP RI
executive succession; I further omitted any cases from consideration where top management change 
was directly associated with an acquisition of the firm, of which have been frequent within the 
aerospace and defense industry over the past few decades. 
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Finally, these cases which had satisfied the aforementioned conditions were confirmed as fitting both 
my operational definition of turnaround and change in top management when I investigated their 
executive turnover, observing if top management had changed corresponding to recovery. As indicated, 
instances where this was the case were further validated by triangulation, confirming the new 
H[HFXWLYH¶VUROHDVWKHFHQWUDOSURWDJRQLVWLQHQDFWLQJFRUSRUDWHWXUQDURXQGIURPRWKHUVRXUFHV 
From this process, three firms were identified to have attained a successful turnaround within the year 
2000-2008, as instigated by a new top management. Thus the three firms led to the development of 
WKUHH FDVH VWXGLHV 7KH WXUQDURXQG FDVHV DQG WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH µFKDQJH-DJHQWV¶ DUH BAE (British 
Aerospace & Engineering) led by Mike Turner, VT Group led by Paul Lester and the Boeing 
Company led by Ian McNerney. 
 
3.8 Data Sources  
During my research I used multiple sources and research instruments necessary to not only select firms 
for study, but provide evidence when building the cases. Selection of cases was initially informed by 
XVLQJ WKH GDWDEDVH µ)$0(¶ ZKLFK SURYLGHG 52&( VWDWLVWLFV DV ZHOO DV PRVW RWKHU ILQDQFLDO
information. This was used to filter firms within the selected industry and then apply my operational 
definitions. As mentioned, this was limited to the UK and hence I had to use annual reports of 
prominent Aerospace & Defence companies to see if they too characterised the specified turnaround 
definition. Correspondingly, annual reports were valuable for observable incidences of top 
management change. In turn, triangulation of this with achievement of turnaround was sought for  
within the prominent media sources, of which comprised the basis of data and insight for the building 
of case studies. 
 
The case studies were primarily based on the use of secondary data. This was exemplified from 
archival sources giving the retrospective data necessary to create comprehensive and detailed accounts 
of the turnaround incidents. Furthermore, use of multiple data sources represents the hallmark of case 
study research, whilst additionally engenders a strategy to enhance data credibility (Yin, 2003). Press 
releases, internet sources and trade journals provided some of this. Predominantly, public archives and 
specifically, newspaper or business magazine sources afforded the bulk of the material. Archival data 
in this sense is highly beneficial as it is easily available on the internet whilst allowing a greater 
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volume of information can be accessed. Albeit, it is limited to the extent that its suitability can be 
difficult to determine whilst significantly, authenticity is questionable from some places. 
 
Sources of which go some way toward alleviating these problems are online publications. Archives 
IURPµ7KH(FRQRPLVW¶µ7KH7LPHV¶µ7KH)7¶ DQGµ7KH*XDUGLDQ¶ were of the most fruitful within my 
research, especially for ascertaining why or what actions were taken by the incumbent cases. As such, 
they engender greater impartiality to some extent and hence significantly reduce bias; of which is 
naturally personified within official sources. 
 
Speaking of which, official publications such as annual reports or official website-based information 
often supplemented archival data for more specific details. Typically, financial information was often 
sourced from such official routes; to facilitate reaching a holistic understanding of the phenomenon 
EHLQJVWXGLHG&RQYHUJHQFHRITXDOLWDWLYHDQGTXDQWLWDWLYHGDWD µDGGVVWUHQJWK WR WKH ILQGLQJVDV WKH
various VWUDQGVRIGDWDDUHEUDLGHGWRJHWKHUWRSURPRWHDJUHDWHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHFDVH¶%D[WHU	
Jack, 2008, p.554). Additionally, triangulation through use of multiple and varying types of sources is 
critical to eliminate inconsistency and ensure that the data collected represents absolute events and not 
DXWKRUV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVJLYHQELDVLQHYLWDEO\LVLQWURGXFHGLQVRPHLQVWDQFHV 
 
Alternatively, primary data could not be attained as the three companies failed to deliver to requests 
for interviews or provision of any other materials. Lack of primary data is expected as one anticipates 
considerable difficulty in collecting such information from multinational corporations. However, 
Gephart (2004) contends this is not a problem, confirming that secondary data is often easily obtained, 
reliable and an apt replacement for primary data associated with business-world studies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Case Studies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is critical in initially highlighting the dynamics and development within the Aerospace 
and Defence industry both domestically and internationally, over the past few decades. Subsequently, 
this presents an important perspective and contextual base, after which the individual cases studies are 
delineated. Hereby, the cases explore the events and top management influences which combined to 
achieve successful turnaround among the selected three firms. 
 
4.2 The Aerospace and Defence Industry 
 
The aerospace & defence industry is deemed to be the revenues accrued by aerospace and defence 
equipment manufacturers from civil or military aerospace and defence procurements. Global leaders 
have and continue to become increasingly large, integrated, multinational companies amongst greater 
incidence of  acquisitions. Typically, government organisations, the military, airline companies and 
space programs such as NASA comprise the likely buyers within the market.  The industry depends on 
two closely intertwined pillars: civil and defence; of which are both complementary and mutually 
dependent. Operating in civil and defence markets means sharing skills and technologies, realising the 
advantages of a broad product range and enjoying synergies from bringing major industrial benefits 
and creating economies of scale through the absorption of high fixed and non-recurring costs. 
Consequently, it is a highly capital-intensive, reflected by levels of investment in R & D and capital 
facilities as a proportion of turnover exceeding those of many other industries. At the same time, 
returns are inherently long-term and high risk, which restricts the appetite of the financial markets. 
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Accordingly,  government support, funding, and risk-sharing partnerships are essential features of the 
industry (Star21, 2002). 
 
Traditionally, civil aerospace has been dependent on technologies developed for military applications; 
however, µ6XVWDLQLQJ D YLDEOH DHURVSDFH LQGXVWU\ WR VHUYH WKH QHHGV RI FLYLO PDUNHWV LV LQWLPDWHO\
linked to maintaining its capabilities in the security and defence fields ± DQGYLFHYHUVD¶6WDU
p.14). Furthermore, the industry is highly cyclical in nature, dependent mainly on the investment 
decisions of the airlines and on the fluctuating patterns of defence programmes. The strong inter-
relationship between the civil and defence sectors in many firms means  that in addition to the 
technological synergies, the different cycles of civil and defence programmes allow companies to 
EDODQFHWKHLUGHYHORSPHQWUHVRXUFHVPRUHHIIHFWLYHO\,QGLFDWLYHRIWKLVG\QDPLFWKHµ6WDU5HSRUW¶
(2001) offers the example of the slump in air transport following September 11th , encouraged 
improved defence and security requirements offering de facto, some counterweight to the slowdown in 
airline orders. 
 
4.3 Development of Industry Post Second World War 
The foundations to the aerospace industry were originally set out around the Second World War, after 
which it has continued to rapidly expand and develop into a successful business environment 
(Alfredsson and Hildingson, 2003). Throughout this time, the ever increasing demand for public air 
travel has driven the civil sector whilst demand for domestic or homeland security has been the source 
for growth within the military sector. Between the end of the cold war and the present day,  US & 
European defence industries have  undergone dramatic transformations. The decline in defence 
VSHQGLQJ VLQFH WKH ODWH ¶V UHVXOWHG LQ UHGXFHG VDOHVE\ GHIHQFH FRQWUDFWRUV0DLQWHQDQFHRI WKH
overcapacity in the defence industrial base from the Reagan-era build-up exacted substantial US 
domestic costs.  
 
 
4.3.1 U.S. Consolidation 
 
Subsequently, the Clinton Administration encouraged almost compulsory mergers and acquisitions 
DPRQJVW LQFXPEHQWSOD\HUV PDGHIDPRXVE\ZKDWKDVFRPHWREHUHIHUUHGWRDV WKHµ/DVW6XSSHU¶
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This led the post-Cold War US defence industry to be characterised by massive consolidations of 
contractors, driven by the simultaneous pushing and pursuit of economies of scale and increased 
efficiency in reaction to the overcapacity  (Datamonitor, 2008b). Come the turn of the century, with 
arms sales of $18.5 billion and $14.5 billion respectively, Lockheed Martin and Boeing dominated the 
global industry. Additionally, these incumbents were the most technologically advanced in the world, 
DQGDVRQHVFKRODUFDXWLRQHGµ)RUWKHILUst time in modern history, one country was on the verge of 
PRQRSROL]LQJWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODUPVWUDGH¶-RQHVS 
 
The impact of regional conflicts such as those in ex-Yugoslavia and the emergence of terrorism in the 
Middle-East illustrated new challenges confronting the sector, of which the US were first to address. 
0HDQZKLOH (XURSH¶V GHIHQFH LQGXVWU\ HQWHUHG WKH V DV D FROOHFWLRQ RI QDWLRQDO ILHIGRPV
FRQWLQXLQJWRORRNLQZDUGV%\WKHHQGRIWKH¶VWKHVLWXDWLRQZDVXQWHQDEOH(XURSHan defence 
firms found themselves under intense economical and political pressure to consolidate. Previously, 
Governments and defence firms further held monopsonist and monopolist positions, respectively  in 
each country (Guay & Callum, 2002). In just over a decade, the European aerospace and defence 
industry had transformed itself from a collection of medium sized, nationally orientated firms to one 
dominated by two giants, with several smaller firms closely linked to these leaders.  
 
 
4.3.2 European Consolidation 
In Europe, events conspired to allow two defence firms to dominate Europe (BAE Systems and EADS). 
The paths of these series of mergers appear to represent two different strategies of consolidation. BAE 
6\VWHPV PLJKW EH FDOOHG D µK\SHU QDWLRQDO FKDPSLRQ¶ KDYLQJ FRQVROLGDWHG PXFK RI WKH QDWLRQDO
defence infrastructure of the UK into one company, without any major cross border ties. The strategy 
leading to the creation of EADS on the other hand , was to pursue transnational mergers within similar 
sectors of the defence industry by the national champions of individual countries. Consequently, 
Europe have formed two defence titans that could finally match the heft and clout of their American 
cousins (Guay & Callum, 2002, p.761). Reflecting this trend, Jones (2006, p.254) confirms that 
(XURSHDQGHIHQFHILUPVKDYHEHHQDOPRVWµWZLFHDVOLNHO\WRSXUVXHFR-production and co-development 
SURMHFWVZLWKHDFKRWKHUWKDQZLWK86ILUPV¶ 
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4.3.3 Antecedents Precipitating European Consolidation  
 
 4.3.3.1  Opposition to US Dominance 
Consolidation was expected to be in response to the exigencies of the new defence market that had 
finally become impossible for European industry executives to ignore (Guay & Callum, 2002). 
McGuire (2007) argues US dominance was owed not only to engineering and manufacturing 
excellence, but more effective post-Second World War industrial policy. Albeit both the US and 
(XURSH DGDSWHG SROLF\ DQG SRXUHG PRQH\ LQWR WKH VHFWRU¶V GHYHORSPHQW WR FDWDO\VH JURZWK WKH
IRUPHU¶VPDQDJHPHQWRIWKLVSrocess was far more effective. American support was directed at applied 
research combining with military procurement, so allowing US firms to apply military technologies to 
the nascent civilian aircraft market. However, Europe emphasised development toward aerospace 
WHFKQRORJLHVµIRUWKHLURZQVDNHUDWKHUWKDQYLHZLQJWHFKQRORJ\LQVWUXPHQWDOO\DVDPHDQVWRGRVRPH
RWKHU DFWLYLW\ PRUH FKHDSO\ RU HIIHFWLYHO\¶ S 7KLV ZDV FRPSRXQGHG E\ KLJK IUDJPHQWDWLRQ
amongst European firms where scale economies were becoming important and for the time being, the 
logic of a pan-European agglomeration was politically too sensitive to contemplate. 
 
+RZHYHU WKH SHUFHSWLRQ RI D 86 µWKUHDW¶ EHFDPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ SUHYDOHQW ZLWKLQ (XURSHDQ SROLWLFDO-
industrial circles, being DZDUHWKDWDSUHSRQGHUDQWVWDWH¶VGHIHQFHILUPVDUHOLNHO\WRKDYHJOREDOSRZHU
and reach, in an open international trading system. Thus, it will try to expand its arms sales to foreign 
markets, pursue an arms monopoly, and thereby increase influence over RWKHUV DW (XURSHDQ ILUPV¶
H[SHQVH  7KHVH FRQFHUQV ZHUH YRFDOLVHG ZLWKLQ D (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ UHSRUW FRQFOXGLQJ µKH
European industry could be reduced to the status of sub-supplier to prime US contractors, while the 
key know-how is reserved for US firms.¶7KHVHVHQWLPHQWVZHUHHFKRHGDWWKHWLPHE\WKHWKHQ)UHQFK
3UHVLGHQW-DFTXHV&KLUDFZDUQLQJWKH(XURSHDQLQGXVWU\ULVNVµYDVVDOVWDWXV¶WRDSUHSRQGHUDQW86LI
efforts toward aggregating defenFHUHVRXUFHVDUHQ¶WDFWXDOLVHG(Jones, 2006). 
 
Therefore, in response to the uni-polar international industry characterised by US dominance, 
previously competitive national firms from Germany, France, and Britain; were obliged to launch into 
D UDFH IRU µFULWLFDO PDVV¶ WKURXJK DGRSWLRQ SURFXUHPHQW SROLFLHV WKDW VWUHssed intra-European 
collaboration or consolidation, so increasing their economic and defence power whilst decreasing 
transatlantic reliance upon the preponderant state (Jones, 2006, p.260). 
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4.3.3.2  Policy Implementation in Europe 
 
Increased control over defence policy afforded to the EU from the adoption of a single currency, 
coupled by European economies pushing policies of economic liberalisation, combined to encourage 
European firms to become more receptive to the prospects of further integration. Albeit, it would be 
difficult to claim economic policies played a decisive role in the restructuring of this sector over the 
past few years. As such, movement towards common defence policy with economic restructuring 
coalesce to give the claim more gravitas. Declarations at St Malo and Helsinki were critical in 
providing political support for private sector reorganisation. Furthermore, trends indicative from these 
events culminated in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, defining a common European defence policy; the 
ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) (Guay & Callum, 2002). 
 
 
 4.3.3.3 Economic Justifications 
 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the severely competitive and crowded export market coupled with 
new entrants pushing costs down;  makes consolidation almost a necessity. At odd to European firms,  
US defence companies also receive generous support from their government, manifesting a significant 
advantage in developing and integrating specialist systems. Fewer resources from European industry 
devoted to these research and development initiatives; compounded by advancements being based on 
US firm commercial information technology software/computer development, allows US defence 
firms considerable advantage of European firms (Guay & Callum, 2002, p.765). 
 
 
4.4  Current Industry Statistics Pertinent to this Study 
The global aerospace and defence market grew by 9.8% in 2008 to reach a value of $674.6 billion, 
representing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.4% for the period spanning 2004-08. 
Moreover, the US market accounts for 53.5% of that value and Europe 28.8%. Globally, the defence 
segment is the most lucrative, accounting for 75.6% of the market, with civil aerospace generating the 
residual 24.4% (www.globalbusinessinsights.com). Indicative of its trajectory, the industry is forecast 
to grow at a CAGR of 6.2% for the five-year period 2008-13, to reach $910 billion by the end of 2013 
(www.alacrastore.com). Specifically, the European aerospace & defence market generated total 
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revenues of $184.3 billion in 2008, representing CAGR of 9% for the period spanning 2004-2008, of 
which the UK industry accounted for 23% (Datamonitor, 2008b, p.7-8). BAE Systems Plc is the 
leading company in the UK market, with a 13.1% share of the market's value. In comparison, EADS 
accounts for 9.4% of the market's value (Datamonitor, 2008, p.12). 
 
4.5  Recent Industry Development 
The global aerospace & defence industry has experienced substantial growth over the last few years, 
gradually becoming an important constituent of the economic structure of most powerful nations. This 
is due to its crucial relevance within Foreign Affairs Policy and its capability to provide many 
technological improvements which pervade many other sectors (www.tesionline.com). In turn,  the 
rising threat of global terrorism has led to the defence sector to become comfortably the most lucrative. 
In contrast, aerospace has experienced downturns onset by factors such as low cost airlines putting 
pressure on prices (Datamonitor, 2008). 
 
Perhaps the most important development is the rapid globalisation of the industry. Over the next 20 
years, commercial aircraft deliveries are expected to shrink in Europe and North America but grow 
elsewhere. If defence spending continues along contemporary patterns, predictions see the biggest 
growth in China and India, and less spending in the U.S. with dramatic reductions in the UK, Germany 
and France. Hence,  success will be increasingly dependent on competing worldwide, not just 
regionally. Companies clearly cannot exist only on their restricted home markets and increasingly look 
to leverage long-term strategies to secure market access on a global scale (Star21, 2002). This is 
reflected in shifts of component outsourcing to China;  focusing upon keeping cost as well as quality 
parameters efficient. This process of globalisation is making global business markets increasingly 
uncertain, mainly as a result of higher levels of competition. In addition, technological  improvements 
are advancing such that products have shorter life cycles, become obsolescent faster and cost more to 
produce. Thereby, technological change is fragmenting global markets and emphasises a necessity for  
organisations to develop a clear strategies to account for this. 
 
4.5.1 Transatlantic Collaboration 
86 DHURVSDFH DQG GHIHQFH FRPSDQLHV DFFRXQW IRU DERXW KDOI RI WKH LQGXVWU\¶V JOREDO WXUQRYHU D
product of the US military accounting for 40% of total global military expenditures  
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(www.blackcollegian.com). 7KHVDOHVRI(XURSH¶VLQGXVWU\RQO\HTXDWHVWRMXVWRYHUWZR-thirds those of 
US manufacturers. These results reflect the advantages of the US aerospace and defence environment, 
GUDZQ IURP RSHUDWLQJ LQ WKH ZRUOG¶V VLQJOH ODUJHVW KRPH PDUNHW 7KH\ DOVR EHQHILW IURP D KLJKO\
VXSSRUWLYH RSHUDWLQJ IUDPHZRUN ZKLFK LV µGHVLJQHG WR XQGHUSLQ D GHFODUHG SROLF\ DLP ZKLFK GDWHV
back many deFDGHV WR PDLQWDLQ 86 VXSUHPDF\ LQ DHURVSDFH¶ 6WDU  S. Designed to 
PDLQWDLQ86VXSUHPDF\LQWKHLQGXVWU\WKHµGLUHFWOLQNDJHVEHWZHHQGHIHQFHDQGFLYLOXVHVDQGKHDY\
investment in defence to fund research and innovation bring clear advantages to the US industry;  in 
terms of beneficial spin-off effects in non-defence aerospace applications. This situation poses a 
FRQVWDQW FKDOOHQJH WR (XURSHDQ LQGXVWU\ DQG FDQQRW EXW DIIHFW (XURSHDQ FRQWUDFWRU¶V FRPSHWLWLYH
SRVLWLRQ¶6WDUS 
Consequently, it is argued that building transatlantic partnerships to reap the huge benefits which are 
evidently available across the Atlantic is highly desirable for European firms. Hereby, European firms 
engaged in transatlantic collaborations would become more likely to participate in US defence projects 
DQGPRUHRYHUZRXOGµUHGXFHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIµ)RUWUHVV(XURSH¶ZKHUHE\(XURSHDQGHIHQFHPLQLVWULHV
would procure few US-PDQXIDFWXUHGZHDSRQVV\VWHPV¶*XD\	&DOOXPS%XWOHU
adds that emphasis on the export market as a means of off-setting the problems of reduced domestic 
market profitability is the primary rationale of using transatlantic strategic alliances. Albeit, evidence 
to this end is found in few cases. It is acknowledged that not only the opportunities in the US market, 
but the  cost and complexity of product development generates an interdependency among firms, with 
no one firm being able to design, develop, manufacture and support e.g. an aircraft programme on its 
own; thereby justifying transatlantic collaboration.  
 
Defence Federal Acquisition Regulations restricting market access in the US is indicative of politicised 
EDUULHUV WR WUDQVDWODQWLFHIIRUWV UHIOHFWLQJDµ%X\$PHULFDQ¶SROLF\IURPWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI'HIHQFH
CorresSRQGLQJO\ SURSRQHQWV RI WKLV SRVLWLRQ µVXJJHVW VWULQJHQW H[SRUW UHJXODWLRQV SURWHFW QDWLRQDO
VHFXULW\DQGYLHZWKHH[SRUWRIFXWWLQJHGJHWHFKQRORJLHVDVGDPDJLQJWRWKHQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW¶1LHOVHQ
2005, p.497). This is juxtaposed to incumbent U.S. firms spokespeople, who frequently complain of 
this cumbersome and outdated policy restricting their ability to conduct business across borders to a  
greater extent and constitutes a disadvantage in competition for foreign market sales. Thereby,  the  
U.S aerospace  & defence sector is one marked by conflicting goals between companies and their 
national government over the level of export control regulations (Nielsen, 2005). 
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4.6 Current & Future Industry Outlook 
 
 
(Source: www.pwc.co.uk. & Reuters) 
 
The strong cycle characterised within the industry over the past decade is believed to be heading into 
decline amongst the global recession weighing heavily on commercial aerospace manufacturers and 
their suppliers. Declines have resulted in a sharp drop in aircraft orders and a cloudy outlook for 
deliveries, reversing the strong market upturn that occurred in recent years. The defence sector 
however, is bucking this trend for the most part as it is still benefiting from large government spending, 
although shifting military priorities and budget pressures are creating uncertainties in the long term. 
This means difficult conditions will continue for the commercial aerospace industry, with the defense 
market less affected because it receives aid from sizable budgets (www.businessweek.com).  
Alternatively, European top-tier companies have been actively seeking alliances with their U.S. 
counterparts to diversify and gain greater access to the U.S. defense market and to improve their 
foreign currency exposure (www.businessweek.com). Jones (2006) takes an opposing stance, arguing 
that assuming that the United States remains the preponderant global power, this structural condition 
will cause EU states to continue collaborating. Therefore, the European defence industry will likely 
become more integrated over the next decade (p.267). 
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This aside, WKH ULVH LQ JOREDO FRPPRGLW\ SULFHV LV LPSDFWLQJ FRPSDQ\¶V PDUgins; in particular, 
increasing oil prices have affected the aerospace sector. The steep run-up in oil prices over the past few 
years, which led to as much as 60% of operating costs for some airlines, should stabilize at 
approximately 25% of operating costs in 2009; albeit above prevailing marker of around 15% 
(www.duffandphelps.com).  
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4.7 BAE Systems 
 
Source: FAME 
 
4.7.1 Synopsis 
BAE Systems is currently the largest defence contractor in Europe and second-largest globally. The 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V LQWHUHVWV VSDQ both civil and military aerospace, defence electronics, naval vessels, 
munitions and land warfare systems. BAE Systems was formed in 1999, by the £7.7 billion merger of 
%ULWLVK $HURVSDFH %$H 0DUFRQL (OHFWURQLF 6\VWHPV 0(6 DQG *HQHUDO (OHFWULF &RPSDQ\ SOF¶V
(GEC) US based defence interests. This merger was largely in response to the pressure from US 
contractor consolidation, and was compounded by the long-term aim  and pursuit (albeit unsuccessful 
thus far) of US expansion. 
%$(¶VGHFOLQHDURXQGWKHWXUQRIWKHFHQWXU\ZDVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\VFKHGXOHGHOD\VDQGFRVWRYHUUXQV
on two of the Ministry of 'HIHQFH¶V 0R' most important programmes;  causing the company to 
haemorrhage cash and speculation of takeovers to surface. &RUUHVSRQGLQJO\ ZLWK 0LNH 7XUQHU¶V
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promotion from COO to CEO in 2002; he was charged with alleviating these woes and rebuilding 
relationships with the MoD. 
Come 2008, Mr Turner is  given the credit for the turnaround (www.ft.comv). His reign and route 
WRZDUGDFKLHYLQJ WXUQDURXQG LQFOXGHG VHOOLQJ%$(¶V VWDNH LQ$LUEXV RIZKLFK IXQGHGSXUVXLQJ  DQ
aggressive acquisition strategy in the US; both DJDLQVW JRYHUQPHQW¶V ZLVKHV DQG HPERG\LQJ WKH
fractious and difficult relationship they shared.  Upon leaving, Turner left BAE as the biggest foreign 
supplier to the US military and second biggest in the world, changing the company from a medium-
sized, UK-focused aerospace and defence group into a global defence player with an order book of 
£38.6bn (www.ft.comw) and revenue in 2008 of $32.6 billion. 
 
4.7.2.  1999-µ)UHHIDOO¶ 
In December 2002%$(LVVXHGDSURILWZDUQLQJLQGLFDWLYHRIWKHSHUFHLYHGµIUHHIDOO¶WKH\KDGEHHQ
in for the past few years (www.ft.como). This originated from poor project management exemplified 
E\ FRVW RYHUUXQV DQG VFKHGXOH GHOD\V  RI WKH 0R' FRPPLVVLRQHG  µNimrod MRA4¶ PDULWLPH
UHFRQQDLVVDQFHDWWDFNDLUFUDIWDQGWKHµ$VWXWH¶FODVVVXEPDULQH projects. Moreover, lack of confidence 
was exacerbated from speculation BAE might be taken over by a larger US rival (www.ft.como) ; an 
unsurprising proposition given the climate of aggressive consolidation. In 2001, the company posted a 
loss of £134m on sales of £13 billion. Unless the company shaped up, Whitehall mandarins warned, 
Britain would buy aircraft carriers from France and invite more foreign firms to set up shop in Britain 
(www.economist.com). Difficult relations were compounded by these projects being entered under 
contracts predicated on old competition rules. The extent of these projects polluting the bottom line of 
%$(LVH[HPSOLILHGIURPWKLVWUHQGFRQWLQXLQJLQWRZLWK%$(¶VEXVLQHVVHVVWLOOVXEVLGLVLQJ
the losses made on the 20% tied up in British defence contracts. Moreover, its tangled web of joint 
ventures with European partners was nearly impossible to manage, whilst its position in the US market 
was still little more than a niche player (www.ft.como).  
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4.7.3.  2002-2004 
4.7.3.1 Top Management Change & MoD Renegotiations 
)URPWKHERDUGURRPµFRXS¶ZKLFKHOHYDWHG0LNH7XUQHUWR&(2LQ0DUFKrather than a single 
focus on the United States; it was thought Turner would concentrate on keeping the activities of BAE 
diversified, and on rebuilding relations with the MoD  (www.corporatewatch.org.uk). However, it is 
acknowledged at this point, the company was over-reliant on government contracts 
(www.timesonline.co.ukj). 
7XUQHU¶V ILUVW FDOO ZDV HQWHULQJ IHURFLRXV QHJRWLDWLRQV RYHU ZKR ZRXOG SD\ Ior the £1.45 billion 
overruns; negotiating BAE to take a £797 million write-down. Furthermore, he used this incident to 
vocalise WKHµXQDFFHSWDEOHOHYHOVRIULVNZKLFK0R'FRQWUDFWVKHOG««VHUYLQJWRGHVWUR\WKHGHIHQFH
LQGXVWULDOEDVHRI WKH8.¶ www.ft.comw). Rather than guaranteeing margins as the Pentagon does, 
fixed-price contracts secured through competition did not always provide realistic cost targets or value 
IRUPRQH\DQGWKLVµKDGWRFKDQJH¶www.ft.como). Going forward, Turner asserted WKDW%$(ZRQ¶W
µJRRQWDNLQJLQDSSURSULDWHOHYHOVRIULVNOLNHWKRVHRQ1LPURGDQG$VWXWH¶(www.timesonline.co.ukk). 
Financially, company woes were alleviated to an extent in 2003, albeit one company insider contends 
BAE lost  money on nearly everything except the Al Yamamah contract to supply and run Saudi 
Arabia's air force, whereby BAE gets paid in oil, and hence were fortunate as oil was sustained at its 
highest price since 1983 (www.economist.comb). 
 
4.7.3.2. Unimpressive Performance 
2004 engendered poor financial performance, predicated on weak returns from Ministry of Defence 
contracts and write-downs  relating to the merger with MES  and simplification of ties with 
Finnmeccanica; totalling £546 million. This gloomy outlook was tempered by reporting a net cash 
position of £5 million; a stark contrast to the £870 million of debt in 2003. The strong cash position for 
the year allowed internal financing of acquisitions e.g. %$(¶V DFTXLVLWLRQ RI WKH 8.¶V PDLQ
manufacturer of armoured vehicles; Alvis Vickers,  was completed to strengthen their position in the 
land sector7KLVUHIOHFWHG7XUQHU¶VGULYHRIµFRQWLQXLQJWRSXVKH[SDQGLQJ1RUWK$PHULFDQRSHUDWLRQV
E\ILQGLQJVXLWDEOHWDUJHWV¶www.ft.coml). Profit growth came from outside its traditional UK business, 
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ZKLFKQRZRQO\DFFRXQWVIRUDILIWKRIRYHUDOOUHYHQXHV0RVWLPSUHVVLYHJURZWKFDPHLQ%$(¶V
per cent ownership stake in Airbus, where profits grew £20 million to £108 million (www.ft.comm). 
Furthermore, this positive note was coupled with a new commercial agreement for Typhoon fighters 
VLJQHGZLWKWKH5$)HQVXULQJIXWXUHUHYHQXHVRIRQHRI%$(¶VPRVWOXFUDWLYHSURGXFWV 
 
4.7.4  2005-2008  
4.7.4.1 The Beginnings of Turnaround 
LVV\QRQ\PRXVZLWKWKHXSWXUQLQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI%$(LQLWLDWHGWKURXJK7XUQHU¶VSURJUDPRI
shreud acquisitions. Following from the Alvis Vickers buy-out, Turner targeted United Defense 
Industies (UDI) in a £2.25 billion acquisition. Subsequently, BAE moved from a limited player to the 
second largest ODQGVXSSOLHULQWKHZRUOG6LJQLILFDQWO\WKLVµhelped BAE take its first major step on 
WKHRWKHUVLGHRI WKHSRQG¶(www.thisismoney.co.uk),  in light of the enlarged land systems business 
ZLWKLQWKH86DUP\
VELJJHVWSURFXUHPHQWSODQWKHµ)XWXUH&RPEDW6\VWHPV¶SURJUDPPHUHIOHFWLQJ
the  new tactical approaches necessary in Iraq and Afghanistan. Competitively, this move pushed the 
group into sixth place among US defence contractors and meant the American Department of Defence 
'R' RYHUWRRN WKH 0R' DV %$( 6\VWHPV
 ODUJHVW FXVWRPHU 7KLV PRYH ZDV LQGLFDWLYH RI %$(¶V
efforts to grab a share of rising defence spending in the United States and comes at a time when it 
regarded European defence budgets as under pressure. Turner illustrated this policy when describing 
WKH DFTXLVLWLRQ DV µD IXUWKHU VWHS LQ GHOLYHULQJ RQ RXU VWUDWHJ\ WR JURZ DV WKH SUHPLHU WUDQVDWODQWLF
DHURVSDFH DQG GHIHQFH FRPSDQ\¶ (www.guardian.co.ukn). Additionally, BAE secured substantial 
future earnings by agreeing to subcontract development of  F-35 joint strike fighter with Lockheed 
Martin, which could be worth up to $300 billion (www.guardian.co.ukk). Moreover, Turner offset a 
VPDOO SRUWLRQ RI DFTXLVLWLRQ FRVWV IURP WKH  VDOH RI LWV *HUPDQ QDYDO V\VWHPV VXEVLGLDU\ µ$WODV
(OHNWURQLN¶ 
 
4.7.4.2. Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) 
7XUQHU¶V FULWLFLVP RI 0R' FRQWUDFWXDO WHQGHQFLHV DQG 86-market based acquisition policy 
compounded conjecture, combined with the WKH WDFLW WKUHDW VLQFH 7XUQHU¶V DSSRLQWPHQW RI %$(
decamping to the US; precipitated the government to publish a radical departure from the old 
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procurement model; the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS). This clarified the relationship between the 
MoD and the industry, identifying key industrial capabilities which must be maintained within the UK 
through long term government commitments to support research and procurement. Significantly,  BAE 
monopolised many of these capabilities in the UK, therein protecting their domestic dominance 
ZKHUHE\7XUQHU UHWURVSHFWLYHO\ FRPPHQWHG µZLWKRXW WKH',6 WKHQ WKHUHKDG WREHDTXHVWLRQPDUN
DERXW RXU IXWXUH LQ WKH 8.¶ (www.aviationweek.com). Interestingly, albeit guaranteeing BAE 
company margins around 8%, it pales by comparison with the 15% defence companies expect to make 
in the US (www.ft.comu). Company pre-tax profits for 2005 of £696 million reflected these initiatives, 
credited to its expansion into the US and an improvement in its troubled UK operations 
(www.baesystems.com).  
 
4.7.4.3 The Sale of Airbus 
,Q%$(FRQWLQXHGLQWKHLUVDOHRI¶QRQ-FRUHEXVLQHVVHV¶E\OHWWLQJJRRIµ$HURVWUXFWXUHV¶ whilst 
enjoying the awarding of two contracts from Saudi Arabia totalling around £8.5 to £12.5 billion for 
delivery and upgrade of Eurofighter Typhoons and Tornados respectively.  
Increased focus on the defence industry and sale of non-core businesses ZDVHFKRHG7XUQHU¶VIRUHPRVW
DFWLRQLQWKLVSHULRGWKHVDOHRI%$(¶VVWDNHLQ$LUEXVWR($'6IRUELOOLRQ7KLVIROORZHG
announced delays to the  A380, increased exposure to the US dollar and competition from a resurgent 
Boeing; signalling the end of UK involvement in civil airliner production. BAE was a highly 
successful defence contractor and strategically, Airbus had no value to BAE whilst further, it made no 
sense to have capital tied up in a business over which the company had no operational, management or 
strategic control. +RZHYHULWZDVYLHZHGDVµQRQ-FRUH¶DQGJDYH%$(WKHDPPXQLWLRQWRSUHVVDKHDG
with its US ambitions (www.thisismoney.co.uk), as Turner emphasises: µIf you want to be the leading 
defence company in the world, you have to be in the US and you have to be big in the US¶ 
(www.ft.comw). 
Britain's biggest defence contractor made it clear that some of the proceeds would go towards further 
acquisitions in the US and that BAE could tap into "virtually unlimited" funds for this strategy. With 
operating profits up 16% to £1.1 billion from strong demand from US military and lucrative Saudi 
Arabian business; group worth grew to £14 billion, signifying BAE as larger than all its US peers 
except Lockheed Martin and Boeing (www.timesonlines.co.ukk). 
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4.7.4.4  µBritain's Defence &KDPSLRQ /RVHV LWV 0RVW 6XFFHVVIXO %RVV LQ <HDUV¶
(www.economist.com) 
 
7XUQHUFRQWLQXHGZLWKKLVSROLF\RIVHOOLQJµQRQ-FRUH¶DVVHWVLQE\RIIORDGLQJ%$(¶VVKDUH
RI µSelex Sensors and Airborne Systems¶ to Finmeccanica for £270 million; thereby increasingly 
disengaging from its businesses in continental Europe in favour of U.S. priorities. As such, Turner 
admitted BAE commitment in continental Europe will largely remain programmatic , where BAE 
would represent Britain in any Europe-wide weapons programme at most (www.ft.como). This sale 
preceded the acquisition of Armor Holdings in May for £2.3 billion; a leading provider armoured 
YHKLFOHV DQG VXUYLYDELOLW\ WHFKQRORJLHV  7KLV IXUWKHU FRQVROLGDWHG %$(¶V OHDGLQJ VKDUH RI WKH ODQG
systems market that was critical to campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The success of which the 
company enjoyed during this period is indicated by announced pre- tax profits of £1.235 billion; amid 
allegations of corruption within BAE deals. In August 2008, Turner speculatively left BAE; having 
presided over the most successful period the company had ever enjoyed. 
 
4.7.5 The Profile of Mike Turner 
Mike Turner worked within BAE for 42 years, having been in 22 different roles. The holistic 
perspective of the multivariate workings of BAE  acquired over these posts, undoubtedly informed his 
success as Chief Operating Officer (COO), being responsible for all of the company's business units. 
One would expect this too carried over toward his success as CEO. 
)URP WKH HDUO\ ¶V 7XUQHU HDUQHG UHFRJQLWLRQ IRU KDQGOLQJ WKH JURXS¶V FRPPHUFLDO DLUFUDIW
interests. As well as its interest in Airbus (in those days a loose consortium of national aerospace 
groups), BAE was struggling to sell its own line of aircraft; the Avro RJ. BAE extricated itself from 
the project at a cost of £4 billion. Albeit, it was recognised the cost would have been far worse if the 
line had continued in existence and hence Turner received much praise (www.timesonline.co.ukm). 
7XUQHU¶V VL[ \HDU tenure as CEO led BAE to becoming a superpower within the Aerospace and 
Defence industry; evident from its £41.1 billion order book (www.thisismoney.co.uk).  
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Within his post as Head of BAe's defence export businesses, Turner was argued as a tireless advocate 
RI(XURSHDQFRQVROLGDWLRQTXRWLQJµWREHFRPHDJOREDOFRPSDQ\ZHEHOLHYHWKDWWKHILUVWVWHSLQWKLV
SURFHVV LV WR HVWDEOLVK (XUR&R DQG WR GHYHORS IURP WKDW VWURQJ EDVH¶www.findarticles.com). More 
broadly, he considered 'Just being the number 10 defence contractor in the world is not a desirable 
SODFHWREHIRUDFRPSDQ\OLNH%$(
DQGKHQFHDQLQGXVWU\VRXUFHFRQILUPHGWKDWµ0LNH¶VYLVLRQZDV
that the UK was not big enough to sustain a company like BAE, oU ZKHUH LW ZDQWV WR EH¶
(www.thisismoney.co.uk). Interestingly, the aforementioned favour of European consolidation was 
replaced upon his ascension to CEO by US emphasis, long pushing for more growth (www.ft.como). 
This pugnacity toward rapid growth in the US is exemplified by putting the group on the Pentagon's 
radar with a dozen transatlantic deals, resulting in BAE now accruing over £16 billion of sales from 
the DoD; triple compared to 2002 (www.ft.comq) . 
Upon his announced resignation, the City while acknowledging he was not a typical chief executive, 
praised his work in turning round the behemoth that is Europe's largest defence contractor; reflected in 
an initial fall in the company's share price (www.ft.coms). As such, he came out of BAE's old school, 
with a reputation for a negotiating technique of directness and an unabashed, combative  manner which 
was regarded by many as bullying. This made him enemies, not least inside the MoD (www.ft.comn). 
During his career, Turner held directorships at Babcock International Group plc (1996 to 2005), P&O 
(2005) and Lazard Ltd (2006 onwards). He further sat on the Airbus Supervisory Board µ6RFLHW\RI 
%ULWLVK$HURVSDFH&RPSDQLHV¶ from 1998 (www.baesystems.com). 
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4.8 Boeing 
 
 
4.8.1 Synopsis 
Founded in 1916, The Boeing Company is the second-largest aerospace and defence contractor in the 
world, based on revenues of over $60.9 billion in 2008 (www.defensenews.coma). Their business 
VWUDWHJLHVDUHFHQWHUHGRQWKHVXFFHVVIXOH[HFXWLRQLQFRUHEXVLQHVVHVRIµ&RPPHUFLDO$LUSODQHV¶DQG
µ,QWHJUDWHG'HIHQFH6\VWHPV¶,'67heir strong footing within the defence industry is reflected by 
them being the number three defence contractor globally (www.defensenews.comb), with the lion 
VKDUH RI UHYHQXH JHQHUDWHG IURP WKH 86 'R'¶V  ELOOLRQ EXGJHW &RPELQHG VWUHQJWK LQ ERWK
sectoUVEHQHILWVWKHPDVFRPPHUFLDODQGGHIHQFHPDUNHWVRIWHQRIIVHWHDFKRWKHU¶VF\FOLFDOLW\ 
Numerous allegations of corruption, outdated production systems and lack of clear corporate strategy 
coalesced to hinder performance in the early 21st century. Most significantly, declines up to 2003 were 
prompted by the resurgence  and successes of Airbus, outselling Boeing for the first time. These woes 
were further exacerbated over the period by macroeconomic factors such as volatile fuel costs, 
deregulation stimulating airline closures and commercial airline industry decline post September 11th.              
To date, Boeing has regained its previous financial health following triumphant initiatives of primarily 
-LP0F1HUQH\DVLQGLFDWHGE\WKHERRNµ<RX&DQ¶W2UGHU &KDQJH¶ recounting his efforts in achieving 
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turnaround (www.leadershipnow.com)%RHLQJ¶VUHFRYHU\ZDVGHULYHGIURPWKHGHYHORSPHQWDQGVDOHRI
WKH µ 'UHDPOLQHU¶ WR PDWFK $LUEXV¶ HTXLYDOHQW ZKLOVW IXUWKHU EHing compounded by ramped up 
production through adoption of lean methods, efficient outsourcing and not least, a reorientation 
WRZDUGVLQQRYDWLRQ6XEVHTXHQWO\0F1HUQH\DQGRWKHUV¶DFKLHYHPHQWRIWXUQDURXQGZDVFRQILUPHGLQ
the 2007 posting of record high $67 billion revenues, resulting from eradication of  a number of 
underlying difficulties which plagued firm history over the past decade. 
 
4.8.2. 2000-2003: Components of Decline 
4.8.2.1 The Resurrection of Airbus 
,QGLFDWLRQVRI%RHLQJ¶VGHFOLQHDQG$LUEXV¶DVFHQVLRQZHUHHYLGHQWZKHQWKHODWWHURXWVROGWKHIRUPHU
for the first time in 2003, subsequently causing the US firm to lose its position as market leader. 
%RHLQJ µVPLQRU LPSURYHPHQWVRI  LWV SUHYLRXVO\ VXFFHVVIXO DQGKDOWLQJRI LQQRYDWLRQ DOORZHd 
Airbus to capitalise on their lack of an aircraft in the super jumbo and smaller jetliner space. This gave 
the Airbus A380 and A350 lucrative first mover advantages  (www.docstoc.com), capitalising on 
demand for reduced running costs and less waste emission amongst aircraft. Moreover,  Boeing 
couldn't duplicate Airbus's innovations without redesigning its aircraft at prohibitive cost.  
 
4.8.2.2 Corporate Lethargy & Industry Decline 
This predicament was a product of corporate lethargy, exemplified in an unwillingness to update 
archaic production-line techniques and ignorance of recommendations to build either a super-jumbo or 
a smaller jetliner long before 2003 (Adesanya, 2006). Adesanya (2006) argues this problem was 
assisted by over-HPSKDVLVRQJRYHUQPHQWGHIHQFHFRQWUDFWVRIZKLFKZHUHQ¶WVHFXUHGHJORVLQJRXW
WR/RFNKHHG0DUWLQRYHUWKHµ-RLQW-Striker-)LJKWHU¶SURJUDP 
Following the 9/11 attacks, global airlines were hit by large declines in air traffic. Suited to the A380,  
the idea of not breaking long journeys and  thereby avoiding multiple take-offs and landings appealed 
WR FXVWRPHUV $GHVDQ\D  %RHLQJ¶V UHVSRQVH ZDV  OD\RIIV DV UHIOHFWHG LQ WKHLU 
DQQXDOUHSRUWµZHTXLFNO\UHGXFHGSURGXFWLRQ to prevent the inevitable glut of new and idle jetliners 
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from being any JUHDWHUWKDQLWZDV¶www.boeing.com1). 2003 thus culminated in a low $50.5 billion 
in revenue, attributing the slump expectedly; to very poor commercial airplane performance and sales. 
 
4.8.3. 2003-7RS0DQDJHPHQW&KDQJH	WKHµ'UHDPOLQHU¶ 
December 2003 saw Harry Stonecipher replace Phil Condit as CEO at a Boeing, embroiled in 
allegations of corruption and bedevilled by problems from a  lack of clear corporate  strategy. Above 
all else, the rediscovery and dogged pursuit of a sound corporate vision was  vital to the improved 
SHUIRUPDQFH DW %RHLQJ $GHVDQ\D  S $FFRUGLQJO\ $LUEXV¶ XQSUHFHGHQWHG YLVLELOLW\ DQG
dominance throughout the first five years of the new century prompted a reactionary strategy from 
Boeing, announcing the development of a mid-VL]HGDLUFUDIWWKHRUWKHµ'UHDPOLQHU¶ 
Record high jet fuel prices FRPSRXQGHGE\ WKH¶V UHSXWDEOH IXHO-efficiency, prompted airlines to 
start putting in orders in 2004,  looking to capitalise on an aircraft expected to burn 20% less fuel than 
comparably sized planes e.g. All Nippon Airways of Japan ordered 50, worth around $6 billion. 
0HDQZKLOH$LUEXV¶FRVWRYHUUXQVDQGGHOD\V LQSURducing the A380 encouraged some customers to 
switch the modernised versions of the 747, 737 or 777 newly launched by Boeing. Nevertheless, 
Airbus had seized 20%  (Anonamous, 2006) RI%RHLQJ¶VPDUNHWVKDUHE\VHFXULQJQHWRUGHUVIRU
aircraft compared to WKH 86 ILUP¶V  RYHUDOO Defence revenue was solid with $30 billion in 
contracts won, continuing to add to the highest backlog in the defence industry. Overall, indicative of 
WKHµ&RPPHUFLDO$LUSODQH¶DUP¶VXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFHWKHJURXSJHQHUDWHGELOOion for 2004, albeit 
an improvement from the preceding year (www.boeing.com2, p.4). 
 
 
4.8.4  2005- 2007: Turning Around 
4.8.4.1  Top Management Change (again): Installation of Jim McNerney 
$QDO\VWVFRQVLVWHQWO\DWWULEXWH%RHLQJ¶V³WXUQ-DURXQG´WRWKHKLULQg of James McNerney in June 2005 
as CEO (www.oppapers.com), of  whom was installed after Stonecipher was forced to step down 
(amid allegations of illicit affairs) albeit the commercial aircraft business was bouncing back.  
0F1HUQH\PLJKWKDYHEHHQWHPSWHGWRPHUHO\HQJDJHLQDXWRSLORWEXWLQVWHDGVDZKLVMREDVµWXUER-
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FKDUJLQJ WKH H[HFXWLRQ¶ RI WKH FXUUHQW VWUDWHJ\ Consequently, McNerney unveiled a series of 
initiatives designed to deliver substantially improved financial results. These included lean practices, 
global sourcing and increased productivity in internal services and development processes 
(www.factiva.comf). He recognised that although Boeing's commercial business was rebounding, there 
were problems with defence, due not to a lack of immediate revenues or profits, but stemming from its 
relations with its biggest customer, the DoD. McNerney had inherited a legacy of ethical problems in 
Boeing's relationship with the US defence department, as well as a shrinking US defence budget and 
the maturity of some its main contracts (www.ft.comx). A clear lack of strong leadership was evident.  
 
4.8.4.2  Lean Production & Outsourcing 
McNerney set XSRQ PDNLQJ µGHHS GLYHV LQWR WHFKQRORJ\¶ WR H[HFXWH %RHLQJ¶V OHDQ PDQXIDFWXULQJ
advantage more aggressively, by DGRSWLQJµ7R\RWLVP¶	.DL]HQTXDOLW\V\VWHPVwww.docstoc.com). 
Greater implementation thus allowed efficiency to usurp disorder and aircraft assembly became much 
more streamlined and structured.  Modernisations creating lower costs thus facilitated Boeing to rival 
the manufacturing efficiency and aggressive pricing of Airbus (www.economist.comf). Furthermore, 
µGHYHORSPHQW SURFHVV H[FHOOHQFH¶ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH VSHHG DQG LPSURYLQJ WKH \LHOG RI ERWK 5	' DQG
major development projects was not confined to the Commercial Airplane business, but the IDS as 
well; specifically thH µ)XWXUH &RPEDW 6\VWHP¶ SURJUDP FRQWUDFWHG E\ WKH 'R' (www.boeing.com3, 
p.5). Efficacy of increased emphasis on these practices by McNerney is reflected in the difference in 
aircraft delivery of 290 in 2005 to 398 in 7KXVGLVFLSOLQHGDQG PHDVXUHG µUDPS-XS¶DLUSODQH
production was integral to meeting financial performance goals by increasing efficiency and reducing 
costs (www.boeing.com4, p.9).  
Whilst pushing innovation in both technology and manufacturing, McNerney took upon the decision to 
RXWVRXUFH VRPHDLUFUDIW FRQVWUXFWLRQPHDQLQJ WKDW WKH µ'UHDPOLQHU¶ FRVWPLOOLRQ VLJQLILFDQWO\
less than the list price of $280 million for the A380 (Adesanya, 2006). Use of external contractors was 
too used by Airbus, however Boeing applied this option to a far greater extent and thus, to the 
advantage of sales.  
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4.8.4.3 Outselling Airbus 
Boeing regained their position as market leader in 2006, by securing 1044 orders (488 for the 
µ'UHDPOLQHU¶IRUDLUFUDIWLQFRPSDULVRQWR$LUEXV¶(www.chicagomag.com).  Group-wide 2006 
revenue climbed to $ 61.5 billion, up 15% from $53.6 billion from 2005. Moreover, the business had 
grown 50% in last 6 years and booked $190 billion in orders during the time (www.boeing.com4). A 
stark contrast to their position in 2003; a number of initiatives and people had contributed to enacting 
this turnaround in performance. 
One such agent of change who drove the success of innovative Dreamliner and continues to develop 
and market all the other jets Boeing offers is Scott Carson. Carson  was appointed head of sales for the 
Commercial Airplane division in 2004, taking over a demoralized and handcuffed sales staff. He gave 
KLVVDOHVVWDIIPXFKPRUHDXWKRULW\WRPDNHWKHLURZQGHFLVLRQVµ,QHYHU\OLQH\RXVWDUWHGWRVHHVDOHV
ULVHQRWMXVWWKH'UHDPOLQHU¶&DUVRQUHPDUNHGwww.seattlepi.com). This was predicated on an ethos 
of µOLVWHQLQJWRRXUFXVWRPHUVDQGWKXVEXLOGDFRPPHUFLDODLUSODQHVWUDWHJ\WKDWGLVWLQJXLVKHVXVIURP
RXUFRPSHWLWLRQ¶www.boeing.com4, p.4) Application of this principle was evident in 2006 when the 
sales team secured huge deals with Air India and Air Canada (both long time Airbus buyers) 
(www.economist.comf) or $10 billion, $9 billion and $5 billion deals with Qantas Airways, Emirates 
Airways and Ryanair respectively (www.factiva.com). Increased demand from airlines was further 
augmented by the resurgence of passenger air traffic since 9/11, and the high cost of fuel meaning 
%RHLQJ¶VIXHOHIILFLHQWDLUFUDIWZHUHSUHIHUUHGRYHU$LUEXV¶ 
Following this customer-centric approach, he installed the initiative that the company now works to 
help customers sell off old planes in order to pave the way for the purchase of new ones. µ7KHPDQGDWH
was to rebuild relationships with airlines and take further advantage of our product development, and 
WKH UHGXFWLRQ LQ SURGXFWLRQ FRVWV¶ FRPPHQWHG &DUVRQ www.factiva.coma). Executing this strategy 
was assisted by the 2006 purchase of Aviall Inc for $1.7 billion; a specialist in supply chain services 
and global parts distribution of whom would provide services to Boeing customers in aerospace and 
defence sectors (www.ft.comy). 
 
 
4.8.4.4  A Record Year 
These initiatives and improvements  exhibited by Boeing  over the past few years culminated in 2007 
with revenues of  $67 billion and a 84% growth in profit to $4.07 billion,  based on record sales of 
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1413 aircraft (www.rte.ie). The group's total backlog, including defence contracts, doubled in the last 
three years to $327bn, which is the biggest order backlog in the world for the aerospace and defence 
sector (www.domain-b.com). 7KH ODXQFKRI WKHµ'UHDPOLQHU¶DQGPRGHUQLVDWLRQRIH[LVWLQJDLUFUDIWV
SXW%RHLQJEDFNLQWRWKHOHDJXHRIWHFKQRORJLFDOOHDGHUVLQDYLDWLRQIRUFHV0F1HUQH\¶VOHDGHUVKLSRI
good strategy coupled with a re-infused innovative culture  and improved processes have  propelled 
Boeing back to the top of its industry. The successes of this period are indicated by; albeit 2008 has 
seen the company plagued by breakdowns  in the supply chain and delays in production of the 
Dreamliner, Boeing remain relatively unworried; because they have a bulging order book with 
production backlogs that will take years to work through (see figure 1).  
 
 
4.8.5 The Profile of Jim McNerney 
-LP0F1HUQH\¶VKDVEHHQVHDWHG LQKLJK UDQNLQJSRVLWLRQV VSDQQLQJDQXPEHURIKXJHFRUSRUDWLRQV
during his career,  thus emerging  as one of the most effective leaders of his generation 
(www.leadershipnow.com). Beginning at Proctor & Gamble and then McKinsey & Co consultancy 
group, McNerney subsequently joined General Electric in 1982; where he spent 18 years working his 
way up in roles closely linked to the commercial aviation sector; including positions of CEO in GE 
Lighting, president of GE Asia-Pacific and Executive Vice President of GE Financial Services and GE 
Capital. Importantly, he was CEO of GE Aircraft Engines, being the architect of the agreement to 
SRZHU%RHLQJ¶VQHZHVWPRGHOVH[FOXVLYHO\ZLWKWKH*(MHWHQJLQHwww.factiva.comf). Herein, 
McNerney thrived and modelled his approach to management on Jack Welch; notorious for relentless 
cost-cutting, devotion to manufacturing excellence and ruthless weeding out of lesser performers in the 
workforce (www.chicagomag.com) 
In 2001 he joined 3M as chief executiYH ZKLOVW DW WKH VDPH WLPH MRLQHG %RHLQJ¶V ERDUG DV D QRQ-
executive director. 3M was underperforming with $16 billion in revenues and investors regarded the 
culture as somewhat insular. McNerney was credited with turnaround by through a program of organic 
growth; introduced manufacturing process improvements that lowered costs, whilst sales still climbed 
30 % over 2001, to $21.2 billion in 2005 (www.chicagomag.com). Consequently, he has a proven 
track record as a leader of complex global businesses, gaining experience working with a range of 
government and commercial customers. Come 2005 and his appointment to Boeing, McNerney said 
KLVIDPLOLDULW\ZLWKWKHDHURVSDFHEXVLQHVVDQG%RHLQJ¶VFRPPHUFLDODQGPLOLWDU\SURducts through his 
former role at GE, means the new job will not be a steep learning curve for him.  
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His style has been to ride herd on top managers, giving them the tools they need to do their jobs and 
then holding them accountable if they don't deliver (www. businessweek.com). Moreover, he adopts a 
consensus-driven approach placing an importance of winning hearts and minds with a clear vision of 
future success (www.leadershipnow.com). McNerney established himself as someone who knows how 
to manufacture more efficiently and profitability, which impacted Boeing considerably . Moreover, his 
NQRZOHGJH RI %RHLQJ¶V PDUNHWV DQG UHFRUG RI LPSURYLQJ SURILWV WKURXJK FRPELQHG RSHUDWLQJ
efficiency and capital discipline too shone through (www.oppapers.com8QOLNHPDQ\RWKHU&(2¶V
he holds no other directorships currently other than Proctor & Gamble; albeit previously held a 
position on the 3M board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Source: www.economist.comd 
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4.9 VT Group 
 
Source: FAME 
 
4.9.1 Synopsis 
VT Group primarily provides a myriad of support services to the public sector in Britain and for the 
US & UK armed forces; albeit it is better known for its shipbuilding roots, of which accounted for only 
one fifth of £1.2 billion turnover in 2008 (www.ft.comg). It derives much of its business from large 
contracts with the MoD for such support as training naval staff, a joint venture with BAE and servicing 
support ships leased to the navy. Vosper Thornycroft as it was formerly known, specialised in 
shipbuilding up until the warship industry began to decline in munificence, as the end of the Cold War 
precipitated curtails in defence spending. From 1999 to 2002, profits continued to stagnate as 
shipbuildinJ GHPDQG ZDQHG HYHQ WKRXJK VXSSRUW VHUYLFHV UHYHQXH JUHZ WKLV SURSRUWLRQDOO\ ZDVQ¶W
enough to offset decline. This trend served to increase decline in ROCE as capital injections from 
retained profit and shareholders increased, with little performance improvement 
(www.investorchronicle.co.uk). This was compounded by industrial action halting production, PFI  
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-costs and expenses of moving to a new shipyard.  
7KHLQVWDOOPHQWRI3DXO/HVWHUDV&(2LQVDZDUHYHUVDORIWKHJURXS¶VIRUWXQHVµWUDQVIRUPLQJ¶ 
VT by chasing fatter margin in broad-based support services operations, creating a huge forward order 
book (www.timesonline.co.uki). Moreover, long term growth opportunities were pursued by 
diversifying out of WKHµOXPS\¶VKLSEXLOGLQJVHFWRUDQGFDSWXUHGLQWKH86RXWVRXUFLQJPDUNHWDQGLQ
public education and training. 8QGHU/HVWHU¶VOHDGHUVKLS97*URXSLVQRZZRUWKRYHUELOOLRQDQG
just 16 % of operations are based around shipbuilding (www.ft.comg) 
 
4.9.2 1999-2002: Decline 
Vosper Thornycroft was victim of the post- Cold war fallout in the defence industry, of which hit the 
shipbuilding sector the hardest. Consequently, making up over 50% of revenues at the time; fall in 
GHPDQGIRUZDUVKLSVGHSOHWHGWKHFRPSDQ\¶VUHYHQXHVVLJQLILFDQWO\ 
Moreover, the sector has fallen out of favour on the back of accounting controversies and PFI 
problems. The company endured industrial action at its Woolston yard whilst incurring delays and 
VLJQLILFDQW FRVW RYHUUXQV PRYLQJ WR LWV QHZ VKLSSLQJ \DUG LQ 3RUWVPRXWK 0HDQZKLOH 97¶V VXSSRUW
services operations were roaring ahead, with operating profits soaring 54 per cent to £7.95m  by 2001. 
The fast-growing division accounted for 80 % of Vosper's £1.16 billion order book.  Future growth 
was also bolstered by the acquisition of Griffin Services, a US provider of facilities management 
services to the US Department of Defence, for up to $31m (www.investorchroniclle.co.uka). 
Nonetheless, heavy capital investments in numerous acquisitions over the period bore no fruit and with 
WKHVWUXJJOLQJVKLSEXLOGLQJPDUNHW97¶VSHUIRUPDQFHZDVGHFOLQLQJ 
 
4.9.3 2002-2004 
4.9.3.1 Top Management Change 
July 2002 saw the appointment of Paul Lester as CEO whilst correspondingly, the firm changed its 
name to VT Group, in an effort to shed its image of an old-fashioned shipbuilding company. Lester 
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was brought in to revitalise the business and fully direct it toward its growing support service 
orientation. Additionally, he looked to step up the pace of Vosper's outsourcing business which was 
already set to grow by up to 20% a year, after six acquisitions made in 2001 (www.guardian.co.ukg). 
Overall, Lester set demanding targets for double-digit growth in profits for the next three years 
(www.investorschronicle.co.uka). The profits pledge followed a root and branch review of the group; 
identifying the key toward better performance in the long term, removal from the defence industry into 
support services, whilst short term; included capturing the remaining available MoD contracts. Hereby, 
LWZDVUHFRJQLVHGWKDWVKLSEXLOGLQJUHYHQXHVFDQEHµOXPS\¶DQGPRYHVLQWRVXSSRUWservices provide 
smooth upward progress in earnings (www.timesonline.co.ukh). 
/HVWHU¶VLPPHGLDWHH[SDQVLRQ in the warship business was boosted by the award of a £200m contract 
to build 20% of the first six Type 45 destroyers for BAE Systems and the Royal Navy 
(www.guardian.co.ukg), including the opportunity to secure further orders up till 2010. In turn, the 
FDSWXUHRI WKLVDQGRWKHUFRQWUDFWV VDZ WKHJURXS¶VRUGHUERRN  LQFUHDVHP WRD UHFRUGEQ LQ
2002 (www.guardian.co.ukg). In 2003, Lester further oversaw the highly symbolic move of VT from 
its old-fashioned shipyard roots in Southampton; to operate from a headquarters next to their £60m 
new state of the art, automated shipbuilding facility in Portsmouth, where the group works on key 
sections of the Type 45 destroyers (www.guardian.co.ukf). Naval shipbuilding was in the upswing of 
its cycle again, and Lester was determined WR HQVXUH 97¶V QHZ VKLS\DUG JRW LWV VKDUH RI WKH ZRUN
(www.ft.coma 6WLOO /HVWHU¶V ORQJ WHUP YLVLRQ RI 97 *URXS DV DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO VXSSRUW VHUYLFH
EXVLQHVVZDVEDVHGRQWKHORJLFWKDWµWKHEHVWPDUJLQVDUHQRWPDGHRQbuilding Type 45 destroyers, 
but on maintaining them¶www.timesonline.co.ukb). 
Two  events highlighted Lester's restless ambition for the group and its continuing reinvention, a 
paradigm for what the former president of the EEF - the engineering employers federation - sees as the 
revitalisation of manufacturing in Britain (www.guardian.co.ukf).  
 
4.9.3.2 Growth in Education 
The first being Lester taking to properly expanding their education business by becoming the first 
private contractor to take over a successful local education authority. VT announced in May 2003 that 
µ97(GXFDWLRQ¶  agreed a £100m, seven-year deal with Surrey county council to run a joint venture 
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company aiming to win contracts from failing LEAs (www.guardian.co.ukh). This includes supply 
services to schools, including governor advice, curriculum and technology support, finance and 
personnel services as well as contract management for catering, grounds maintenance and cleaning 
(www.guardian.co.ukf). Lester viewed this opportunity as the springboard for growth in the education 
field where schools, even with limited budgets, are free to buy services from outside the local 
HGXFDWLRQDXWKRULW\DQGWKXVWKHUHLVµDQDSSHWLWHDPRQJRWKHUORFDOHGXFDWLRQDXWKRULWLHVIRUVLPLODU
GHDOV¶www.timesonline.co.ukb). Moreover, growth herH UHGXFHV WKH JURXS¶V UHOLDQFH RQ LWV OXPS\
naval shipbuilding business. 
Lester says this shift from pure industrial production - process, measurement, command-control, 
capital intensity - to customer-facing services can help British manufacturing retain its 19% share of 
the economy and redevelop world class status by abandoning low cost, low skill metal-bashing and 
adding value, intellectual property in design and high technology as well as skills training and 
aftermarket servicing (www.guardian.co.ukf). 
 
4.9.3.3 Building A Reputation in the US 
The second significant win came at a public auction in January 2004 where VT paid just £10m for 
American government military contracts held by JA Jones, a construction and services group in 
&KDSWHU  EDQNUXSWF\ SURWHFWLRQ 7KLV DFTXLVLWLRQ OLIWHG DQQXDO WXUQRYHU RI 97¶V 86 *ULIILQ
subsidiary, which focuses on government outsourcing contracts in the defence sector; by $100m to 
$300m (www.ft.coma).  Lester applied the reasoning that perversely, when government spending on 
the military or education falls, public sector services are outsourced to save money and hence provides 
more work for VT. 
97¶V86EXVLQHVVKDVJURZQUDSLGO\VLQFH/HVWHUMRLQHGFRPPHQWLQJWKDWKHORRNHGWRµLQFUHDVH97¶V
presence in the US defence market as it is 10 times bigger than anyone else and aim to register on the 
3HQWDJRQ
V VFDOHV DV D VHULRXV VXSSOLHU¶ www.ft.coma). Similarly in outsourcing, he justifies 
LQFUHDVLQJWKHLUSUHVHQFHDVµWKH86LV\HDUVEHKLQGWKH8.LQRXWVRXUFLQJLQdefence,  it would be 
FUD]\ QRW WR PDNH LW D ELJ SODQN RI RXU VWUDWHJ\¶ www.ft.coma). Moreover, he acknowledged that 
whilst the group had benefited from outsourcing of MoD work through direct contracts and PFI deals, 
he realised outsourcing had a certain limit in the UK (www.ft.comc). 
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4.9.4 2005-2007 
In 2005, VT delivered its targeWRIDQQXDOHDUQLQJVJURZWK)XUWKHUPRUHWKH\HDU¶VSHUIRUPDQFH
reflected the benefits of diversity in an order book standing at £2.7 billion,  and profit rising by 13% to 
£41.6 million. Significantly, the group generated £734 million in turnover of which  shipbuilding 
contributed a little over £145 million; with the lion share of £591 million coming from support services 
(www.vtgroupplc.com). Specifically, the company had achieved 20% per annum growth in support 
services over the last 5-6 years through a mix of organic and acquisitive growth (www.ft.comk). 
 
6KLSEXLOGLQJ¶V5HVXUJHQFH	86([SDQVLRQ 
 
Nonetheless, shipbuilding still accrued significant earnings; especially as unlike many of its rivals in 
WKHLQGXVWU\97¶VUHFHQWO\PRGHUQLVHG3RUWVPRXWKVKLS\DUGLVSURILWDEOHDQGLVEXLOGLQJWKHERZIRU
the new Type-45 destroyer for the British Navy. The company further pioneered an innovative way of 
building offshore patrol ships for the MoD, where VT retains ownership of the vessels, leases them to 
the MoD on a five-year contract and makes sure they are kept in service almost constantly 
(www.ft.come). On top of this, the 2005 AirTanker win will start delivering serious revenues in 2007. 
Hereby, VT had established itself well within the newly revitalised British naval ship-building for the 
short term, albeit Lester still recognised that the main engine of growth comes from support services in 
sectors such as education. 
Beyond this, US expansion was an important strategy for Lester; exemplified in the £13.2m acquisition 
RI µ7KH &XEH &RUSRUDWLRQ¶ EULQJLQJ FULWLFDO PDVV WR 97¶V 86 IDFLOLWLHV PDQDJHPHQW RSHUDWLRQ
Moreover, this complimented their existing army-base management operations, providing maintenance 
services and training to clients, including a NASA contract worth $157m 
(www.investorschronicle.co.ukb). This acquisition served to lift VT into the top-five base operations 
SURYLGHUVWRWKH'R'DJDLQLQGLFDWLYHRI97¶VFRPPLWPHQWDQG/HVWHU¶VGULYHWRDFKLHYHWKHLUWDUJHW
of doubling US and education revenues over the next few years (www.investorschronicle.co.ukb). 
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4.9.4.2 Record Performance & the BAE Joint Venture 
8QGHU/HVWHU¶VVWHZDUGVKLSLPSURYHGSHUIRUPDQFHDQGJURZWKSHUVLVWHGWKURXJKDQG
Group revenue reached £847 million and tipped just over £1 billion and correspondingly, profit before 
tax was £61.5 million and £74.2 million in 2006 and 2007 respectively (www.vtgroupplc.coma). 
Revenue jumped over the period as VT finally started gaining some returns on their 10% stake in the 
£13 billion PFI AirTanker contract whilst also beat a number of other shipping yards to win a £400 
million contract from the Royal Navy of Oman and £150 million contract from the government of 
Trinidad & Tobago for the production of patrol vessels (www.deagel.com).The successes of 2007 and 
DOVR WKH UHVXUJHQFH RI VKLSEXLOGLQJ LV H[HPSOLILHG EHVW E\ 97¶V  ELOOLRQ FRQWUDFW ZLWK %$(
EXLOGLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VQHZDLUFUDIW FDUULHUV WKH ILUVW 8.H[SRUWRUGHUV IRUZDUVKLSV LQ DGHFDGH  /HVWHU
further acknowOHGJHV WKDW EHFDXVH RI WKH F\FOLFDO QDWXUH RI VKLSEXLOGLQJ 97 KDV D  µJROGHQ
opportunity with BAE where we can be more cost-effective and can utilise facilities much more 
effectively (www.ft.comd). Such is the case that again this is viewed from a shorter term perspective 
as VT looks to spin off the shipbuilding arm to BAE, and focus exclusively on higher margin 
engineering-based services (www.ft.comh). This concurs with Cazenove analysts position, that 
µVKLSEXLOGLQJEXVLQHVVGLOXWHV WKHTXDOLW\RI WKHJURXS¶ (www.timesonline.co.ukb). From here Lester 
HPSKDVLVHGDQHHG WR ORRN IRUKLJKHUJURZWKRSSRUWXQLWLHVDV µPRVWELJPLOLWDU\3),FRQWUDFWVKDYH
EHHQGRQH¶ZZZIWFRPJGHFODULQJWKDWhe wants the group to enter the UK's £70billion-plus nuclear 
decommissioning market.  
 
4.9.5. The Profile of Paul Lester 
/HVWHU¶VH[SHFWHGO\KDVKHOGDQXPEHURIVHQLRUSRVLWLRQVLQODUJHFRPSDQLHVZKLOVWIXUWKHUWKRVHKDYH
been predominantly in affiliated industries to VT Group which one expects informed his success. 
'XULQJ WKH ¶V DQG HDUO\ ¶V KH KHOG VHQLRU PDQDJHPHQW positions at the Dowty Group, 
Schlumberger and Graseby Plc. From 1993 to 1999 , he was non-executive chairman of A & P Group 
Holdings Limited a leading force in ship-repair, conversion and marine services. Herein, Lester honed 
his management skills through a series of managerial and executive positions in British engineering.  
This culminated in a five year tenure in 1997 when he was appointed as Group Managing Director of 
Balfour Beatty Plc, being in charge of construction and facilities management. It was here he says, that  
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he substantially widened his experience and learned how to manage big construction projects, evaluate 
and control risk and run huge private finance initiative (PFI) contracts in partnership with the 
government (www.guardian.co.ukf). Balfour Beatty was the premier outfit for construction and civil 
engineering in Britain and there was a huge cultural change: moving away from low-margin, 
adversarial relationships to being more customer-IRFXVHG+HFRPPHQWVWKDWµKRSHIXOO\WKDWZDVZKDW
,EURXJKWWR97¶www.guardian.co.ukf). 
One can easily see the conveyance of skills as Lester has transformed VT from a medium-sized 
shipbuilding company into a international, broad-based support services operation; by driving forward 
a programme of relentless change (www.timesonline.co.uki). He attributed growth to the linking of 
HQJLQHHULQJ VHUYLFHV DQG HGXFDWLRQ ZKHUH WKHLU YDOXH LV µHQJLQHHULQJ GULYHQ EXW NQRZOHGJH EDVHG¶
(www.guardian.co.ukf). 
His strong background in government outsourcing as well as appropriate experience in providing 
services to the Ministry of Defence and the US Department of Defence are positively reflected in his 
achievements at VT Group.  Moreover, his inclination to chase fatter margins and willingness to 
participate in the vicious politicking for contracts at Whitehall is indicative of his competency in this 
area. In turn, his efficacy at this is evident in the number of PFI deals that VT secured under his 
leadership. Furthermore, what he excels at is the management of change and risk. He stated that 
µFKDQJHPDQDJHPHQWLVZKDW,
PLQWHUHVWHGLQDQGLI,
YHJRWRQHZHDNQHVV,
YHJRWWRVWRSFKDQJLQJ
WKLQJVZKLFKDUHDFWXDOO\ZRUNLQJ¶2YHUDOOKHKDVHPHUJHGDVDNH\GHIHQFHLQGXVWU\SODyer with little 
time or inclination for the old way of doing things (www.guardian.co.ukf). Beyond his primary role, he 
is non-executive of VT Holdings Plc, Chloride Group Plc and Civica Plc (www.businessweek.come). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to present an analysis across the cases of the various aspects 
contributing to how new top management enact turnaround. This discussion integrates the prominent 
themes introduced in Chapter 2 and applies them toward the three case studies elucidated in Chapter 4, 
serving to reveal a number of key insights. This is achieved using the method of cross case analysis, 
selecting categories of analysis and then finding group similarities coupled with group differences. 
Specifically, the cases are compared against the categories of the existent turnaround models, the 
µ5HVRXUFH %DVHG 9LHZ¶ 5%9 WRS PDQDJHPHQW VNLOOV DQG µ'\QDPLF 0DQDJHULDO &DSDELOLWLHV¶ DOO
discussed within the Literature Review. Hereby, this allows me to go beyond initial impressions using 
structured and diverse lenses, in order to explore if any patterns can be identified and further, the 
findings generated are considered to be robust and reliable. 
At this juncture, it is necessary to emphasise my research questions in order to inform the direction of 
GLVFXVVLRQ µ+RZ GR QHZ WRS PDQDJHPHQW HQDFW VXFFHVVIXO WXUQDURXQGV"¶ and ͚Thus, what CEO 
characteristics inform the actions exhibited by new top management to enact successful turnarounds?¶ 
 
5.2 Types of Turnaround Enacted 
The results of my case studies demonstrate that albeit different approaches to turnaround were applied, 
there too emerged common occurrences within these strategies.  Retrenchment as a lone response to 
decline was not found to be prominent across the three studies albeit substantiating Robbins & 
3HDUFH¶V SRVLWLRQRQH FRXOGFRQWHQG LWGLGFKDUDFWHULVH WKH initial responses wherein Boeing 
laid off 40,000 employees after 9/11 and further, BAE took a £797million write-GRZQ WR µVWRS WKH
EOHHGLQJ¶6ODWWHUZKHQKDHPRUUKDJLQJFDVKIURPJRYHUQPHQWFRQWUDFWV+RZHYHUFODVVLI\LQJ
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WKHVHDV  WH[WERRNµUHWUHQFKPHQW¶HIIRUWV LV WHPSHUHGE\ WKH IDFW WKDW WKHVHZHUH LVRODWHGHYHQWVQRW
part of any enduring program of cost-reductions. Barker & Mone (1994) support the questionable 
YDOLGLW\RIWKHRFFXUUHQFHRIµUHWUHQFKPHQW¶LQWKHVHFDVHVDVWKH\FRQWHQGWKDWUHWUHQFKLQJILUPVWHQG
WR EH H[SHULHQFLQJ VHYHUH GHFOLQH 7KLV FRUURERUDWHV +RIHU¶V  Drgument that the severity of 
decline dictates the extent of retrenching activities. Hereby, all three cases exhibited relatively mild 
GHFOLQHV DQG DV VXFK DVVHW UHGXFWLRQ ZDVQ¶W QHFHVVDU\ DV FRVW UHGXFWLRQ ZDV VXIILFLHQW WR LPSURYH
margins. Moreover, this SRVLWLRQQRWRQO\H[SODLQV97*URXS¶VODFNRIFRVWUHGXFWLRQDVWKHVHYHULW\RI
their decline was the least, but also the remaining two firms reverting back to growth strategies so 
quickly; as Zimmerman (1989) warns occurs too early in unsuccessful turnaround attempts.  
What is evident is that all three cases applied a strategic orientation; albeit they did not prescriptively 
FRQIRUPWR6FKHQGHOHWDO¶VGLVWLQFWLRQWKDWILUP-based (internal) decline necessitated operating 
orientations and externally caused difficulties requires strategic approaches. Initially, it is true to say 
WKDW F\FOLFDO GHFOLQHV LQ LQGXVWU\ PXQLILFHQFH ZHUH HQJHQGHUHG LQ %RHLQJ DQG 97¶V FDVH WKHUHE\
precipitating strategic orientations whilst internal inefficiencies at BAE necessitated operating-oriented 
VROXWLRQV DOLJQHG WR 6FKHQGHO HW DO¶V  GLFKRWRP\ (TXDOO\ $URJ\DVZDP\ HW DO¶V 
H[FHSWLRQ WKDW µILUP EDVHG GHFOLQH GXH WR LQHIILFLHQW LQWHUQDO RSHUDWLRQV QHFHVVLWDWHV D VWUDWHJLF QRW
operating) approach if firms have strong competitive positions wherein certain resources and 
FDSDELOLWLHVKDYHDQXQGHUXWLOLVHGYDOXH¶WRRFDQH[SODLQWKHDSSURDFKHVHPSOR\HGZLWKLQWKHFDVHV 
%RHLQJ¶V LQWHUQDO FRUSRUDWH OHWKDUJ\ VXEVWDQWLDWHG WKHLU GHFOLQH DQG LQ UHVSRQVH DGRSWHG D Vtrategic 
RULHQWDWLRQ DGGUHVVLQJ WKH PDUNHW IRU VPDOOHU IXHO HIILFLHQW MHWOLQHUV 6LPLODUO\ 97 *URXS¶V GHFOLQH
resulted from high expenditures on acquisitions of which bore little return; thus responding in kind by 
a strategic orientation leveraging their expertise in support and outsourcing services in the UK and US.  
%$(FRUUHVSRQGLQJO\ZHUHLQµIUHHIDOO¶DVDUHVXOWRIPDVVLYHRYHUUXQVDQGUHVSRQGHGE\VWUDWHJLFDOO\
acquiring companies which combined with their existing strengths, thus becoming ideally suited to 
serving the US defence market. This would indicate that whilst choice of turnaround approach should 
match cause of decline, when large organisations have spare resources to leverage; opposite 
orientations than are recommended can be the desired or a supplementary approach to enact recovery. 
Moreover, this compounds the argument that cause of decline might not be the primary contingent 
factor influencing turnaround strategy choice and hence, this study would indicate underutilisation of 
resources or opportunities to serve new markets carries equal influence.  
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6SHFLILFDOO\WKHFDVHVDOOH[KLELWVWUDWHJLFRULHQWDWLRQVDOLJQHGWR+RIHU¶VGHILQLWLRQRIµSURGXFW
GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ¶ RU VLPLODUO\ +DPEULFN 	 6FKHFWHU¶V  µSURGXFW PDUNHW UHIRFXVLQJ¶ %RHLQJ¶V
ODXQFKRIWKHµ'UHDPOLQHU¶LVLQGLFDWLYHRIGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQE\SURGXFLQJDXQLTXHIXHO-efficient jetliner 
suited to serving the emerging market of environmentally friendly aircraft. Zimmerman (1989) adds 
emphasis on quality during the production process assists differentiation, and is exemplified in  the 
LQWHJUDWLRQ RI µ7R\RWLVP¶ .DL]HQ DQG OHDQ SURGXFWLRQ PHWKRGV 0RUHRYHU %RHLQJ¶V GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ
strategy is compounded beyond the Dreamliner in their re-introduction of existing models, having 
PDGH VPDOO LQFUHPHQWDO LPSURYHPHQWV DJDLQ ILWWLQJ =LPPHUPDQ¶V  typology. Alternatively, 
BAE demonstrated product-market refocusing in expanding their land systems product range in 
response to the increased demand from the US defence market. VT Group similarly observed an 
opportunity in support services and in the US, thus targeting growth in these markets through acquiring 
related businesses who would enhance their market penetration and quality of service provision. 
Combined, these efforts all indicate shifts in emphasis toward lucrative and defensible niche markets 
in order to assist turnaround; supporting the importance of market opportunity in informing strategic 
choice. 
This strategic emphasis exhibited from the case studies is sustained further from Hambrick & 
6FKHFWHU¶V  FDWHJRULVDWLRQ RI µ(QWUHSUHQHXULDO¶ DSSURDFKHV WR WXUQDURXQG GHQRWLQJ HIIRUWV
indicative of grand, long term initiatives. BAE typifies this in its aggressive restructuring of its asset 
portfolio through divestment of non- core businesses such as Atlas Elektronik, Aerostructures, Selex 
Sensors and finally, Airbus; in order to fund its acquisition policy of strengthening its core land 
V\VWHPVHJ$OYLV9LFNHUV8',DQG$UPRU+ROGLQJV%$(¶VHQWUHSUHQHXULDOLQFOLQDWLRQ in its efforts 
toward turnaround is further reflected in its strategic alliance with Lockheed Martin on the F-35 fighter 
program and its new market share thrust in the US as already discussed in its product-market 
refocusing approach. 
97*URXS¶VGLYHUVLILFation away from shipbuilding toward a long term emphasis on support services 
too is symptomatic of an entrepreneurial approach to turnaround. They too adopted a policy of 
acquisitive growth as well as organic growth, by strengthening their core assets in support services and 
in the US with purchases of JA Jones and Cube Corporation. Correspondingly, albeit short term; they 
engaged in the development of a new shipyard to significantly improve their warship building 
capabilities of which enabled them to capture a highly valuable joint venture with BAE. Alternatively, 
%RHLQJRIIHUWKHFRQWUDVWLQJDSSURDFKZLWKLQ+DPEULFN	6FKHFWHU¶VPRGHO%\WKHLUFDWHJRULVDWLRQ
%RHLQJ¶V UHVXUJHQFH characterises DQ µHIILFLHQF\¶ WXUQDURXQG WKURXJKFXWWLQJEDFN MREV DQGPDNLQg 
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efficiency improvements through lean manufacturing, outsourcing and kaizen. Moreover, this is 
supplemented by investments in technology, driven by a re-infused innovation culture.  
Taken together, these results too support the contention that both entrepreneurial and efficiency 
oriented turnaround approaches can be associated with success. However, it is important to highlight 
WKDWLQ%RHLQJ¶VFDVHWKH\WRRXQGHUWRRNDQµHQWUHSUHQHXULDO¶DSSURDFKZKHQHQDFWLQJDQHZPDUNHW
share thrust into the fuel/environmentally efficient small jetliner market. Significantly, this case therein 
concurs with positions espoused by Zimmerman (1989) and Hambrick & Schecter (1983) that 
effective management actions supporting a combination of low-cost production and product 
differentiation, are vital to recovering from decline.  
7KLV DSSOLFDWLRQ RI ERWK W\SRORJLHV LV PLUURUHG E\ %$( DOEHLW %RHLQJ¶V DSSURDFK H[KLELWV
simultaneous HIIRUWVZKHUHDV%$(IROORZV%LEHDXOWRU3HDUFH	5REELQ¶VPRGHOWKDW
the dual appliance is staged: decline stemming strategies preceding recovery strategies. Decline 
VWHPPLQJKHUHE\LVGHPRQVWUDWHGLQ%$(¶VZULWHGRZQRIZKLFKZDVIROORZHGE\DUHWXUQWRJURZWK
phase where strategic clarity toward recovery was exemplified by US expansion; thus positioning the 
company to compete better in the industry. Interestingly, VT Group exhibited no such operating, 
efficiency or retrenchment activity to fall in either model; substantiating Arogyaswamy et al (1995) 
argument that the current literature cedes too much emphasis on the role of retrenchment to enact 
successful turnaround. 
 
5.3. A Resource Based View (RBV) 
Uncommon in the turnaround literature, this phenomenon can too be explained from a resource 
perspective, wherein executives deploy scarce firm-specific resources to achieve in this instance, 
successful firm recovery. This serves to illuminate how competitive advantage ± critical toward 
recovery- is re-captured after its evident loosing during organisational decline. 
0LNH7XUQHU¶VGHSOR\PHQWof resources to enact turnaround initially drew on the favour the MoD has 
for BAE. Deployment or more aptly- leverage of this resource was characterised by procuring highly 
IDYRXUDEOHWHUPVRIIXWXUHFRQWUDFWLQJXQGHUWKH',6HQWUHQFKLQJWKHPDVDµK\SHUQDWLRQDOFKDPSLRQ¶
IRU\HDUVWRFRPH$SSOLHGWR%DUQH\¶V95,1IUDPHZRUNWKLVUHODWLRQVKLSGHPRQVWUDWHVYDOXHDVWKH
MoD views BAE as their primary supplier and moreover, one could argue it is rare and in very short 
supply as few if any other global arms manufacturers enjoy preferential domestic contracting to the 
79 
 
same extent. Therein, it is heterogeneous and highly immobile; embodying a highly advantageous 
resource. Correspondingly, it is highly inimitable as this resource exemplifies the efficacy of historical 
circumstances in the UK, nurturing a staunch commitment to domestic supply in arms and thereby, 
provides an extremely strong barrier to erosion. Finally, it too satisfies the criteria of being non-
substitutable, given that rival incumbents cannot replicate domestically as BAE holds a monopolistic 
position within the UK market.  
Deployment and exploitation of this intangible resource to generate sustained competitive advantage 
ZDV FRPSRXQGHG E\ %$(¶V exploration of their strong asset base together with their land-system 
competency. The restructuring of this asset base through acquisition and divestment served to 
supplement their existing core competency of land-based products. As such, this bundle of resources 
created competitive advantage as the development and provision of  land-systems competencies were 
especially in demand whilst in short supply; and thereby highly valuable toward US operations in the 
Middle-(DVW 6XVWDLQLQJ WKLV DGYDQWDJH LQ WKH PHGLXP WHUP KRZHYHU LV WRXJK DV LW¶V EDUULHUV WR
imitation are low, albeit it is highly non-VXEVWLWXWDEOH IRU WKH WLPH EHLQJ DV %$(¶V ODQG V\VWHPV
provision is the best and military contracts tend to last lengthy time frames. That said, this framework 
does not account for changes in military emphasis or conflicts ending which would serve to 
immediately erode any advantage.  
-LP 0F1HUQH\¶V LQVWDOPHQW RI OHDQ SURGXFWLRQ PHWKRGV PDQLIHVWHG D YDOXDEOH FRPSHWHQF\
contributing to turnaround. Albeit effective for ramping up production, Airbus too apply these 
principles and they can easily be imitated, rendering its longevity as a source of advantage short. As 
such, its purpose in affecting recovery was supplementary to other more prominent initiatives. 
%RHLQJ¶V H[SORLWDWLRQ RI LWV 'UHDPOLQHU  ZDV W\SLFDO RI DGYDQWDJHous deployment of a scarce, firm-
specific resource. Its value and rarity were the basis from which so many sales were made, as no other 
commercial aircraft was as fuel efficient whilst serving the demanding small aircraft market. Imitation 
and substitutability of this are high and to date, Airbus has re-developed its A350 in direct competition 
to the Dreamliner, already re-claiming a portion of market share. Consequently, Boeing is contingent 
upon its exploration of its innovative culture and customer-centric ethos in order to sustain advantage. 
These were paramount in securing the sales which reclaimed industry dominance over Airbus, and 
HYLGHQWO\ SURYLGH D JUHDWHU VRXUFH RI VXVWDLQLQJ DGYDQWDJH H[HPSOLILHG ZKHQ %RHLQJ¶V VDOHV VWDII
RXWVROG $LUEXV¶ ZKLOVW both had equally valuable products. Moreover, characteristic of intangible 
resources such as culture; imitation or substitution is highly unlikely by virtue of barriers such as social 
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complexity; wherein innovation and customer-centricity are engrained in %RHLQJ¶VFXOWXUHDQGDVVXFK
other incumbents find them hard to delineate. 
&RQWUDVWLQJO\3DXO/HVWHUH[SORLWHG97*URXS¶VQHZO\EXLOWVKLS\DUGWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIWKHF\FOLFDO
upswing in shipbuilding. Whilst valuable in incentivising defence departments to contract with VT, it 
is further a rare resource which few other firms enjoy, thus allowing the group to improve their 
competitive position compared to other industry incumbents. However, competing shipyards can 
relatively easily be developed; and are not constrained by barriers to imitation or substitutability. In 
WXUQ /HVWHU¶V H[SORUDWLRQ RI FRPSHWHQFLHV LQ VXSSRUW VHUYLFHV ZDV WKH FULWLFDO VWHS LQ HQDFWLQJ
turnaround.  Deployment of this resource in the US and UK on a greater scale, delivered value as it 
satisfied  the emerging market for outsourcing and PFI contracting amongst public sector bodies such 
DV/($¶V7KHH[WHQWRI WKLVDGYDQWDJH LV WHPSHUHGE\ WKHIDFW WKDW97KDGD ILUVW-mover advantage 
and such being, a number of other firms with equal competence in support services exist to dilute its 
VFDUFLW\$OEHLWWKLVGRHVQRWVHUYHWRUHQGHULWHDVLO\LPLWDEOHDV97¶VVXSSRUWVHUYLFHVDUHSUHGLFDWHG
on specialist PFI contracting of which few incumbents can replicate. Herein, this is indicative of causal 
ambiguity as a barrier to imitation. Moreover, exploration and aggressive organic and acquisitive 
growth of their support services, coalesced to enhance the reputation and competence of VT in this 
resource therein engraining this within their culture. Like Boeing, this became increasingly socially 
complex and hard to imitate; thereby increasing the longevity of their advantage and subsequently, 
increasing the time the company accrued super-normal profits. 
 
5.4 Top Management Skills Assisting Turnaround 
Albeit the above section acknowledges the firm as the unit of analysis in enacting turnaround, the 
VNLOOV DQG FRPSHWHQFLHV ZKLFK DUH FKDUDFWHULVHG ZLWKLQ QHZO\ DSSRLQWHG &(2¶V DUH RI HTXDO
importance for illuminating how successful turnaround is achieved.  
Tourtellot (2004) amongst others advocates executive replacement to be allocated to outside 
FDQGLGDWHV0F1HUQH\¶VKLULQJDW%RHLQJZDVODUJHO\DQRXWVLGHKLUHKHKDGVHUYHGRQWKHERDUGDVD
non-executive director four years previously); but retained the same central strategy as before- except 
µDFFHOHUDWLQJ¶DQGVXSSOHPHQWLQJLWE\LPSURYLQJHIILFLHQF\7KLVLVDWRGGVWRWKHWKHRUHWLFDOSRVLWLRQ
that outside hires are best suited to initiating strategic change to engender improved performance. Paul 
/HVWHU¶V DSSRLQWPHQW DW 97 *URXS VLPLODUO\ ZDV DQ RXWVLGH KLUH KRZHYHU KH IROORZHG DQ HQWLUHO\
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different strategy in directing the company toward support services and in shedding their shipbuilding 
image. In turn, his mandate was change and therein, VT selected him given his previous expertise in 
change. Contrastingly, BAE opted for insider succession in appointing their COO Mike Turner; of 
whom had a long standing dedication to their engrained strategy, albeit upon his elevation immediately 
redirected emphasis toward market opportunities in the US and land systems. The received view on the 
topic argues in this instance, that Turner should have been unable to enact significant change as his 
existing affiliation to BAE would hinder his ability to objectively choose the best course for recovery. 
&RPELQHG7RXUWHOORW¶VSRVLWLRQDQGWKHDGYRFDF\RIRXWVLGHVXFFHVVLRQDVDEHWWHUFDWDO\VWRI
change is unsupported by the three cases. Moreover, it suggests that other characteristics of executives 
reflect their inclination toward certain strategies; as evidently, inside or outside succession has little 
bearing here. Thereby, inside or outside succession in turnaround contexts has little if any significance 
toward approaches to change, as they are informed by far more important factors.  
What the three change-agents studied do all demonstrate and therein informs their approach to 
WXUQDURXQGLVµKXPDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶0F1HUQH\H[KLELWHGWKLVLQUHFRJQLVLQJ'R'FRQFHUQVWRZDUGV
the ethical conduct of Boeing in previous years, and thereby set about attenuating their unease in order 
to secure future custom. Probably more significantly, Scott Carson at Boeing too exemplified this trait 
by implementing a customer-FHQWULF HWKRV RI µOLVWHQLQJ WR WKHLU QHHGV¶ ZLWKLQ WKH sales force, 
predicated on building relationships with them. Furthermore, this human understanding prompted the 
program of helping customers sell off old planes; and combined with the aforementioned initiatives, 
served to drastically improve sales to the betterment of firm performance and recovery. This is in stark 
contrast to the evident disconnection from customers (airlines) which previous management at Boeing 
displayed, when strong demand for fuel-efficient jetliners went unnoticed for so long.  
Turner DW %$( WRR H[HPSOLILHG D VWURQJ µKXPDQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶ DV VKRZQ LQ KLV DVVHW UHVWUXFWXULQJ
WRZDUGEXLOGLQJRQ%$(¶VFRUHFRPSHWHQFLHVLQ ODQG-systems; of which the US army were in strong 
GHPDQG IRU JLYHQ WKHLU QHZ WDFWLFDO GHSOR\PHQWV /HVWHU¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ of this attribute in turn was 
UHYHDOHG LQ UHFRJQLVLQJ WKH DSSHWLWH DPRQJ /($¶V IRU VXSSRUW VHUYLFHV LQ HGXFDWLRQ VXEVHTXHQWO\
forming a cornerstone of his program of in diversifying out of the shipbuilding industry. In support of 
Bibeault (1982), the unanimous appliance of market orientation and human understanding amongst the 
three cases is thus indicative of its importance toward enacting turnaround; of which becomes 
especially pertinent amongst dynamic and competitive environments characterised by constant and 
cyclical change, as is the aerospace and defence industry. 
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:KDWLVHYLGHQWPRUHRYHUDPRQJVWWKH&(2¶VLVWKHSRVVHVVLRQDQGDIIHFWLQJRIORQJ-term and short-
WHUP YLHZV XSRQ ILUP VWUDWHJ\ 0LNH 7XUQHU¶V ORQJ WHUP VWUDWHJLF RULHQWDWLRQ ZDV WRZDUG 86 
expansion and securing constant custom from the massive Pentagon and DoD budgets. Conversely, his 
short term strategy in recovery was writing down and cutting losses on the MoD contracts whilst 
further renegotiating better contract terms. Paul Lester correspondingly took a long term view toward 
diversifying out of shipbuilding toward support services and outsourcing in the US; albeit applied a 
VKRUWWHUPDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHF\FOLFDOXSVZLQJLQWKHVKLSEXLOGLQJLQGXVWU\DQGKHQFHOHYHUDJHG97¶V
resources to best secure the available contracts. McNerney similarly applied a short-term view toward 
recovery by implementing efficiency measures to lower costs, including the layoffs; hence stopping 
the bleeding so to speak. Long term, he encouraged the proliferation of innovation amongst product 
development.  
&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHPDQLIHVWHGGXDOLW\RISHUVSHFWLYHLQKHUHQWWRWKHQHZO\DSSRLQWHG&(2¶VDSSHDUVWR
highly inform approaches to turnaround. Specifically, short term strategies appear to be more aligned 
to efficiency, operational and retrenching based efforts and therefore, long term approaches be more 
strategic in their orientation. This  in turn corroborates turnaround models such as those of Pearce & 
Robbins (1992) positing retrenchment as an initial responsH WRGHFOLQHRU µVWDJHG¶PRGHOVRIZKLFK
SRVLWµGHFOLQHVWHPPLQJ¶VWUDWHJLHVSUHFHGHµUHFRYHU\VWUDWHJLHV¶ 
 
5.5 Dynamic Managerial Capabilities 
5.5.1 Human Capital 
+XPDQ FDSLWDO LV GHULYHG IURP D QXPEHU RI VRXUFHV RQH RI ZKLFK EHLQJ PDQDJHUV¶ IXQFWLRQDl 
background. All three executives have predominantly occupied management and financial roles 
throughout their careers. Paul Lester earned an engineering degree, albeit by his own admission, he 
was very bad in the field and hence his previous jobs were confined to less specialist roles. McNerney 
and Turner similarly had basic engineering understandings at best. Subsequently, this would suggest 
that effective instigators of turnaround may need more broader functional backgrounds as their 
perspectives are not constrained to one discipline; as would possibly occur with an experienced 
aeronautical engineer, who might place greater emphasis upon aircraft when deciding how best to 
enact recovery. 
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Correspondingly, they all have spent a number of years working within the Aerospace & Defence 
sector, thereby undoubtedly acquiring a high amount of industry-specific skills. Consequently and in 
the case of McNerney; he asserted that upon taking the role as CEO, adapting to would Boeing not be 
a steep learning curve by virtue of his familiarity with aerospace e.g. his industry specific experience. 
The ease with which he embedded would have been compounded by his firm-specific knowledge 
acquired from having served upon the board since 2001 and further his understanding of BoHLQJ¶V
commercial and military products through his former role at GE.  Turner extends beyond this by 
spending most of career at BAE (including being the COO); of which would have precipitated him 
acquiring a huge bank of intimate firm specific knowledge of the internal mechanics of the 
organisation. Therefore, one could argue this was invaluable in affording him a holistic understanding 
of the operations and positioning of the organisation, thus allowing him to make a strategic re-
orientations in the best interests of BAE as a whole.  
As such, specific actions which the newly appointed executives took to mitigate decline and enact 
recovery can be traced to previous roles or experiences, therein serving to prove the importance of 
human capital in influencing turnaround. One such skill which Mike Turner has developed over his 
career is his negotiating technique; evident in its efficacy by securing half of a £1.5 billion writedown 
or re-negotiating contracts with the MoD exemplified in the favourable terms within the DIS. 
Importantly, establishing this skill was acquired throughout his career in dealing with governmental 
departments, whilst also being the BAE contracts manager at one point. Similarly, Jim McNerney and 
3DXO/HVWHU¶VVXFFHVVLQWKHLULQWHUDFWLRQVwith the DoD and MoD are indicative of their previous roles 
LQYROYLQJKLJKYLVLELOLW\ZLWKGHIHQFHGHSDUWPHQWVHJ/HVWHU¶VH[SHULHQFHUXQQLQJKXJH3),FRQWUDFWV
in partnership with the government when he worked at Balfour Beatty. Past experience has evidently 
informed the strategic orientations towards turnaround in other instances. A exemplary case is 
0F1HUQH\¶V VFKRROLQJ LQ WKHXVHRIFRVW FXWWLQJPDQXIDFWXULQJH[FHOOHQFHDQGHPSOR\LQJ WKHPRVW
efficient workforce from his tenure at GE. These skills coPSULVLQJ0F1HUQH\¶VKXPDQFDSLWDOZHUH
directly applied when he laid off employees, introduced lean production and his emphasis on 
RXWVRXUFLQJWRLPSURYHSURGXFWTXDOLW\6LPLODUO\/HVWHU¶VUROHDW%DOIRXU%HDWW\ZDVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\
managing big construction projects, evaluating risk and running huge PFI contracts as discussed. 
Correspondingly, this human capital was reflected in overseeing the movement to the new shipyard or 
the BAE venture, correctly observing the risk of diversifying toward support services would generate 
higher returns than their current operations and the securing of numerous lucrative PFI and outsourcing 
contracts from the government.  
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As such, I believe it may be the case that these generic skills are the most valuable components 
amongst human capital that helps enact turnaround. This assertion is critically supported through the 
fact that both McNerney and Lester have been credited with aiding turning around their previous 
FRPSDQLHV0F1HUQH\¶VRFFXUUHGWKURXJKDSURJUDPRIRUJDQLFgrowth and introducing manufacturing 
improvements at 3M; whilst Lester helped drive a cultural change toward customer-centric operations 
whilst at Balfour Beatty. Significantly, these incidences are identical in the orientations of executives 
to achieve turnaround in the cases studied in this paper. Therefore, not only does this cede  importance 
on generic skills within human capital in order to enact turnaround, but also; suggests that these 
strategic orientations may be decisive in effecting recovery or performance improvement in 
manufacturing industries. 
 
5.5.2 Social Capital 
 This study unfortunately finds little support for social capital as a critical influence upon strategic 
orientations of change-agents. External social capital is not found to be significant as no causal 
evidence can be found to reflect extra-RUJDQLVDWLRQDO QHWZRUNV LQIRUPLQJ H[HFXWLYHV¶ WXUQDURXQG
DSSURDFKHV $OEHLW , FDQ VSHFXODWH WKDW /HVWHU¶V ERDUG PHPEHUVKLS DW &KORULGH 3OF DQG &LYLFD 3OF
may have influenced his expansion plans toward nuclear decommissioning and service provision in the 
SXEOLFVHFWRUUHVSHFWLYHO\6LPLODUO\LWFRXOGEHVDLGWKDW7XUQHU¶VERDUGPHPEHUVKLSVDW%DEFRFNRU
the Society of British Aerospace Companies gave him insights into an industry competitor or the 
LQGXVWU\ DV D ZKROH IURP ZKLFK KH DGMXVWHG %$(¶V VWUDWHJ\ DFFRUGLQJO\ HJ GLYHVWPHQW RXW RI
aerospace by selling Airbus. However, the lack of verification that such links did in fact influence 
H[HFXWLYHV¶ UHFRYHU\ PHWKRGV PHDQV , FDQQRW GUDZ DQ\ GLVWinctive insights into how or if social 
capital contributed to turnaround success.           
                             
5.5.3 Managerial Cognition 
Contrastingly, managerial cognition evidently does impart some extent of influence upon the 
turnaround approaches applied in these cases as Adner & Helfat (2003) assert, the two are inexorably 
OLQNHG 0LNH 7XUQHU¶V FRJQLWLYH EDVH IRU GHFLVLRQV LV SUHGLFDWHG RQ D KROLVWLF DQG LQWLPDWH
understanding of BAE. Therein, he was well tuned to the core of the business and looked to strengthen 
this core through his aggressive policy of asset restructuring characterised by acquisitions and 
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divestment. Corresponding to this, he too held ambition for the company, beyond the constraints of the 
British Aerospace & Defence market and the MoD;  therefore installing a pugnacious growth strategy 
toward the US. Importantly, this was at odds to the dominant logic residing in BAE, emphasising 
reliance on the MoD and the British market. US expansion hence demonstrated efforts to unlearn and 
update the dominant logic in response to a rapidly changing environment; characterised  by a hugely 
inflated US defence budget. Likewise, McNerney was charged with re-installing the dominant logic of 
innovation of which laid dormant at Boeing during their decline. Innovation in product development 
and production methods had been engrained in McNerney from his days at 3M; forming a central 
value amongst his cognitive base and thereby, was integrated into his strategic orientation for turning 
Boeing around. Once more, the purposeful erosion of dominant logic is exemplified in the case of VT 
Group wherein Lester implemented a long term strategy of diversifying the company out of 
shipbuilding into support services. 
Management cognition further shaped the stUDWHJLF GLUHFWLRQ RI %RHLQJ IURP 0F1HUQH\¶V YDOXH RI
efficiency, by enacting operating based measures to curtail spending. This was compounded by his 
EHOLHI LQ µULGLQJ KHUG¶ RQ HPSOR\HHV WR HQVXUH TXDOLW\ UHPDLQHG KLJK $OWHUQDWLYHO\ /HVWHU¶V ULVN-
tolerabOH PHQWDO PRGHO SUHFLSLWDWHG 97¶V UHPRYDO IURP LWV HVWDEOLVKHG VKLSEXLOGLQJ SRVLWLRQ 0RUH
JHQHUDOO\KLVµLQWHUHVWLQFKDQJH¶H[SODLQVKLVXSURRWLQJRI97¶VGRPLQDQWORJLFDQGUHSRVLWLRQLQJ,Q
sum, the three cases all exhibit different cognitive bases from which executives have enacted diverse 
turnaround approaches. Most significantly, they are share an affinity for change and specifically, 
removal of dominant logics in order to re-direct strategy firm performance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
The exploration of  corporate recovery is an especially interesting and  significant topic of study, as 
recent years have seen increasing incidences of corporate decline be mitigated by the phenomenon of 
turnaround. Such being, the analysis of this paper has some important implications as to how newly 
appointed executives achieve turnaround. Research toward this end is increasingly pertinent in 
competitive environments characterised by volatility, uncertainty and innovation; coalescing to 
advance organisational decline. Subsequently, the existent literary base surrounding turnaround 
remains fragmented, pluralistic, and uneven; demonstrating how incomplete our understanding of the 
phenomenon actually is and thus, leaves no enduring dominant model for successful corporate 
turnaround. Correspondingly, application of this bank of work to the analysis was supplemented by 
µ'\QDPLF 0DQDJHULDO &DSDELOLWLHV¶ DQG WKH µ5HVRXUFH-%DVHG 9LHZ¶ EHLQJ IUDPHZRUNV IURP ZKLFK
this study could draw novel insights into the characteristics and ways in which executives successfully 
enact turnaround. Methodologically, these were directed toward multiple case-studies in order to 
ascertain better generalisations which unpack the approaches and ways in which decline is interrupted, 
when recovery strategies are installed by new top management. 
A number of approaches to turnaround are evidently reflected in the cases. Retrenchment was 
exhibited as an initial response in two of the cases, albeit fitting the ambiguity with which it is 
supported; this application was tempered by a lack of severity in decline across the cases. Significantly, 
$URJ\DVZDP\HWDO¶V H[FHSWLRQKHOG WUXHZLWKLQWKHDQDO\VLV$VVXFK WKLVVXJJHVWVFDXVHRI
decline was not a primary contingent factor influencing the turnaround strategies of executives. What 
is more, this insight promotes underutilisation of resources or opportunities to occupy new markets as 
carrying equal if not more influence, LQ LQIRUPLQJ H[HFXWLYHV¶ WXUQDURXQG HIIRUWV 7KLV LQIHUHQFH LV
substantiated E\ HDFK FDVH FRQIRUPLQJ WR +RIHU¶V  W\SRORJLHV RI VWUDWHJLF RULHQWDWLRQV
emphasising organisational redirections toward other lucrative and defensible niche markets. In turn, 
+DPEULFN	6FKHFWHU¶VHQWUHSUHQHXULDODQGHIILFLHQF\RULHQWHGDSSURaches are too found to be 
associated with successful turnarounds. Overall, the predominant application of staged, simultaneous 
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or strategic-based efforts re-DIILUPV $URJ\DVZDP\ HW DO¶V  DVVHUWLRQ WKDW WKH FXUUHQW OLWHUDWXUH
cedes too much emphasis on the role of retrenchment. 
This said, operational or efficiency based efforts are evidently necessitated, even when conditions of 
decline are less harsh and more conducive to  recovery; as characterised in growth markets. Thereby, I 
extend the caveat that it is foolish to reduce the role of retrenchment any more by furthering the above 
position and therein, acknowledge that efforts aligned to cost reduction are still effective to achieving 
turnaround when strategic orientations take precedent. Conclusively, I believe that opposed to 
predominant emphasis on retrenchment cited in studies such as Robbins & Pearce (1992), the 
emphasis on strategic orientations is indicative of the influence of growth markets. Executives 
recognise that whilst rival incumbents are enjoying the fruits of upswings, efficiency orientations can 
only improve performance to a point; whereby strategic re-orientations are employed to complete 
turnaround and beyond that, re-capture leading competitive positions. Subsequently, this reflects 
=LPPHUPDQ¶V  REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW ODVWLQJ WXUQDURXQGV HPHUJHG ZLWK FRPELQDWLRQV RI  ERWK
operational and strategic efforts and by this token, turnaround models can be applied to growth 
industries in much the same way as they have been predominantly in declining industries.  
Albeit accumulating currency recently as a product of its wide propagation within social science 
literature, as yet the RBV has not featured within the existent turnaround discourse. Its relevance in 
application in this study is exacerbated moreover, as it was designed to be used when analysing 
dynamic industries e.g. the aerospace and defence market (McWilliams & Smart, 1993). Nonetheless, 
in framing turnaround by the resource deployments executives use to explicate recovery; firm-specific 
competencies are found to be critical toward re-capturing competitive advantage after its evident 
loosing during organisational decline. From delineating the VRIN criteria toward each scarce resource, 
I conclude that sustained efforts for longer term and strategic growth are aligned to intangible 
resources e.g. culture, of which protected competitive advantage longer as they have higher barriers to 
imitation than tangible resources.  
Hereby, this framework was especially insightful for determining the longevity of resources used by 
&(2¶VWRDFKLHYHWXUQDURXQG6SHFLILFDOO\LWDSSHDUVWKDWVKRUWWHUPVWUDWHJLHVUHIOHFWYDOXHDQGUDULW\
ZLWKLQ %DUQH\¶V  PRGHO DQG WKHUHIRUH ZHUH FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH H[SORLWDWLRQ RI UHVRXUFHV
leveraged in operating orientations e.g. cost-cutting. As such, long term strategies tended to be 
explored using more intangible resources of which satisfied the additionally inimitable and non-
substitutable criteria. Hereby, explorational and exploititative resource deployments directly 
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corresponded to long and short term orientation towards turnaround respectively.  Overall, this 
illuminates the value of the RBV by it confirming deployments of resources toward strategic 
orientations as more long term efforts which comprise the basis of achieving successful turnaround. 
Moreover, this reflects the value of the RBV as an analytical tool toward incidences of turnaround. 
7KLVSDSHUIXUWKHULGHQWLILHVDQXPEHURIVLJQLILFDQWIDFWRUVZKLFKLQIRUPWRSPDQDJHPHQW¶VFKRLFHRI
approach. One of which goes unsupported and thereby is subsumed as merely theoretical within this 
VWXG\ LV µRXWVLGHU VXFFHVVLRQ¶ ,Q WXUQ WKLV SRLQWV WRZDUG RWKHU FKDUDFWHULVWLFV VXFK DV  µKuman 
understaQGLQJ¶DQGµPDUNHWRULHQWDWLRQ¶. Furthermore, this is compounded by both long term and short 
term perceptions of strategy. This duality of perspective evident in each case is highly insightful and 
informative, as short-termist approaches follow operational and efficiency orientations; whilst long 
term efforts reflect strategic categorisations. Not only does this serve to corroborate retrenchment as an 
initial response but further, staged models of turnaround from Bibeault (1982) or Pearce & Robbins 
(1993) as well. Again, this is indicative of operational approaches being unsupported by successful 
change-agents for enacting long term initiatives to sustain improvement and achieve turnaround. 
&RUUHVSRQGLQJO\ WKH µ'\QDPLF0DQDJHULDO&DSDELOLWLHV¶SDUDGLJP further explained the  basis from 
which executives choose their approaches to turnaround. Being that these drive heterogeneity between 
successful and unsuccessful turnaround attempts, it was understandable that the cases should exhibit 
JUHDWVWRFNVRILW7KXVµ+XPDQ&DSLWDO¶VWRFNVZHUHKLJKGHULYHGIURPEURDGIXQFWLRQal backgrounds 
and past experiences combining to indicate generic skills as the most important in influencing 
turnaround. Albeit prevalent, firm and industry-VSHFLILFVNLOO¶VYDOXHGLPLQLVKHGDVLQWZRRIWKHWKUHH
cases, executives had enacted turnarounds previously, therein buttressing support for generic skills as a 
critical determinant to success. Importantly, I believe the similarity in these previous incidences of 
turnaround suggests that the recovery strategies applied may be decisive in affecting recovery or 
performance improvement in manufacturing industries. This novel finding is at odds to the inferences 
PDGHIURPLQYHVWLJDWLQJH[HFXWLYHµ6RFLDO&DSLWDO¶RIZKLFKDIIRUGHGQRHYLGHQFHFRQILUPLQJFDXVDO
OLQNV ,Q WXUQ µ0DQDJHULDO &RJQLWLRQ¶ ZDV GLVFRYHUHG WR KLJKOLJKW H[HFXWLYHV¶ WHQGHQF\ WR FKRRVH
strategies which looked to uproot and replace incumbent dominant logics,  aligned to principal 
application of long term strategic reorientations to achieve turnaround. In sum, human capital persists 
in this study as the most informative of these capabilities toward CEO recovery strategy choice. 
However, it is shrewd to acknowledge that methodological limitations prevented delineating the true 
H[WHQWRIµVRFLDOFDSLWDO¶V¶LQIOXHQFHXSRQH[HFXWLYHWXUQDURXQd orientation. 
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With respect to the case industry, CEO choices were informed to an extent by prevalent factors which 
characterise Aerospace & Defence. Foremost, globalisation has precipitated the advocacy of 
outsourcing through which all our cases engaged in to achieve turnaround. Moreover, collaboration by 
alliances or joint ventures is not confined to continents; evident in the pan-European or Trans-Atlantic 
mergers observed. As such, operation within domestic markets appears not enough to sustain 
advantage; and thereby export markets evidently and government contracting are increasingly sought 
after to secure custom or in this study, enact turnaround.  This too occurred in response to the 
cyclicality of the industry at the time, wherein case firms directed strategies toward sectors  in cyclical 
upturn. Continuing this trend, international consolidation appears not to have slowed; wherein 
acquisitive policies reflect the stacking of resource bundles to create and sustain competitive advantage 
over rival incuPEHQWV 2QHFRXOG H[WHQG WKLV IDFW WR H[SODLQLQJ97*URXS¶VGLYHUVLI\LQJRXWRI WKH
defence industry, in response to aggressive acquisition policies of major contractors, thus transcending 
the market into oligopolistic competition. Looking forward, one could observe the incidence of 
turnaround occurring more frequently amongst smaller aerospace and defence firms, by following 
97¶VVWUDWHJ\RIPRYLQJRXWRIWKHPDUNHWLQWKHORQJWHUP7KLVWUHQGZRXOGEHFRPSRXQGHGIXUWKHU
by observed capital-intensity of the industry and constant pursuit of innovation. 
In appreciation of the limitations of my study, I acknowledge that my findings cannot be generalised 
across industries, and moreover, cannot be generalised across the Aerospace & Defence industry as a 
whole. Such being, this paper serves to direct attention toward the phenomenon of corporate 
turnaround and furthermore, the characteristics and ways in which new top managers achieve recovery. 
Fundamentally, it is designed to address two central questions, the primary being:  
µ+RZGRQHZWRSPDQDJHPHQWHQDFWVXFFHVVIXOWXUQDURXQGV"¶ 
My study identifies new top management to follow normative turnaround models wherein prominence 
is afforded to long term, strategic orientations as short term, operational solutions eYLGHQWO\ GRQ¶W
engender significant improvement to complete turnaround. Specifically, turnaround strategy 
orientations are informed by the severity of decline ± the greater of which necessitates more operating-
oriented cost reductions; market opportunity- the existence of which induces strategic re-alignment to 
more lucrative and defensible markets; and the amount of underutilised resources- the greater of which 
necessitates more deployment of these in exploitative or explorative ways, dependent largely on the 
tangibility and imitability of the resource.  
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Thus, what CEO characteristics inform the actions exhibited by new top management to enact 
successful turnarounds? 
As such, CEO choices are influenced too by characteristics and inclinations which are independent of 
situational, market and firm influences. Significant traits were human understanding, a long and short 
term perspectives, and the possession of a high stock human capital. Within this capital, generic skills 
were observed as the most influential DQGGHULYHG IURPH[HFXWLYHV¶SDVW H[SHULHQFH DQG LQH[RUDEO\
their cognitive base. These factors coalesced to direct change agents towards the strategic orientations 
from which turnaround was achieved. Subsequently, I can conclude that these are positively related to 
successful turnaround efforts; albeit this is tempered by recognising that as such, application of these 
upon strategic choice does not guarantee recovery; and therein, possession of this bundle of executive 
characteristics is not a universal panacea toward mitigating and reversing decline 
The significance and added value my study generates draws from its departure from the existent bank 
of turnaround literature, by addressing the global Aerospace and Defence sector and a growth industry 
in general; both of which have received scant literary attention until this point . Pandit (2000) 
compounds the uniqueness of my study when commenting that little theoretical analysis combines 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQV LQWR WXUQDURXQGV ZLWK WKH 5%9 DQG DGGLWLRQDOO\ µ'\QDPLF 0DQDJHULDO &DSDELOLWLHV¶
The merging of turnaround literature with these two models served to better illuminate the strategies, 
competencies and skills that top managers employ when enacting turnaround, evident from my 
conclusions. Beyond elucidating some of the critical characteristics which influence successful 
turnaround approaches, my results are significant in adding to the emerging literature of which 
challenges the predominant advocacy of retrenchment, over strategic approaches to turnaround. 
Moreover, it exists as evidence adding to the theoretical position that application of both operating and 
strategic approaches can combine to achieve successful turnaround and hence, the two are not 
mutually exclusive toward enacting recovery. 
 
6.1 Limitations of the Study and Methodology 
The initial limitations to my study are that the sample size was small and hence inferences I have 
drawn cannot be generalised across the industry. Furthermore, lack of primary research may have 
meant that critical information H[SODLQLQJKRZ&(2¶VDSSURDFKHVWRWXUQDURXQGDUHLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHLU
characteristics were missed. This problem is compounded in turnaround situations because it seems 
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likely that few top managers want researchers investigating their firm during a crisis situation. This 
OLPLWDWLRQ LV HYLGHQW ZKHUHLQ LQYHVWLJDWLQJ µVRFLDO FDSLWDO¶ DIIRUGHG QR DFWLRQDEOH FDXVDO OLQNV
&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKLV FRXOG JLYH UHDVRQ WR WKH ZLGH SUROLIHUDWLRQ RI µKXPDQ FDSLWDO¶ DV WKH PRVW
significant determinant of managers performance ZLWKLQ WKH µ'\QDPLF 0DQDJHULDO &DSDELOLWLHV¶
framework. With regards to research design, one could argue I needed to include unsuccessful cases of 
turnaround organisations (with top management change) in my sample as well, so clearer distinctions 
could be made over what characteristics and approaches inform successful turnarounds, and those that 
GRQ¶W7KLVSUREOHPDURVHDPRQJVWGLIIHUHQFHV LQ IRU H[DPSOHHJRXWVLGHU VXFFHVVLRQ DV LW OHIW WKH
theory unsupported. 
The primary limitation of my study was that of the three cases; albeit operating in the aerospace and 
GHIHQFH LQGXVWU\ 97 *URXS DQG %RHLQJ¶V GHFOLQHV ZHUH LQ SDUW FDXVHG E\ F\FOLFDO GRZQWXUQV LQ
demand within the sectors which they primarily operated in and thus were highly exposed to. 
Consequently, it would be incorrect for me to observe a number of differences or make inferences 
across these cases when drawing inferences pertaining to the effect/ difference of operating in a growth 
industry has on executive approaches or more generally, the process of turnaround. This limitation is 
extended in that there are few guidelines for conducting cross-case analysis, and hence the quality of 
my inferences and insights could have been affected further because of it.  
Making comparisons toward turnaround models was further difficult in that all provide different 
categorisations of the various approaches and thus,  this inherent complexity explains partly why no 
dominant model for turnaround has emerged. More practically, a common occurrence was although 
unique in definition (operational and strategic turnarounds), the distinction between the two types of 
turnaround strategies is often blurred in practice because changes in one area often necessitates 
changes in the other (Kesner & Dalton, 1994). This is exemplary among +RIHU¶V 
FDWHJRULVDWLRQV RI RSHUDWLQJ GHILQLWLRQV ZKHUHE\ HDFK FDQ WRR EH DSSOLHG WRZDUG %RHLQJ¶V VWUDWHJLF
approaches. 
The final enduring limitation is the use of ROCE as a the measure turnaround. ROCE measures return 
against the book value of assets in the business. As these are depreciated the ROCE will increase even 
though cash flow has remained the same. Thus, older businesses with depreciated assets will tend to 
have higher ROCE than newer, possibly better businesses. However, one can find a number of 
limitations associated with all the other performance measuring indicators and thus, I am happy with 
my selection. 
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6.2 Further Research 
Whilst I am aware of limitations of the study, I too believe my emphasis on growth industry and 
application of the RBV is significant. Significant such that this study provides a basis or platform from 
which it is recommended, that these two concepts be explored in greater depth within turnaround 
contexts. Moreover, by merging turnaround and top management research, I hope this paper stimulates 
IXUWKHU H[DPLQDWLRQ RI WKH UROH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG UHVRXUFHV &(2¶V GHSOR\ WR DFKLHYH UHFRYHU\ 
Further research would naturally apply these paradigms to a wider sample of firms, and or to study 
individual firms more intensively to describe the processes which accompany turnaround more fully. 
This could be achieved through integrating primary research, therein serving to elucidate richer 
descriptions within growth industry contexts. Moreover, research that extends beyond this paper may 
look to include unsuccessful incidences of turnaround as well. 
Correspondingly, there are other limitations to my research can be improved upon to deliver more 
robust and reliable results. Better selection of cases which conform truer tR µJURZWK LQGXVWULHV¶ DUH
necessitated in this instance. This would be done by observing which sectors within the aerospace & 
defence industry the cases primarily serve, and hence are they growing corresponding to the industry 
or offset in sub-sectoral cyclical decline. Departing from emphasis on growth industries and 
integration of the RBV in future research;  I follow the position that too much emphasis has been 
placed upon retrenchment within turnaround discourse. As such, I argue that future research needs to 
move beyond the simplicity of the current focus on retrenchment as the primary and essential first step 
in the turnaround process. Hereby, other models need to be given greater attention and correspondingly, 
need to be defined better in order to preYHQWµEOXUULQJ¶RIVXFKW\SRORJLHV 
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http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4098157 a accessed on 06/08/09 as at 10:25 
http://www.defensenews.com/static/features/top100/charts/rank_2008.php b accessed on 07/08/09 as 
at 10:25 
http://www.domain-b.com/companies/companies_b/Boeing/20080131_boeing.html accessed on 
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BFDUVRQKWPO¶ accessed 
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(www.docstoc.com) represents: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/275274/Boeing-Organizational-theory) 
accessed on 07/08/09 as at 14:30 
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2006) accessed on 10/08/09 as at 17:43 
(www.reuters.com) represents (http://www.reuters.com/article/tnBasicIndustries-
SP/idUSN0132683220070202) accessed on 10/08/09 as at 16:45 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/apr2008/db20080422_664074_page_2.htm) 
accessed on 10/08/09 as at 16:32 
(www.businessweek.coma) represents 
(http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_23/b4087000734432_page_2.htm) accessed on 
10/08/09 as at 11:42 
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(www.chicagomag.com) represents http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/March-2007/Jet-
Setter/) accessed on 10/08/09 as at 11:45 
(www.factiva.com) represents 
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p=1&fcpil=en&napc=S&sa_from=) accessed on 10/08/09 as at 13:15 
 
(http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=SEPI000020050407e1460001t&pp=1&fcpil=en&napc=S&sa_from
=) accessed on 10/08/09 as at 13:20 
(www.factiva.comb) represent: 
http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=LBA0000020060503e253000of&pp=1&fcpil=en&napc=S&sa_from
=) accessed on 10/08/09 as at 13:25 
( www.factiva.comc) 
represents :(http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=AIRCLM0020050708e17800001&pp=1&fcpil=en&napc
=S&sa_from=) accessed on 10/08/09 as at 13: 27 
(www.factiva.comd) represents: 
(http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=DEFD000020050801e1710000x&pp=1&fcpil=en&napc=S&sa_fro
m=) accessed on 10/08/09 as at 13:29 
 (www.factiva.come) represents: 
(http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=FORCST0020090728e57r00030&pp=1&fcpil=en&napc=S&sa_fro
m=) accessed on 10/08/09 as at 13:30 
 (www.factiva.comf) represents: 
(http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=CCHI000020071026e3am00011&pp=1&fcpil=en&napc=S&sa_fro
m=) accessed on 10/08/09 as at13:35 
http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=LBA0000020060716e27g0005y&pp=1&fcpil=en&napc=S&sa_from
=) accessed on 10/08/09 as at 13:40 
(www.factiva.comf) 
represents :http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=FLIGI00020060628e26r00021&pp=1&fcpil=en&napc=S
&sa_from=) accessed on 17/08/09 as at 13:45 
 
(www.economist.comc) represents: 
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=E1_SNTRGGR) accessed on 
17/08/09 as at 14:00 
(www.economist.comd) represents: 
(http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11750444) accessed on 
17/08/09 as at 14:00 
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(http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=E1_JPVGTVJ) accessed on 
17/08/09 as at 14:00 
(www.economist.comg) 
represents :(http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13872823) 
accessed on 17/08/09 as at 14:00 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/jul/09/theairlineindustry.transportintheuk) accessed on 
17/08/09 as at 15:05 
(www.timesonline.como) represents: 
(http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/career_and_jobs/senior_executive/article691726.ece) 
accessed on 17/08/09 as at 15:09 
(www.timesonline.co.ukn) represents 
(http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/engineering/article630794.ece) 
accessed on 17/08/09 as at 15:10 
(www.ft.comx) represents: (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/216e3046-8fac-11da-b430-0000779e2340.html) 
accessed on 17/08/09 as at 16:00 
  (www.ft.comy) represents http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d7a3c48-d977-11da-8b06-
0000779e2340.html) accessed on 17/08/09 as at 16:10 
 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/32c1192c-0664-11dd-802c-0000779fd2ac.html) accessed on 17/08/09 as 
at 16:13 
(www.dailyfinance.com) represents :(http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/08/21/could-fords-mulally-
fix-boeings-787-woes/) accessed on 17/08/09 as at 17:40 
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2005/07/05/200164/mcnerney-takes-helm-at-boeing.html 
accessed on 17/08/09 as at 17:45 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=aviationdaily&id=news/sonc122
32.xml accessed on 17/08/09 as at 17: 54 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2003245507_boeingheads06.html) accessed 
on 17/08/09 as at 17:55 
(www.boeing.com1) represents: 
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/financial/finreports/annual/03annualreport/boeing_03ar.pdf 
accessed on 17/08/09 as at 18:00 
(www.boeing.com2) representsAnnual Report 2004 accessed on 17/08/09 as at 
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/financial/finreports/annual/04annualreport/BOEING_04AR.p
df accessed on 17/08/09 as at 18:00 
Annual Report 2005 (www.boeing.com3) represents 
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/financial/finreports/annual/05annualreport/05AR_links.pdf 
accessed on 17/08/09 as at 18:00 
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Annual Report 2006 (www.boeing.com4) represents 
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/financial/finreports/annual/06annualreport/assets/Boeing_06
AR_00.pdf accessed on 20/08/09 as at 18:00 
 
BAE Web Addresses 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/12195p1.xml  
accessed on 03/08/09 as at 09:00 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3126/is_1998_April/ai_n28714163/ accessed on 03/08/09 as 
at09:00 
http://www.baesystems.com/AboutUs/CompanyStructure/Leadership/MikeTurner/index.htm accessed 
on 03/08/09 as at 09:10 
 (www.corporatewatch.org.uk) represents (http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/?lid=182) accessed on 
03/08/09 as at 09:10 
  (www.timesonline.co.ukj) represents: 
(http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/engineering/article2669340.ece) 
accessed on 03/08/09 as at 09:10 
 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2004/jul/04/observerbusiness.baesystemsbusiness) accessed on 
03/08/09 as at 09:15 
(www.independent.co.uk) represents: (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/jeremy-
warners-outlook-baes-mike-turner-is-doing-the-right-thing-in-baling-out-of-airbus-even-at-a-cutprice-
rate-414832.html) accessed on 03/08/09 as at 09:30 
http://www.baesystems.com/AboutUs/CompanyStructure/Leadership/MikeTurner/index.htm) accessed 
on 03/08/09 as at 10:00 
(www.findarticles.com) represents: 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3126/is_1998_April/ai_n28714163/) accessed on 03/08/09 as at 
10:00 
 (http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/markets/article.html?in_article_id=450960&in_page_id=3) accessed 
on 03/08/09 as at 10:15 
 
(http://www.themanufacturer.com/uk/content/4207/BAE_Systems_performs_better_than_expected?P
HPSESSID=9fef1477bd8333cfa2c2ddef5f7fa1ee) (www.themanufacturer,com) accessed on 03/08/09 
as at 13:45 
www.ft.coml) represents: (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/204c8f9c-8642-11d9-8075-00000e2511c8.html) 
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